ARMY

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UNITED STATES ARMY READY FORCE

IN THIS ISSUE: **Congress' day of decision ▸ Military and scientific significance of nuclear explosions in space ▸ A European view of the readiness of Seventh Army today ▸ MacArthur's bold triumph at Inchon ▸ Two remarkable reviews of two excellent books: *Armor Command* and *The Marauders*** (see The Month's Books)

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

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

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VOL. 9 No. 10 MAY 1959

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROJECT ARGUS
Nike-Zeus Radars can "See Through" Nuclear Explosions in Space 22

The Scientific Implications
Henry T. Simmons 23

THE SWORD AND BUCKLER OF FREEDOM. Two European journalists review Seventh Army's Performance in Exercise Free Play
Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein and Dr. Volkmar von Zuehlsdorff 27

THE BETHANY INVASION. A Close Look at What Has Happened to the Army Reserve in the Last Ten Years
Major Frederic S. Otis 33

THE STRATEGY OF CONTROLLED WARFARE—SOVIET STYLE. How the Kremlin Subordinates Military Operations to Long-Range Political Objectives
Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty 37

TRAINING IS BASIC. Some Light on Our Basic Training Problem, from the Viewpoint of the Company Officer
Major Harlan G. Koch 45

THE INCHON LANDING. Was it a Perilous Gamble or an Instance of Exemplary Boldness?
Lt. Col. James F. Schnabel 50

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail	4	The Month's Cerebrations	60
Front and Center	10	Irons in the Fire	68
1959 Reunions	49	The Month's Books	72
AUSA CP	77		

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

Overworked Commanders

● I take issue with the statement in your February issue in "Pentomic Evolution" (Front and Center), dealing with the increase from four to five rifle companies in the new battle group and the decrease from four to three rifle platoons in each company. Your statement says, "While this adds another company headquarters to the battle group, it will ease the burden of overworked company commanders and should improve control on the battlefield." I believe that statement is both misleading and incorrect.

First, four rifle platoons are not a burden, and the company commander is not overworked. With four platoons he has a flexibility, particularly with attachments, to accomplish his mission whether attacking or defending. This flexibility far exceeds that of a company commander who has only three platoons. Taking away the fourth platoon does not ease, but adds to his burden, because then he has less with which to accomplish his mission.

Although we can assume that with the smaller companies the mission given a rifle company will be somewhat curtailed, I am not sure this will necessarily always be the case. At least it has not always been so in Seventh Army. As for the company commander being overworked, it just ain't so. He works hard at a trying job, but from personal experience, observation and conversation with many other rifle company commanders, I can say that without exception every one is enthusiastically in favor of four rifle platoons over three. None has felt overworked in controlling them in the field.

The second part of your statement, "should improve control on the battlefield," is contradictory. In effect, you say it helps the company commander when we take away one of his units and yet it helps the battle group commander by adding one to his control. Normally a battle group will fight with tanks, artillery, APCs, engineers and air support. Adding another unit may have advantages, but certainly not in improving control. On the contrary, control and support are made more difficult.

It has been my experience that frequently the battle group hasn't enough rifle platoons during field operations to perform its mission as well as it should. This is particularly true in defense. During real combat, shortages in men will always be felt first in the rifle platoons, the most important and critical element of the battle group. Yet the new battle group contains one less rifle platoon than it had under the old setup, and an additional rifle company headquarters. There is no noticeable increase in flexibility for the battle group commander.

I feel that the answer is to adopt the airborne organization of five rifle companies each of four rifle platoons, with a deputy commander where we don't have one in the present battle group. This gives both the company commander and the battle group CO the muscle and the flexibility to do any job better than they can under the proposed system. The rifle company with four rifle platoons has worked well during training, and will work in combat. What the Army has given, it has taken away. Give back his fourth platoon to the rifle company commander.

CAPT. JOSEPH R. FRANKLIN
APO 34, New York City

For 23d Infantry Veterans

● The 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry, is searching for pictures, trophies, items of historical interest, and war souvenirs for display in its museum. Former members of the regiment or anyone who wishes to donate to the museum are requested to write the Historian, 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry, Fort Benning, Georgia. Each contribution will be appropriately inscribed with the donor's name.

CAPT. DAVID L. ROOKS
Fort Benning, Ga.

Our Own Potemkim Village

● AUSA has done a much-needed job in pointing out certain dangers in the current status of the Army. Perhaps it can do something about a practice that is contributing to that danger.

Our public relations workers seem to have developed a great love of that fine old Russian flim-flam known as "Potemkin Village."

To refresh your memory, Grigori Alexandrovitch Potemkin was a politician and favorite of Catherine the Great. Once his imperial mistress desired to make an inspection trip to see how things were going among her people. They were going rather badly, and when Potemkin found he couldn't talk her out of the inspection, he had to think fast to convince her that all was hunky-dorski.

His solution had a certain perverse brilliance: the Potemkin Village—a setup amounting to a travelling stage troupe, complete with costumes, props and scenery. When Catherine inspected, she was conducted through a series of attractive, prosperous-looking villages, peopled by plump, well-dressed, happy peasants.

The only catch was that she was allowed to see only Potemkin's troupers, who had been leapfrogged ahead of the Imperial entourage. The trip succeeded in its purpose: a small but intentional sham served to delude the Empress and kept her from knowing the real state of affairs.

How does this tie in with today's problems? How many of us have seen technically excellent and exciting press photographs of new equipment? Most of us have, for the Army seems to get excellent coverage on such photos in all sorts of news media. But how many people outside the Army know that in all too many instances, these photos represent merely the prototypes of the equipment? That in all too many instances these are pictures of the one and only piece of equipment in existence?

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Such pictures don't fool our soldiers, and they don't fool our enemies. But they do flim-flam the general public. And to the extent that they so fool the public, they are the American equivalent of the Potemkin Village.

In the March issue of ARMY there is this statement: "This lack of understanding of the Army's need for improved weapons and machines that don't make exciting subjects for a newsreel makes it difficult for the Army to establish a public awareness of its need."

It's quite possible that the freehanded use of the Potemkin Village device has had a part in bringing about our trouble. I'll cite an example. A national weekly magazine had an excellent article on our current national military posture. Much of what it recommended agrees with AUSA's objectives. But our boys have been at it again. This article included a dynamic photo of an infantry rifle squad deploying out of its helicopter and charging forward ferociously at the foe. The squad leader brandishes his M1 at the van of his unit in the best Follow Me tradition.

How many of that magazine's readers can figure out for themselves that the men are carrying obsolescent weapons, and that the number of helicopters available for such work it pitiable?

The public sees a never-ending flow of such pictures. Is it any wonder that our people get the impression that all is well? That they look at appeals for more funds for more up-to-date equipment as mere attempts to satisfy military ego and push up our taxes?

The public has seen countless pictures of troops with new, shiny equipment practicing new and dynamic methods of combat. With all these impressive photos as "evidence," it assumes that naturally all this equipment must be in full production, and in the hands of troops on a full TOE basis.

Perhaps our cause would be better served by showing conditions as they really exist. The public may not be overjoyed to learn that Castro's followers have more U. S. Army small arms than many of our own Reserve divisions. It might help to point up that not all is as it is made to appear.

A paper tiger is not too dreadful a beast to other tigers. All it can fool is the public. It's better to show a half-starved real tiger than a fat, sleek, paper one. It may not be as pleasant to contemplate, but it would not perpetrate a fraud on our people.

Let the words of old Diogenes Laertius guide us: "If appearances are deceitful, then they do not deserve any confidence when they assert what appears to them to be true." Let's stop using photographic Potemkin Villages.

CAPT. DONALD G. ROSS
Auburndale, Mass.

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The Jeep's Name

• With regard to Mr. Marden Bishop's letter in the March issue, regarding the Willys trademark on the name "Jeep": I do not dispute the fact that many quarter-ton military vehicles include the name "Jeep" cut into the engine. I am not sure that all were manufactured by Willys. Ford manufactured many of these vehicles during World War II. Neither company's products were officially called "Jeep." In fact, the word was first used in the Army in 1940, and was applied to the vehicle officially designated "Car, Command and Reconnaissance, ¾-ton, 4-wheel drive."

As commander of Company B, 51st Signal Battalion, I conducted a service test in 1941 on one of the preliminary models of the quarter-ton vehicle. At that time it was called a Peep. Since then, the name Jeep has been absorbed into many European languages as a generic term for

for exacting engineers . . .

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COL. W. W. STURDY
Fort Monmouth, N. J.

Authority Where Needed

● I congratulate Captain Bashore on his timely article, "The Ties That Bind" [February]. It reflects a particularly good insight into the heart of the prestige problem existing among companies. It further reflects the thoughts of many senior noncommissioned officers in the matter of restoring authority where it is most needed.

I hope that high commanders who read this article were as favorably impressed as I. It could do a great deal toward giving company-sized units back to their commanders, their junior officers and noncommissioned officers, and in so doing assist in providing vitally needed career incentives.

MAJ. LAWRENCE M. VROOM
Eielson AFB, Alaska

Kitchener Review

● I thank you for sending me that review of *Kitchener*. I think it's splendid and I am filled with admiration for Colonel DeWeerd's accomplishment. The thing I like about it is that it's a long review—and this book is important enough to merit lengthy attention. But more than that, the Colonel has made every sentence count—every sentence, every phrase holds the reader's interest and adds to his knowledge of the contents of the book. I wish he could review all our books!

Kitchener is one of my favorite books and it looks as if we are going to have a reprint . . . so I couldn't be happier about this development. It has also been made the June Selection of the History Book Club, which will mean that a few more people will become word-of-mouth advertisers for it as soon as they begin to read it.

Again thank you for the advance copy of the review!

ELLIOTT GRAHAM
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Benefits of Guard Service

● When I read Sergeant Jack W. Aclin's letter [March] comparing his active Army experiences to his ten years of National Guard service, I had just finished an article on the development of Army National Guard aviation. It is a mystery to me how Sergeant Aclin could have spent ten years in the Guard and managed to remain unaware that the Army Guard now flies nearly 800 first-rate Army aircraft about 145,000 hours a year, and that these aircraft are being maintained by what the Army acknowledges to be the "best trained, most readily available pool of aircraft maintenance personnel anywhere within the Army today."

With many other Guardsmen, I am happy to note that the Army considered Sergeant Aclin's ten years of National Guard service good enough to enlist him directly into one of the first three grades and to assign him directly to a forward combat unit without, apparently, a single day's training beyond what the Guard had given him. It seems to me, however, that the tone of Sergeant Aclin's letter is somewhat reminiscent of the son of an immigrant family who, having been advanced in education and status through the work and sacrifices of his parents, decides in maturity that he is entitled to look down his nose at them.

CAPT. WILLIAM V. KENNEDY
Camp Hill, Pa.

Army Bands

● I note that Captain Glasgow, who wrote "Give the Battle Group a Showcase," is the author of a book, *Exhibition Drills*. Can you tell me how I can obtain a copy? I want to form a drill team within my unit.

Keep up the good work. ARMY is tops.

CAPT. EDWIN S. WINCH
Prairie Village, Kans.

● *Captain Glasgow's* Exhibition Drills *was published by the Military Service Publishing Company (now The Stackpole Company), in 1958, at $2.50. (See the review in* ARMY, *September, 1958.)*

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PRIORITIES ON CONGRESS' DAY OF DECISION

THE day of decision on the Fiscal Year 1960 budget is rapidly approaching and the Congress, which throughout the session has exhibited a healthy skepticism towards the sufficiencies of the Army portion of the Defense Department budget, is going to have to come to grips with some very vital problems.

The problems are tough. The decisions of the Congress will affect world strategy and diplomacy, military security, and the economic posture of the United States. In considering the grave issues raised by the Defense budget the Congress has needed and has sought the best possible advice and counsel, ranging from the Pentagon Secretariat and the military chiefs to field commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and to civilian experts and scientists.

The published unclassified testimony of witnesses appearing before the Armed Services committees and the military subcommittees of the Appropriations committees of both houses of Congress, plus the hearings of the new Space committee, is, as is usual, appallingly massive. There is something of almost everything in these records: words of wisdom and balderdash, trenchant analysis and rambling nonsequiturs. Those members of the committees who listened attentively, questioned wisely, and performed their homework are now close to being experts in their own rights. But even the most knowledgeable man in Congress may be torn by indecision when he compares what he is told by Administration spokesmen with what he is told by field commanders.

Consider the dilemma of the most thoughtful and fair-minded legislator when he compares the President's press conference statement that he wouldn't know what to do with an additional 30,000 or 55,000 soldiers if Congress voted them to him, with the testimony of Generals Norstad and Hodes that the NATO shield is understrength and needs more soldiers, and with the testimony that Koreans are serving in the depleted ranks of U. S. divisions in Korea.

The thoughtful member of Congress may reflect on the one hand that the President has a record and a reputation as a professional commander that is second to no other living soldier. On the other hand he may recall that one of the principles that brought success to American arms in World War II was recognition of the fact that the field commander on the spot had a better understanding of his problems and requirements than did Washington. Adherence to this principle by Washington contributed to the successes of the SHAEF commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The Congressman may also remember that the man who really convinced Congress in 1951 of the wisdom of participating in the defense of Europe was not a spokesman of the White House or Defense or State Departments, but a soldier—again Dwight D. Eisenhower—who, like Joshua's emissaries, had gone to spy out the land and returned from Europe to report to Congress that U. S. participation in the collective defense of Europe was feasible and in the best interests of the nation.

VIP treatment, including the privilege of firing an antitank gun, was accorded to King Hussein of Jordan during a two day visit to Fort Benning, Ga. The 23-year old ruler is shown here taking careful aim following a demonstration by the Army's Infantry School.

BUT the inadequacies of Army strength, as seen through the eyes of the commanders in the field, are only one of the many problems plaguing the Congress as it considers the Army portion of the Defense budget. Nor can the Congress be parochial and view the Army portion through blinders that shut out the rest of the Defense budget. The Congress must consider the whole and in doing so it must of necessity make grave decisions that will strengthen or weaken the security of the nation, not during the fiscal year ahead but perhaps for years to come.

The Congress must consider the nuclear deterrent and "how much is enough." It must analyze the meaning of the missile gap." It must make judgments about the military capabilities of Moscow and Peiping and the most likely manner in which those capabilities may be exercised.

But when all of this is done and Congress comes back to the Army budget, convinced of the need for increasing it in order to give the nation a more balanced military posture, what is it to do? It will desire to give the Army a capability that will truly deter the Communists from engaging in military aggression of any kind. It will want to beef up the nation's "conventional" capability against the likelihood of all forms of war other than "self-defeating" nuclear exchange, which is the way the President has characterized it. Self-

defeating, obviously, for both opposing camps.

As Congress considers the needs of the Army it will inevitably begin to establish priorities. What Army program should it strengthen with additional funds and what programs may be delayed? The Army needs more active Army strength and a strong and active reserve program for both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. But the Army, as the Congress is aware, also needs more modern weapons. Congress knows of the Army's need for new rifles, machine guns, artillery, tactical surface-to-surface missiles, aircraft, tanks, trucks, radios and radars and bridging equipment. It is also aware that the defense of the nation against aerial attack cannot be disregarded and that the development of an antimissile missile is an element in the missile gap that must be closed as fast as is humanly possible.

All of these things are desirable; indeed they are necessities if the U. S. Army is to be the first class fighting force every American citizen wants it to be. But there are also fiscal limits that Congress respects. Consequently priorities.

Congress should give high priority to the modernization of the field Army. That is, funds for tactical missiles, conventional arms, tanks, light aircraft, communications equipment, and so on. As Congress has been told by the Chief of Staff the funds given the Army in recent years for weapons and equipment of this kind have been insufficient to halt the rate of obsolescence. True, funds have been made available by the Administration for piddling numbers of new rifles, machine guns and tanks and for tactical missiles but not enough to keep the Army up to date.

As the time comes for the Congress to make its final decisions on the 1960 budget, the priorities it establishes will determine the kind of military security this nation will have. We hope and believe that Congress on analysis and reflection will place high on its list of priorities in the defense budget these three Army programs:

- a modernization program that will exceed the rate of obsolescence of Army weapons and equipment;
- a floor of at least 900,000 on active Army strength, 400,000 on the Army National Guard and 300,000 on the Army Reserve;
- the fullest possible support of the Nike Zeus antimissile missile.

If on its coming day of decision the Congress does all of these things it will have shown that it is awake to its responsibilities and that its decisions on the programs it will support are realistic and every bit as important as the money it votes.

AUSA ASKS CONGRESS TO PLACE "FLOOR" OF 900,000 ON ARMY STRENGTH DURING NEXT TWO YEARS

The following is the text of an AUSA press release issued on 20 March, following the quarterly meeting of the Executive Council

THE Council of Trustees of the Association of the U. S. Army today called on Congress to enact legislation placing a floor of not less than 900,000 on the strength of the active Army during the next two fiscal years.

Major General A. J. Drexel Biddle, President of the Association, stated that it was the considered opinion of the Council that the prospects of peaceful settlement of the Berlin situation and other points of friction with the Soviet Union would be enhanced "if the world was put on notice that the United States did not intend further to reduce its capability to deter non-nuclear aggression by Communist forces anywhere."

Pointing out that the strength of the active Army has been reduced by more than 600,000 in the past six years, General Biddle said the Association believes Congress should say in effect "this far and no farther" by placing a floor of 900,000 on Army strength.

Present Army strength is below 900,000 and is expected to be 870,000 on 30 June, the end of the present fiscal year. The Administration's budget for the next fiscal year calls for maintenance of the Army at the 870,000 figure.

"Such legislation as we have called for will not only hearten our allies and serve to inform the Communists that we are determined to resist all types of aggression; it will also bring stability to the Army and make it possible for it to perform with greater efficiency and much more economy," General Biddle said.

Constant changes in Army strength are most wasteful of taxpayers' money, he said. "The opening and closing of Army posts, the constant changes in programs involved in rotating troops overseas and back, and fluctuating calls on draft boards for manpower—all make for inefficiency and waste. If the Army could be assured that its strength would not go below 900,000 during the next two years it could make commitments and plans that would be in the public interest and serve the national security."

GENERAL Biddle noted that the Army's Chief of Staff had testified before Congressional committees that he was gravely concerned about the reduction of active Army strength and had proposed a strength of 925,000 to the Administration during the preparation of the 1960 budget.

"The seriousness of the reduction is made manifest by the elimination of one division from the Army's four-division Strategic Army Corps, a force which is as vital to the deterrence of limited Communist aggression as the Strategic Air Command is to the deterrence of nuclear war," General Biddle said.

At its last annual meeting the Association of the U. S. Army adopted a resolution calling for an active Army strength of one million officers and men. "We still believe that one million is a desirable and necessary strength," General Biddle said today. "The action of the Council of Trustees in asking Congress to enact legislation placing a floor of 900,000 on active Army strength is designed to stop the continual downward trend in Army strength. We'll continue to advocate and work for the million-man figure," he said.

General Biddle said that "floors" on military strength were not unprecedented. Congress, he said, had by legislation placed a floor on the strength of the Marine Corps, and only last year placed a floor on the strength of the National Guard and Army Reserve.

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TIME FOR REAPPRAISAL: THE JOINT CHIEFS AND THE BUDGET PROCESS

THE way military budgets are prepared and the news that the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body do not formally pass on such projects as the number of Army divisions, heavy bomber wings, or supercarriers created quite a stir when the testimony of General Maxwell D. Taylor before the military Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee was published.

In the following paragraphs excerpts from General Taylor's testimony have been condensed from the record.

On the need for a reappraisal of the pattern of the military budget: "In the course of my presentation . . . I have indicated or may indicate less than satisfactory progress in certain Army programs. I did not do so and will not do so in an effort to increase the defense budget, the overall adequacy of which I support. But as to the internal composition of the defense budget, I find programs being funded in a manner which to me appears sometimes excessive to military requirements.

"Similarly, I have reservations about the adequacy of the funding of other programs. Among the latter I would list the Army programs for modernization, for the antimissile missile, for personnel—both active and reserve—and for antibomber and antiair-to-surface missile defense.

"I am of the opinion that the time has come to reappraise our service programs in the light of changed world conditions, and to recognize there are changed strategic requirements that call for corresponding changes in the pattern of the military budget."

On overemphasis on certain programs: "I consider that we have an excess number of strategic weapons and weapons systems in the atomic retaliatory force. . . . I refer to the aggregate of bombers of the Air Force, of the Navy, and of our oversea commands and our allies; of the ICBMs and the IRBMs that are coming along in the hands of the Air Force. I see in the future the Polaris system, a very promising system, coming forward. When I add together all those vehicles capable of delivering the atomic retaliatory attack, in my judgment the aggregate is excessive to our requirements."

On atomic retaliatory weapons. "The atomic retaliatory forces contain contributions of the Air Force and the Navy. It is very seldom we put together what the two services have and look at the aggregate. . . . I would say that it is possible to establish the fact that 'x' targets successfully attacked with 'y' megatons is equivalent to the destruction of the enemy. . . . Having determined the bombs required on target you can calculate all the possible losses due to enemy action, aborts, ineffectiveness of the weapons, and so forth, and determine how many delivery vehicles are required. When such a computation is made, you end up . . . not with thousands, but with hundreds of vehicles as a requirement. We presently have thousands."

On fighter interceptor aircraft. "We have been slow in cutting back on fighter interceptor aircraft. We are depending, or have been depending too long, on manned aircraft as a general thing. I am not saying that there is no utility in them at this time, but . . . I would say that we are getting out of the business of manned aircraft too slowly."

On air defense. "I think in continental air defense that the concept of area defense in great depth, calling for long-range interceptor type missiles, has not been proved feasible . . . either technically or economically. It may turn out differently . . . but I am not convinced now. . . . The Bomarc-Sage-interceptor type of defense over large areas . . . runs up a startling bill."

On additional B-52s: The JCS "never passed on that."

On an additional supercarrier: The carrier "was never justified before the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

On the 870,000-man Army: "The Joint Chiefs never specifically approved or disapproved."

On the lack of standards of sufficiency. "I think that our weakness is in not determining standards of suffi-

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ciency—how much is enough for the atomic retaliatory force, for air defense, for limited warfare forces, for strategic airlift and sealift, for reserve-type forces—all of those categories to which several services contribute. We never look at the problem horizontally and determine whether each function is properly supported by the appropriate forces of all contributing services."

* * *

"The basic question in all cases is to decide how much is enough. What are we shooting for? What is the level which is our objective? Having once determined that, it becomes pretty much a technical, semimechanical procedure for the military experts to translate objectives into divisions, planes, aircraft carriers, submarines, and the like."

On JCS participation in the budget-making process. The Joint Chiefs "are not in the budget-making process. They participate . . . only to the extent that the Secretary of Defense wants them to take part. To illustrate, after the current defense budget had been developed and had been essentially approved by the Secretary of Defense, it was then given to the Joint Chiefs for consideration. This happened on a Thursday evening, and the paper was to be presented to the National Se-

STRATEGY BY BUDGET

ERIC SEVAREID

(From a broadcast over CBS Radio)

THE United States Army has another able advocate in its new Chief of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, but it now loses the services of the best intellect on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the retirement of General Maxwell D. Taylor. Like General Matthew Ridgway before him, Taylor is cut from rare and exceptional cloth. But the color of that cloth is olive drab, and in recent years no spokesman, however brilliant, wearing Army colors has been able to save the Army from its status as the underprivileged child in the military family. Army strength has been steadily cut away; even today, in the face of possible crisis over Germany, General Norstad's urgent pleas for several thousand more men for his American NATO forces—not additional men, just replacements for those taken away—even these pleas are falling on deaf official ears.

But we may soon be hearing much more, in rather indignant tones, about what has been happening to the Army. Two or three senators of considerable power in this field, including at least one who has always been a champion of the Air Force, are now in a rebellious mood in the Army's behalf. They are tired of forwarding General Taylor's requests to the Pentagon and then receiving word that the Joint Chiefs of Staff disapprove. That reply has an irrefutable, corporate sound about it, but the Joint Chiefs, of course, are simply the individual heads of each service, plus the chairman—himself an Air Force officer. The pattern of Air Force, Navy, and Marines salvaging their budgets at the expense of the Army is now all too familiar to senators.

THE U. S. Army no longer marches on its stomach—or even its feet. Its men must be flown to trouble spots. But the Air Force controls the troop-carrier planes and the cargo planes. Very few of them exist, since the Air Force does not care to spend very much building new ones, and in this respect the Army is virtually helpless. In terms of a past era, this situation would be comparable to keeping the Navy in charge of the Army's boots. One now hears allegations from responsible congressmen that the Air Force and the Navy really want to turn the Army into a kind of Home Guard, manning such installations as the Nike battalions—which will very soon, of course, be useless as Russian missiles replace Russian bombers.

The latest psychological blow dealt the Army was the President's statement that we would not fight a ground war in Europe. This is the official doctrine, but even in Europe a limited war is not inconceivable. It is just beginning to dawn on many people, in fact, that in a few years conventional wars will be the only kind of war that we or the Russians will be likely to fight—even against each other. Within a few years each country will have a system of nuclear-warhead missiles that cannot possibly be put out of action even by a surprise attack; both sides would be utterly destroyed in such a war, and for certain. Which is why such a war is extremely unlikely; each country's missile establishment will become a necessary but very white, white elephant.

Between now and that coming period, the very smallness of our conventional forces makes a nuclear war more likely—because our existing equipment will determine our strategy, not the other way around. In other words, our present budgets will determine whether a limited war stays limited or becomes an atomic war. The President put it very bluntly a few weeks ago. Asked if our present ground forces are capable of handling any brushfire situations that might break out, he replied as follows: "If we can't, then the war's gotten beyond a brush war and . . . you have got to think in much, much bigger terms."

SO there you have it. Whether a clash remains a small clash will not depend on the nature of the issue involved, or the nations involved, or the intrinsic aims of such a fight; it will, on the President's testimony, depend on the size of the ground forces the U. S. happens to possess at the time. If those forces are too small, then we must think about using nuclear weapons—the one thing that humanity must avoid at almost any cost.

In our first year of the Second World War, when our arsenal was small, General Marshall used to complain that our production was determining our strategy; we seem to be in that condition again.

curity Council on the following Saturday. So, in a very short period of time we were asked our opinions with regard to the budget."

CONGRESSIONAL reaction to these revelations was perhaps best epitomized by the Subcommittee's Chairman, Rep. George H. Mahon (Dem. Tex.) in a statement that also appears in the record: "They [the JCS] are not helping Congress and they are not helping the Secretary of Defense, and the American people are out on a limb insofar as knowing what to do and to think about these problems. . . . I have the feeling, which has been confirmed by [Gen. Taylor's] testimony here this morning, that the Joint Chiefs have not faced up to this situation. They have not kept their feet to the fire until they came to a decision as to the standards of sufficiency which should govern the size and composition of our defenses."

And from the press came this observation by Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, USA, retired, of *The St. Louis Post Dispatch:* "The changes General Taylor recommended can be made within the Defense Department. If they are not, the Congress is apt to make them by law."

THE ARMY'S MONTH

The number of men without prior service who may be enlisted in the six-month active duty National Guard program has been increased to 11,000 for the next three months, with a total of 8,100 who can be accommodated in the three months ending 30 June.

* * *

The Army plans to purchase 180 diesel-powered tanks—the M-60—designed to replace the present medium M-48 and the heavy M-103. The M-60 of 52 tons has a new British-made 105mm gun, said to be capable of defeating all armored vehicles known to exist. It will be served by a crew of four. Its Continental 750-horsepower diesel engine provides a speed of 32 mph and a range of 250 miles. Both are expected to be increased when the 52-ton weight is reduced to 51 with future improvements. Besides the increased hitting power and range, the M-60 has less fire hazard because fuel is less volatile. This simplifies supply problems and lower volatility retards waste of vaporization.

* * *

Major Army commanders throughout the U. S. have been given authority to award 800 promotions to the new E-9 grade during April, May and June. This marks the initiation of the new program.

Time required in grade E-8 has been established at four months for this first allocation only and the requirement will be increased for subsequent quotas.

Other prerequisites for Grade E-9 promotion include: being in an appointable status; having the recommendation of the immediate commanding officer; completion of 18 years active Federal service, of which at least 10 must be enlisted service creditable in the computation of basic pay; and occupy a position which may reasonably be expected to be upgraded to E-9.

There is a below-the-zone provision, as in the case of E-8, for promotion of exceptionally outstanding soldiers to the E-9 grade. Commanders are authorized to appoint, not exceeding 20 percent of their quotas, individuals who have completed at least 10 years active Federal service and who have 10 years of cumulative enlisted service.

Second Lieutenant Robert H. Iwai (right), University of Hawaii graduate, is shown receiving the second annual Dr. Ralph Mershon Memorial Award from Secretary Brucker at a recent Pentagon ceremony. John A. Burns (center), Hawaii delegate to the U. S. Congress, witnesses the presentation, which is decided on the basis of the highest composite score from evaluation reports on military science and tactics among ROTC Distinguished Military graduates. The award, which consists of a $250 check and a certificate from the Secretary of the Army, was established by the late Col. Ralph Davenport Mershon for furtherance of civilian-military education.

General Officer Shifts

Maj. Gen. DWIGHT E. BEACH to 82d Airborne Division . . . Maj. Gen. RAYMOND E. BELL to MAAG, Brazil . . . Maj. Gen. GEORGE E. BUSH to VI Corps . . . Maj. Gen. EDWIN H. J. CARNS to X Corps . . . Maj. Gen. HAMILTON H. HOWZE to USAAG, Korea . . . Maj. Gen. CHARLES R. HUTCHISON to USARPAC . . . Maj. Gen. GEORGE O. N. LODOEN to ODCSLOG . . . Maj. Gen. NELSON M. LYNDE, JR. to OCOFORD . . . Maj. Gen. JOHN H. MICHAELIS to USARAL . . . Maj. Gen. MARTIN J. MORIN to JUSMAT, Turkey . . . Maj. Gen. GILMAN C. MUDGETT to Sixth Army . . . Maj. Gen. THEODORE S. RIGGS to USARPAC . . . Maj. Gen. WILLIAM J. VERBECK to Army Council of Review Boards . . . Brig. Gen. FREDERICK D. ATKINSON to Transportation School . . . Brig. Gen. THEODORE F. BOGART to AAA & Tank TC . . . Brig. Gen. THAD A. BROOM to Army Subsistence Center . . . Brig. Gen. FORREST CARAWAY to MAAG, Japan . . . Brig. Gen. JAMES H. CASH, II, to USATC (Eng) . . . Brig. Gen. CHARLES H. CHASE to MAAG, Cambodia . . . Brig. Gen. EDGAR C. DOLEMAN to USARPAC . . . Brig. Gen. PHILIP H. DRAPER, JR. to USARADCOM . . . Brig. Gen. THOMAS B. EVANS to Hawaii . . . Brig. Gen. EDWIN S. HARTSHORN, JR. to A&M School . . . Brig. Gen. DAVID W. HEIMAN to USARPAC . . . Brig. Gen. WALTER A. HUNTSBERRY to USAAG, Korea . . . Brig. Gen. GERALD C. KELLEHER to AFSE, Italy . . . Brig. Gen. PHILIP F. KROMER, JR. to Engineer Maintenance Center . . . Brig. Gen. ARCHIBALD W. LYON to USAREUR . . . Brig. Gen. GEORGE R. MATHER to Eighth Army . . . Brig. Gen. PETER SCHMICK to USAREUR . . . Brig. Gen. BENJAMIN F. TAYLOR to USAREUR . . . Brig. Gen. JOHN H. WEBER to Tank-Automotive Center . . . Brig. Gen. PHILIP C. WEHLE to MAAG, France . . . Brig. Gen. GEORGE W. WHITE to USAREUR.

Retirements. Maj. Gen. LOUIS E. COTULLA . . . Brig. Gen. NATHANIEL B. RIEGER . . . Brig. Gen. JAMES K. WILSON, JR.


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The Implications

NIKE ZEUS RADARS CAN "SEE" THROUGH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN SPACE

The information in this article was obtained by this magazine from governmental sources.

QUESTIONS have been raised as to the implications of the Argus effects on Nike Zeus radars. Although much of the information regarding the Nike Zeus system is classified, it is possible to clarify, in some respects, the erroneous implication that the Nike Zeus system can be made ineffective by Argus-type nuclear explosions.

Experiments have been conducted in which radars have had their beams directed toward aurora and the returns measured. It has been found experimentally that the radar noises from aurora or reflections therefrom mainly occur when the radar beam is directed perpendicular to the direction of the earth's magnetic field. It has also been found, experimentally, that variations of 20 degrees of the beam from a line perpendicular to the earth's magnetic field will show no essential return. It was pointed out as early as 1953 by Harang and Landmark in *Nature* magazine that "even the most brilliant auroral forms appearing at distances from 80 kilometers in zenith and up to 400-500 kilometers (low in North) do not give the slightest traces of echoes appearing when the antennae are directed against the auroral forms. But at the same time echoes are observed with great ranges of 600-1800 kilometers when the antennae are directed horizontally against North. It has been assumed that reflections from an aurora mainly occur when the waves are incident normally (perpendicular) on the direction of the earth's magnetic field."

As part of its acquisition radar transmitters, Nike Zeus operates one of the most powerful radar beams ever devised by man. These beams are capable of detecting very small enemy ICBM nose cones at ranges of hundreds of miles in space. The reflected energy of the transmitters' beams from the nose cones is picked up by a very sensitive omnidirectional receiver and is capable of tracking these nose cones through auroral displays.

The reason that the Nike Zeus is capable of tracking through auroral displays is that its beam is not attenuated or degraded by the aurora's ionized clouds. This was shown in recent experiments in which radar beams were transmitted from stations in Alaska through auroral displays in the northern arctic to the moon. The signals bounced off the moon and were received at stations in Canada and the U. S. The Nike Zeus receiver is capable of wiping out or, in electronic terms, "gating" out the aurora type noises and following its target. Further, to see noises from auroral zones, the radar antennae would have to have their beams perpendicular to the earth's magnetic field's line of force. If off more than 20 degrees essentially no noise will be seen. This makes receipt of noise limited to a smaller region of space. In addition, the number of electrons in the auroral display determines the reflective properties of the ionized cloud. Therefore, the number of electrons present in a specified volume of the cloud gives the measure of the radio and radar frequencies that will be reflected by the ionized cloud of the aurora.

THE Nike Zeus system has several radars. All of these radars operate on different frequencies. The Nike Zeus battery radars operate on higher frequencies than do the acquisition type radars. It is known from experiment that auroral manifestations have different effects on different frequencies of radio and radar communications. Work now going on at the Air Force's Rome Air Development Center, MIT's Lincoln Laboratories, Stanford Research Institute and the Bell Telephone Laboratories supports this general conclusion. This phenomenon is not completely understood by scientists, although it is known that the greatest interruptive effects occur on radio communications links which are in the high frequency (HF-3000-30,000 KC) and very high frequency (VHF-30,000 KC-300 MC).

In response to questions during his 19 March press con-

# of Project Argus

THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

HENRY T. SIMMONS

ference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles stated that "there is no question about it [referring to effects on radar] that the kind of trapped electron layers that we are talking about will affect the propagation of electromagnetic waves. The effect on the propagation of electromagnetic waves may be different for different wave lengths." For this reason auroral manifestations affect different frequency radio and radar systems in different ways. Since the Nike Zeus systems operate on frequencies which are not jeopardized materially by the aurora, Army scientists point out that Nike Zeus will see through the auroral manifestations created by the explosions of nuclear detonations in space. They say the Argus experiments confirm entirely implications of the trapping of charged particles in the earth's magnetic field. These charged particles will cause auroral manifestations as they collide with the earth's atmosphere at the burst and conjugate points. These auroral manifestations appear to have the same physical properties as natural aurora occurring in polar regions. They further state that results from the polar auroral experiments over many years with radar and radio lead to the conclusion that auroral phenomena will in no way seriously affect the performance of the Nike Zeus system. Auroral phenomena were taken into consideration in the concept and design of the Nike Zeus system from its first inception; therefore, Argus aurorae appear to have no serious effects on the tracking and acquisition capabilities of the Nike Zeus system.

ALL of this appears to confirm statements which were recently made by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and Dr. Herbert York. Mr. Quarles stated "nothing we have learned in any of the experiments to date has made us feel that we had to change our concept of the missile defense system. We are still on the Nike Zeus development course."

AT 45 degrees south latitude—in the South Atlantic between Africa and South America—late last summer the United States detonated three small atomic bombs at an altitude of about 300 miles. The test was called Project Argus and out of it is unfolding a vast panorama of weapons development possibilities.

Immediate result of the bursts was an artificial *aurora* —a persistent glow in the night sky as the high-speed electrons from the bombs collided with atoms of the atmosphere at 60 miles' altitude or more. A second result was the gradual spread of the energetic bomb particles around the earth in the form of a thin shell or girdle. Seen in profile, this shell is shaped like the letter "C", with the points coming to within 100 or 200 miles of the earth in the northern and southern latitudes, but arching as high as 4,000 miles over the equator.

To the scientists, Argus represents a splendid new tool for turning the earth and its immediate space environment into a gigantic laboratory. By producing man-made particles at will, when and where desired, scientists see an opportunity for investigating a broad range of problems: the earth's magnetic field, the two natural "Van Allen" belts of charged particles, the obscure mechanisms by which the sun influences the earth's upper atmosphere and weather, and a host of other dimly understood problems.

To the weapons designer, Argus contains both a warning and a promise. Unnoticed by the world at large, the three shots nevertheless raise important questions about several of our present weapons and communications systems—specifically, radio-guided intercontinental ballistic missiles, global radio communications, and the Nike Zeus anti-missile system. (See box page 25 for discussion of effects on Nike Zeus system.) The tests also hint at a number of fascinating and deadly possibilities for new weapons and counter-measures, including a lethal weapon to counter manned space vehicles. Some

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scientists believe that Argus may also point the way to radical new means of coping with the threat of ICBM attack, possibly by using the Argus phenomenon to erect particle screens to "de-nature" the warheads of hostile ballistic missiles.

Scientific aspects

To understand and evaluate these possibilities it is necessary to consider the scientific base of the Argus experiments. In the first place, the earth is a magnet. It has both a north and a south magnetic pole (though displaced at some distance from the geographical poles). Invisible lines of force arch from one pole, out into space, and back to the other pole. The principle is identical to the familiar experiment of placing a paper over a bar magnet and scattering iron filings on the paper so that they trace out the invisible lines of force.

Free electrons and other charged atomic particles trace out the earth's lines of magnetic force. They take the form of two major radiation belts or shells. As plotted by the Army's Pioneer IV last December, the first belt of charged particles is concentrated at an altitude of between 1,400 and 3,400 miles over the equator, while the second belt is concentrated between 8,000 and 12,000 miles' altitude. Just why there should be two well-defined layers of radiation instead of one huge belt still has the scientists baffled.

The charged particles trapped in the earth's magnetic field—unlike the iron filings over the bar magnet—are in constant motion. They oscillate back and forth around the lines of force in a corkscrew direction, bouncing from the northern to the southern "mirror points" and back many times each second. (The mirror points are formed at the lower altitudes where the lines of force bunch together, thereby deflecting the particles back into space again.) At the same time they are oscillating between north and south latitudes, the particles drift east and west—east for negatively-charged electrons, west for positively-charged protons and other particles. This drifting tendency is what makes the particles spread around the earth in the form of a shell of uniform thickness.

Origin of the particles

Two theories have been advanced to account for the origin of the particles. One holds that the particles are injected into the earth's magnetic field by the sun, during periods of high solar activity. Another states that they are trapped in the field by a complicated nuclear decay process which takes place when super-energetic cosmic particles strike the earth's atmosphere. Latest evidence, including some provided by the Argus experiment itself, appears to indicate that both theories may be correct. It now appears likely that the earth's outer radiation shell originates from the streams of high-energy electrons spewed out by the sun during solar flares, while the inner shell is supplied in part by the debris from cosmic rays.

The first positive evidence of the existence of the radiation belts was obtained early last year by Dr. James Van Allen, chief of the Physics Department of the State University of Iowa. His instruments aboard the Army's Explorer satellites became saturated with radiation whenever they swung beyond 600 miles' altitude. Reasoning that a far more intense layer of radiation existed in space than was previously suspected, Dr. Van Allen and his colleagues devised an elaborate new radiation experiment which was hurled into space last July in the Army Explorer IV satellite.

Meantime, independent of Dr. Van Allen's preliminary findings, the Pentagon was moving ahead on a project to test a proposal advanced by Nicholas C. Christofilos, a self-taught physicist now with the University of California. Christofilos proposed in 1957 that high-energy electrons from an atomic burst high above the atmosphere would be trapped in the earth's magnetic field and form a thin shell around the earth which would leak slowly away through collisions with the atmosphere.

The test firings

To test this idea in advance of the nuclear test suspension deadline last October 31, the Pentagon assembled a 10-ship Navy task force and sent it to the South Atlantic to conduct the shots last August and September. There, the USS *Norton Sound* launched three modified X-17 solid-propellant rockets to the required altitude for the nuclear blasts. (The X-17 was initially developed by the Air Force for nose cone re-entry tests, and later used by the Navy to support its Polaris fleet ballistic missile program.)

A total of 16 five-stage rockets were fired from three points—Wallops Island, Virginia, Cape Canaveral, Florida, and Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico—to conduct high-altitude measurements before and after the blasts. Carrying 60-pound payloads, the rockets reached an average altitude of 550 miles above the earth. Also contributing to the scientific measurements was Explorer IV, launched a month earlier but still "on the air." It made

CLEAR?

I would like to make it clear that the experiments [Project Argus] were kept classified throughout this period for two main reasons. We recognized that they potentially had very substantial military implications, or let's be a little more careful about that—that the scientific results that were expected from these experiments might very well have important implications in our military programs down the road. We also recognized that we were probing a lot of new science here and that it would take a substantial amount of time for the results to be correlated and analyzed, prepared for publication; and as all of you know, scientists like to wait until they have a chance to understand their data themselves and present it before they are required to spread it out for public gain.—Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald F. Quarles, *Press Conference, 19 March 1959.*

HOW A-BOMB AND EARTH'S MAGNETISM FORM 'SKIN' OF RADIATION



Courtesy, The New York Times

Earth's magnetic field seems to be arranged in "lines of force" as shown above—as if a straight bar magnet lay along the axis (A-B) of the earth.

Electrons emitted by explosion (A) spiral back and forth along lines of magnetic force, at the same time tending to "migrate" eastward (arrow).

Within about an hour moving electrons create a shell or "skin" of radiation that girdles the earth, taking the shape of the earth's magnetic field.

approximately 250 passes through the man-made radiation belt, reporting position, intensity and gradual decay of the belt before its batteries went dead in late September.

By a lucky chance, the Argus radiation shell was placed between the two natural radiation belts. (It wasn't until last December that the Pioneer IV discovered the two separate radiation belts and measured their intensity.) This coincidence made it easier to observe the man-made shell of particles, which was comparable in intensity to the natural radiation shells. This would mean an intensity of approximately 10 roentgen per hour, but exact measurements are not available at this writing.

Military significance

From a military standpoint, the chief significance of Argus relates to its effects on the propagation of radio waves—whether for long-range communication by single sideband, high-altitude observations by radar or the control of missile flight at extreme altitude by radio or radar commands.

"Argus is something like tossing a hand grenade into a telephone switchboard before you attack a town," one military scientist commented. "Done at the right time, it can paralyze the defense. But it can also be a tip-off that the attack is coming."

Mr. Roy Johnson, Director of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency, was somewhat more explicit in recent testimony before Congress. He noted that a large nuclear warhead detonated at the correct altitude over the Indian Ocean could produce a radio blackout in the vicinity of Moscow.

This effect is based on the fact that the electrons spewed out by the radio-active decay products of the bomb are immediately trapped on the magnetic lines of force running through the point of injection and proceed both ways along the line, producing auroral displays at either end of the line of force. Thus two auroras were seen almost simultaneously during the Argus shots—one in the South Atlantic close to the point where the particles were injected, and the other in the vicinity of the Azores in the North Atlantic where aircraft had been stationed to detect the display.

Weapon of electronic warfare

One of the effects which almost invariably accompanies a brilliant auroral display is a breakdown in radio communications. This is the result of a marked increase in conductivity of the upper atmosphere as a result of the electron bombardment which produces the aurora. This can render the area opaque to radio waves.

It is this possibility of producing an intense localized aurora that Mr. Johnson referred to in his comment about the possible application of Argus as a weapon of electronic warfare. It is obvious, of course, that the technique cuts both ways—that H-bombs with Soviet insignia could be detonated high over the Pacific off the west coast of South America to black out our electronic devices at the time they are most vitally needed. Thus the grim possibility exists that a significant portion of U. S. defenses and retaliatory forces might be knocked out of action in the moments immediately preceding a powerful thermonuclear assault.

A super-Argus blast would also have a significant effect on the structure of the earth's external magnetic field. It has been suggested that permanent distortions could be produced in the field, possibly permitting the particles now trapped to leak away in the earth's natural auroral zones. This possibility has been advanced as one means of draining the Van Allen radiation belts out of the earth's magnetic field.

As a weapon, Argus and its descendants will have little value against people on the earth, protected by the dense layer of atmosphere. The radiation effects of even the largest of space blasts will be quickly absorbed in the atmosphere, with no particulate fallout to add to the poisonous output of weapons tests previously conducted at sea level.

Range of warhead in space

But in space, a thermonuclear warhead would have an enormous range. Calculations by the Rand Corporation show, for example, that the range of lethal radiation from a given yield warhead will be eight to 17 times greater in space than at sea level. Thus a 20 kiloton warhead will generate a radiation intensity of 600 roentgen (accepted as a fatal dose) at 12 miles, while a multi-megaton warhead would have lethal effects through a much larger volume of space.

This means that a manned spacecraft without adequate shielding would quickly become the coffin of its occupants in the event a powerful warhead was detonated at even a considerable distance. But now Argus suggests still another technique for dealing with manned spacecraft: focus a long-lived shell of energetic electrons at the altitude traversed by the satellite. Assuming an intensity of 10 roentgen, a few hours' exposure would produce illness and two or three days would bring death for the occupants of the unshielded spacecraft.

Another aspect of the Argus tests worthy of note relates to the problem of detecting clandestine nuclear tests. It appears doubtful that the Russians detected the Argus shots, but the Argus experiment paradoxically disclosed that the task of detecting high-altitude nuclear shots should be fairly simple. This is because the earth's magnetic field will act as a kind of "tattletale" since it will trap some of the charged particles. These, in turn, may be detected by a satellite equipped with radiation counters, just as Explorer IV measured the Argus particles. If the shot is staged beyond the earth's magnetic envelope, however, or if it is staged at fairly low levels—say 100 miles—the trapping technique would not work.

Defense against ICBMs

Perhaps the most ambitious notion to arise from Argus is the hope that the newly-discovered focusing effects of the earth's magnetic field can be exploited in some way to produce a defense against ICBMs. ARPA scientists are pushing a program to investigate exotic or "blue sky" means of dealing with the threat. Called GLIPAR (Guide Line Identification Program for Anti-Missile Research), the program is designed to explore such possibilities as anti-matter, anti-gravity and radiation weapons against ICBMs.

But if some ARPA scientists are skeptical about whether Nike Zeus will be fully effective against ICBMs, some are also quick to admit that the Argus experiments have not produced any miracle defense against hostile warheads. They point out that the floods of energetic electrons generated by the Argus shots would have little or no effect on heavily-protected nuclear warheads in the brief time during the few minutes the warheads might be exposed to bombardment by the particles.

In theory, it is possible to induce a low-order explosion in a nuclear warhead by bombarding the triggering mechanism with a dense flux of neutrons. Even though the components are not brought to critical mass, they will experience a sharp temperature rise as they undergo fission. If the temperature increase is sufficient, the precise geometry of the device will be spoiled and it will be rendered inoperable. One of the objects of last summer's high-altitude bursts over Johnston Island in the Pacific was to explore the possibility that neutron irradiation might be more efficient in killing warheads than the thermal effects of the anti-missile warhead. It is understood that promising results were achieved with the Johnston Island tests.

Although a dense screen of neutrons might have the same effect on a nuclear warhead as a close burst of an antimissile, no mechanism has been discovered for trapping the neutrons or focusing them by means of the earth's magnetic field. Unlike electrons, the neutrons carry no electrical charge and are therefore able to wander through the earth's magnetic field unimpeded. Thus there is no ready means of controlling them.

This is not to say that the problem is hopeless. It is impossible to visualize neutrons released by short-lived radioactive ions which themselves are trapped in the earth's magnetic field. The ions would act as temporary "suitcases" for the neutrons, holding them trapped in the magnetic field for a short time before releasing them. But how to produce the right kind of particles from an Argus blast and how to make them dense enough to do any damage to a nuclear warhead are questions no one has yet answered.

But if the answers are to be obtained, at least one thing seems clear: more Argus-type experiments will have to be conducted. Here's how one scientist puts it:

"We know now that it would be very fruitful to have more of these bursts. We are getting along as well as one would expect in a virgin field, but it's imperative that we have more high-altitude nuclear explosions. That's the only way to get the information we need."

As long as the Administration remains determined to uphold its nuclear test ban, the desires of the scientists and weapon designers for more atomic bursts will remain frustrated. But bombs are not the only way to produce radiation belts; it's expected that the scientists will be able to produce artificial radiation belts by other methods—and perhaps get the answers they are looking for.

PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU LOEWENSTEIN and DR. VOLKMAR VON ZUEHLSDORFF

THE echo of the last shot of the First World War had hardly died away when an Allied journalist, penetrating into the Spa headquarters of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Supreme Commander of the German Imperial Army, fired this question: "Your Excellency, who won the war?" The gruff Field Marshal replied in three words: "The American infantry."

Much has happened since. With the dawn of the atomic age, weapons, equipment, communications, means of transport have developed so tremendously that the strategic concepts of 1914-18 and even of a large part of the Second World War might seem as outdated as the battles of the age of chivalry. If one modern bomber can carry more destructive power than all Allied planes of the past combined—if it can fire nuclear missiles at targets hundreds of miles away, to say nothing of ICBMs coming up fast—what is the use, so some contend, of "having infantry on the ground"?

The fact is, of course, that it is a far cry from the infantry of General Pershing's time to today's armor-clad, mechanized, rocket-equipped Pentomic divisions we have just seen in action during Exercise Free Play of Seventh Army in Germany. Having said this, let us add that it is still the individual soldier who counts in nuclear combat. Courage, comradeship and discipline are still the highest virtues essential for victory. They cannot be replaced by even the most modern electronic devices.

Surely no one would ever suggest that the free world would be able to cope with the deadly menace of the Soviet armed forces without airpower serving as NATO's sword pointed at the enemy as an effective deterrent against aggression. This deterrent, however, which for ten years now has prevented the Soviets from gaining one more inch of free soil, would not have been complete without adequate power to hold the territory of the member nations, and this means ground forces. Without NATO's divisions keeping watch at the Iron Curtain the enemy might have been sorely tempted to push farther west. And then, unless the free world would permit itself to be swallowed up piecemeal, the only alternative would be all-out nuclear war.

Thus, the sword and the shield are the two necessary components of the NATO deterrent. The shield must be able not only to resist, to counterattack and to contain the enemy until Allied nuclear reprisals have taken effect. It must also protect the bases in Europe from which the sword will strike.

The specter of an overrun Europe

If anything, the ground forces now shielding Europe should be increased, and tactical nuclear weapons should be made available to all NATO forces in this forward area. To reduce them would be to court disaster. A Soviet Army overrunning Europe would be a ghastly specter, even if meanwhile the Soviet Union itself might be laid waste by strategic bombing. The Soviets would be living off the land, and they would make use of the tremendous industrial potential of Europe, holding her peoples as hostages. Then, unless one would be prepared to face the destruction of the allies along with the Soviet troops, an army of liberation would be required far in excess of anything needed today to make the NATO shield more formidable.

This, it seems to us, is not mere speculation. If the West has time and again reduced its ground forces, the Soviet bloc certainly has not. While making every effort to build up their air forces and to keep ahead in their ballistic and guided missiles program, they have never cut their divisions in any significant way. They have made propaganda announcements to that effect, certainly, and sometimes they have staged carefully prepared shows to deceive the outside world into believing they were reducing their active forces. As, for instance, when they moved out of Austria in 1955 after that country was declared neutral. However, the very same units, with the same T34 and T54 tanks, that had allegedly been withdrawn into Russia proper, turned up in Budapest in October 1956, crushing the Hungarian uprising. When we met them there, they were identified by our Austrian friends. In fact, they turned their guns on us while we were trying to take documentary evidence for the West German Bundestag and the press.

The Naab river near Regensburg is spanned by a ponton bridge put into place by the 237th Engineer Battalion during the 1959 winter maneuvers

Consider also the withdrawal of 40,000 men from the Soviet Zone of Germany last year. They were pulled out, with great fanfare, but their equipment remained, at least that portion that was still modern. Only some obsolete gear was taken along, polished up nicely to make the populace believe it was the real thing. Later the replacements moved back in by small

detachments, so quietly they almost passed unnoticed. They brought with them the most modern equipment. Today, instead of 22, there are at least 28 fully mechanized or motorized Soviet divisions stationed in the USSR's zone of Germany alone.

A large number of these are armored divisions, but even the Soviet infantry division is equipped with 350 tanks and self-propelled assault guns. To increase general firepower, the Red Army, in addition to the organic artillery of its conventional divisions, maintains a sizable number of pure artillery divisions to be used for concentrated attack at breakthrough points. The artillery shock division is equipped with 250 howitzers of 122mm, 152mm and 203mm, with 30 rocket launchers of 300mm, and 60 mortars. The T54/100, weighing 36 tons, mounts a gun somewhat larger than its opposite numbers in the West, the British Centurion and the American M48. The latest model, the JSIII, weighing 45 tons, mounts a 122mm gun. Both models are already available by the thousands.

Soviet air mobility

The Russian ground forces are supported by a considerable number of helicopters, the YAK-24 (NATO code name "Horse") comparable to the Piasecki H-16 Transporter and capable of carrying 40 fully equipped soldiers. The MIL-4 (NATO code name "Hound") is designed for close support of front-line troops. That the Red Army is geared for attack is shown also by the emphasis on air transport of its troops. It has no less than 10 airborne divisions. These paratroopers are well equipped, and they are rigorously trained. Behind them there is a large reserve of parachutists trained in the para-military mass organization called DOSAAF.

The number of Soviet front line divisions is estimated at 175, of which 65 are armored. There are also 65 more divisions in the satellite nations. In addition, there is the Red Air Force, the close network of Soviet rocket and guided missile bases poised against a breakthrough of the Iron Curtain, and the Soviet fleets which include some 600 to 700 submarines. Six million men are under arms in peacetime, 4.5 million of whom are ground forces. One month after D-day, the number of mobilized Soviet divisions would probably rise to some 400.

Of course, not all of these forces would face the NATO armies in central Europe, but certainly they show that there can be no effective defense without nuclear weapons to prevent their concentration, and that our ground forces should be increased if they are to more nearly match those of the enemy. The Bundeswehr must be built up with all possible speed, and all other NATO forces must be kept at full combat strength to meet General Norstad's minimum defense requirements.

NATO's ground forces—Seventh U. S. Army, the British Army of the Rhine, the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg units, the French divisions and the German Bundeswehr—guard a thousand-mile frontier. As NATO forces, all are under General Hans Speidel, Commander of the Allied Land Forces Central Europe with headquarters in Fontainebleau, France, a subcommand of SHAPE.

Year-around readiness

Seventh Army, with its two armored and three infantry divisions, artillery units, support commands and three armored cavalry regiments, is an impressive fighting force. It is highly mobile, with most modern equipment, both conventional and atomic, and is supported by a flexible supply system which, as the maneuvers have shown, stands up very well under combat condi-

Seventh Army personnel carriers move forward during a live fire exercise in northern Bavaria. Field exercises are continuous in USAREUR

Symbolic of the constant alert practiced by Seventh Army is this forward observer peering eastward during the 1959 winter maneuvers

tions. Its commanders see that it maintains an all-year-round state of combat readiness.

Close contact with these excellent troops is of great advantage to the young Bundeswehr's II and III Corps. General Clyde D. Eddleman, who as commander of CENTAG had them under his direction, is pleased at how they are coming along. "Of course they are still lacking in equipment," he said, "and junior officers as well as young NCOs are still at a premium. But there is no doubt that they are good troops." American soldiers and German *Soldaten* get along very well. Relations could hardly be better. Joint maneuvers were held last fall and are planned again for later this year.

Seventh Army's area of responsibility includes the rugged, mountainous terrain along the border which separates the German Federal Republic from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Germany. It is a forbidding borderline, typical of any Communist regime: electrically charged, barbed-wire fences, watchtowers manned by machine gunners, and a 30-foot-wide strip kept plowed to facilitate detection of anyone trying to escape from this huge prison.

Seventh Army's three armored cavalry regiments keeping watch here around the clock and working closely with the Federal German Border Police, are freedom's first line of defense. They know they will be the first to meet the enemy.

It was in this area, only 22 air miles from the Czech border at the closest point, that Seventh Army's winter exercises were held from 2 to 7 February. They ex-

tended from Regensburg, Nürnberg and Bayreuth to the Grafenwöhr and Vilseck training centers. Fifty thousand men, most of them from VII Corps, took part in Free Play. Their equipment included 10,000 vehicles of all kinds including tanks and armored personnel carriers, 8-inch and 155mm howitzers, 280mm atomic cannon, as well as Honest John and Corporal rockets. Liaison and transport planes and a large number of helicopters were brought into action. F-100 Supersabres of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force flying in from Evreux, France, supported them with high- and low-level bombing missions. RB-66 planes, also from the 4th ATAF, flew night photo missions for coverage of an area one mile wide and three miles long, using photo-flash cartridges of 265-million candle power.

The exercise opens

A note of realism was inserted in the communiqué giving the opening move in the exercise: "After a period of increasing tension, Aggressor forces smashed across an assumed international border at dawn today. Red tanks and motorized infantry, supported by artillery and tactical air units, are advancing between Regensburg and Nuernberg. NATO's 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was executing delaying action while other Friendly forces were deployed in main defensive positions."

The Blue forces comprised the 3d Infantry Division; elements of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; 35th Artillery Group; the 46th Infantry's 1st Armored Rifle Battalion; and attached supporting units. Aggressor was played by the 4th Armored Division; the 21st Infantry's 1st Battle Group; the 210th Field Artillery Group; elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and supporting units.

During the first days the Aggressor drove forward against stiffening resistance by NATO forces, who held their main defensive positions. At the height of battle a breakthrough was effected by TOT artillery fire, both conventional and atomic, supported by tactical air, followed by a powerful thrust by tanks and armored infantry.

"We have called our exercise Free Play," Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers, who directed the war games, told us in his headquarters at Vilseck, "because we want our troops to display initiative." He was a controller at the Sabrehawk maneuvers last year and he found that if there is too much control, unit commanders are satisfied if they get only to the phase line. "This time we have encouraged our junior officers to show vigor. And they certainly liked it."

Our troops must realize the tremendous power of the nuclear weapon, General Rogers said, but at the same time they must learn to live with it. "Dig a foxhole, pull something over it, and don't look at the blast." That is the fundamental rule. This is not yet pushbutton warfare. No weapon has been developed to replace the men who operate the machines of war.

Many people, General Rogers thinks, rely too much on atomic weapons. If you have, say, 150 tanks trapped, an atomic blast would probably get fifty of them. But then you must follow up with conventional artillery to finish them off. We must always employ the most suitable means, otherwise we allow ourselves to be stifled by the very efficiency of our own weapons.

The armored horde

This exercise took account of the fact that in any future Soviet aggression NATO forces would be faced by Red divisions equipped with large numbers of tanks. The maneuver was also designed to test how infantry divisions will stand up to an attack by armored forces, which are comparatively safe against atomic fallout and can negotiate contaminated terrain. The need for stronger antitank defense was demonstrated. STRAC's M56, with its speed and mobility and its 90mm gun, will remarkably increase the antitank power of infantry. One model was shown for the first time in Europe during the Exercise.

Morale during maneuver was high, despite the bitter cold. Some units had not turned in for days, but all took it in stride and the troops realized why they were there. "We're not scared by Khrushchev's threats," a first lieutenant told us. "If we were," a noncommissioned officer added, "we'd get a Korea right here in Germany." He had been at Pusan.

Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein, lawyer, political scientist, journalist, and lecturer, was educated at universities in Munich, Hamburg, Geneva and Berlin. He was expelled from Germany in 1933. Since he came to America in 1935 he has lectured at some 40 U. S. and Canadian universities, besides contributing to many leading magazines and newspapers. In 1953 he was elected to the Bundestag and served on its House Foreign Affairs Committee. **Dr. Volkmar von Zuehlsdorff** studied law and political science at the universities of Berlin and Innsbruck, with postgraduate work at the University of Vienna. He left Germany in 1933, as one of the youngest exiles. He came to the U. S. in 1938 to become Executive Secretary of the American Guild for German Cultural Freedom, an organization founded by Prince Lowenstein. During 1940-46 he assisted Prince Loewenstein in the latter's capacity as visiting professor of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has also lectured and is a contributor to the *Columbia Encyclopedia*. After his return to Germany he became political editor of *Die Zeit*, West Germany's leading weekly.

The Loewenstein-Zuehlsdorff team was in Budapest shortly after the Hungarian uprising, and witnessed the brutal suppression by Soviet forces. They have written a history of postwar Germany, *Germany's Destiny, 1945 to 1957*, and are now preparing a book on NATO. They recently completed a tour of military installations in the U. S., as well as SACLANT, SAC, TAC, and Cape Canaveral, and in other NATO countries.

Though only U. S. units took part, the exercise concerned and interested all NATO members. More than 300 representatives from all member nations (except Iceland and Portugal, and some others), had come to observe, threescore generals among them. The grandstand overlooking the demonstrations gave the impression of an open-air NATO general staff conference. The Army set the style here. It was so cold that few of the admirals and even some air generals disdained neither the snug winter battle dress labelled "U. S. Army" nor the enormous Mickey Mouse boots.

Why had they all come from so far?, some Americans wondered. "Because you Americans," a Belgian general replied pointedly, "are the only ones who have a completely equipped field army in Western Europe. Your Seventh Army is really combat-ready. And when you have maneuvers like these, this is the only opportunity for many of us to see large units in action."

Support fire motif

Honest John rockets were demonstrated with simulated atomic warheads. We had seen them with SETAF in upper Italy and with STRAC at Fort Bragg, but, like many European officers, never in action. "Fire mission; warhead, flash head; fuze time; one round. . . . On the way!" Then the blinding air burst of the rocket, simulated by a photoflash-powder warhead. To minimize fallout the explosion was set at 270 feet, because Aggressor wanted to move in there himself for the breakthrough. A second rocket, a third and more. Then 280mm atomic cannon opening, and finally the concentrated time-on-target mission of all available medium and heavy artillery with live ammunition. A squadron of F-100 followed, surging down and dropping their loads of high explosive and napalm bombs and strafing the defenders.

Only an exercise? Yes, but more than that: a glimpse of things to come—unless the free world stands on guard.

We watched the ensuing Aggressor armored attack. In a wide, embracing movement the medium and heavy tanks moved forward, employing live ammunition, while personnel carriers following them carried Aggressor's infantry to combat positions. While the attack was conventional, the tactics were different from the last war's. One felt that the troops were conscious of the ever impending atomic threat. To avoid offering a target for a potential nuclear attack, tanks and personnel carriers were widely dispersed. An effective demonstration of battlefield mobility. The NATO forces, on the other hand, proved their ability to effectively defend a wide front.

"An outstanding exercise," General Eddleman called it when all reports were in. It tested the state of training of units, the quality of leadership, the efficiency of communications, supply, and the repair system. Mistakes were promptly corrected. The officers, especially in the junior grades, were enthusiastic about the usefulness of the maneuvers, and both initiative and aggressiveness of commanders and units were noted. In short, the exercise achieved its purpose.

A whole battle group landed by helicopter behind enemy lines: the biggest such lift in Europe so far and an impressive demonstration of the possibilities for increased battlefield mobility. The chief value of the helicopter as a personnel carrier would seem to be for operations behind one's own lines, moving troops quickly to block penetrations, and so on. Contour flying proved a good protection against fighter planes and air-defense weapons.

The hard test of the field

One lesson of the maneuvers was that conventional artillery has not disappeared from the battlefield. Not all targets require an atomic burst. There will always be many that must be destroyed by conventional fire, and it is imperative that the dual capability of the ground army and its artillery be maintained.

Here are what particularly impressed General Hans Speidel, commander of Allied Forces Central Europe, about this exercise:

The realistic and practical manner in which Seventh Army has been adapting its tactics to the changes brought about by nuclear weapons. Not satisfied with mere paper discussions, this army quickly puts its theories to the hard test of field maneuver, whether it be a helicopter mission, preparing and exploiting the use of tactical atomic weapons, new methods of reconnaissance, or what not. Carried out under peacetime limitations, sometimes these tests also invite criticism. This is not only natural, but conducive to further development.

The unfailing alertness and the absorbed dedication of officers and men in the field, even the very young, who were unrelenting after days of continuous exercises at subfreezing temperatures which taxed the endurance even of soldiers so well equipped as Americans. Such a spirit of combat preparedness and morale is a determining factor in his strategic evaluations as the commander responsible for Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

Divergent national views on leadership and training are gradually being equalized owing to the years of cooperation and comradeship. Also, in this respect General Eddleman has carried on the work begun by his predecessors in an open-minded and farsighted manner.

In the NATO armies achievement is what counts, regardless of nationality. The spirit of friendship and mutual esteem extends through all ranks from privates to general officers. The seven German divisions so far in existence are proud of their comradeship-in-arms with the United States Seventh Army.

The presence of American soldiers, together with their NATO allies, in free Berlin and all along the Iron Curtain is in itself part of the deterrent. They are

(Continued on page 58)

Like other county seat towns from coast to coast, Bethany, Missouri, is a pleasant town that grew up around the courthouse—Bethany's new one is shown here—and serves a rich agricultural region. And like other communities, large and small, it sends its sons to war when the nation calls and during peacetime keeps its military tradition alive by supporting a Reserve unit

THE BETHANY INVASION

This is the story of an invasion, not by an army but of the U. S. Army

Major FREDERIC S. OTIS

The Commanding Officer of Bethany's Company B, 406th Infantry, is Captain Truman R. Nickerson, who also serves his community as postmaster

THE United States Army has been "invaded." In every state of the Union, in more than 3,000 communities, in numbers varying from a few dozen to several thousand, a new force has entered the Army ranks. One of the three components of the Army, the United States Army Reserve, now presents the Army staff with some entirely new problems. Soldiers ought to take a close look at what has happened to the Army Reserve in the last ten years.

To focus our attention sharply on the present course of events, it may help to visit Bethany, Missouri. This prosperous farm community of 3,000, located near the geographic center of the United States, is a typical midwestern country town. Midway between Kansas City and Des Moines, it is probably the last place on

SP Charles R. Sharp of Company B gives Bethany youth who have volunteered for the Army's six-month training program the lowdown on what's ahead

Major Frederic S. Otis, *Infantry,* USAR, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army, in the Office of the Chief of U. S. Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, is its Chief of Publications and Editor of *The Army Reservist.*

the map where one would expect to learn much about the Army. But because it is a typical country town, and because what occurred there has happened in thousands of similar towns, it deserves our attention. For in Bethany, the United States Army has become an important part of community life. The Army is exerting a considerable influence in the civic, social, financial and political life of the area. And it is doing it without the full knowledge and awareness of many of us.

Back in 1947 four men got together in Bethany and decided they would like to continue their World War II association with the Army. Two of them were Reserve officers. As a result of that meeting, the 888th Replacement Company was activated (two officers, two enlisted men). The same thing was happening all over the United States, and during the following year the Army began to take stock of its Reserve units. The now familiar "reorganization" followed, and the Bethany unit was redesignated Company B, 820th Tank Battalion (four officers, 23 men). By 1951 the unit had acquired one warrant officer and its enlisted strength had grown to 43 even as its battalion designation was changed to the 661st. In October 1955 it became Company B, 406th Infantry Regiment (102d Division), with a strength of four officers and 54 enlisted men. This assigned strength has now grown to 126 EM, and the officer strength has dropped to three. Before you read this the Pentomic reorganization of the Reserve will probably have reached Company B, and they will find themselves part of a modern battle group.

However, a far greater change has taken place in Bethany than the redesignation or the assigned strength. There has been a gradual but very important change in public acceptance and awareness of the need for the unit in Bethany. The people of this town see in their local Reserve unit a defense against the threat of Soviet aggression, something tangible that they are doing to build the defense of their nation. They accept the need for their husbands, brothers and sons to be prepared to take up arms. They recognize that the mobilization time in a future war will be much shorter than ever before,

A rifle-cleaning detail at work in one corner of Bethany's new Army Reserve Center



It is significant that the leaders of Bethany's Army Reserve unit are also leaders in other community endeavors. For instance, Company B's First Sergeant Gerald H. Landes, a farm-machinery and feed business operator, also serves on the City Park Board and manages the American Legion Boys Baseball team

and that the time to train and prepare is now, and not after M-day.

This is the change that active Army people must carefully consider.

What makes it tick?

To grasp the full significance of this new force in the Army, it will help to look closely at Bethany's Company B. What makes this outfit run? How did it come about? What is its true value to the Army? Can it be depended upon?

First, since it is a body of men, it will pay us to see who these men are, and what their relationship is to their community.

The unit is commanded by its original commander, Captain Truman R. Nickerson, the Bethany postmaster. Like 14 others in the unit he is a World War II veteran. Nickerson has 18 years of service in AUS and USAR (and has long been a member of AUSA). He is also a member of the church board, a past president and member of the Rotary Club, VFW, American Legion, Chamber of Commerce Board, Past Master of the local Masonic lodge, Past President of the City Park Board, member of the Northwest Missouri Fair Board for 21 years, and has served as Scoutmaster and member of the County Boy Scout Executive Board. He would be the last to call himself a leading citizen, but the first man in Bethany whom an outsider would select for the title. For the past 10 years much of his time outside the post office has been devoted to building the Army's strength in the Reserve.

First Lieutenant R. K. Wheeler, a World War II

Another community leader is Lieutenant Robert H. Van Hoozer, who is also president of the Bethany Rotary Club

veteran with 15 years of service, is Mayor of Bethany, member of the Fair Board, of his church board, and the VFW. Besides managing his various properties in the community and operating his insurance and real-estate office, Mayor Wheeler has devoted time to persuading the Army to build the new training center. The town furnished water and sewer lines to the site, without expense to the Government.

First Lieutenant R. H. Van Hoozer, a World War II veteran with 16 years of service, is President of the Bethany Rotary Club, a member of his church board, and of the Parents-Teachers Association. He is associated with a local oil-distributing firm.

"Overage-in-grade!" is the active Army man's first reaction to such a report. The charge is true if you compare these men with their active Army contemporaries. But without these overage officers there would be no unit in Bethany and the promotions they have declined would have required them to serve in staff positions in Kansas City. Their experience, their skill and their interest have best served the nation in the spots they occupy.

First Sergeant G. H. Landes, a World War II veteran with 17 years of service, is a member of the City Park Board, the VFW, Chamber of Commerce, and manages the American Legion Boys' Baseball team. He operates a large feed and farm machinery business in Bethany.

Dozens of others in the unit occupy positions of considerable importance in the community. In addition to the 15 World War II veterans, six served in Korea. Thus the great majority—more than 100—are peacetime veterans of whom most have had two years of active duty. New six-month trainees are coming into the unit each month. A few members are enrolled in Army Extension Courses. One or two have taken resident courses at service schools. As is to be expected in any successful small community organization, there are three father-son combinations in the unit; 8 brother combinations, and many uncle-nephew and cousin combinations. A quick check of the unit rolls shows that five members serve on their church boards, three on the Board of the Chamber of Commerce, and that every civic organization in the community from Farm Bureau to Volunteer Fire Department is represented.

Now we know what makes the outfit run: the devoted dedication of a group of public-minded citizens has made this outfit click. Will it continue to function when the oldtimers now heading it retire? Well, 21 of the members are college students, four manage local boys' baseball teams, 22 own and operate their own business. This would indicate a continuing interest in the unit that is spreading from father to son, from older brother to younger brother, from Scout leader to Scout, from ball-club manager to player, from employer to employee.

The publisher of the Bethany *Republican-Clipper*, a prosperous county-seat weekly, helped organize the unit and later dropped out because of his age. The unit continues to receive considerable space in his paper's columns, as befits a community organization of its stature.

The Army influence

Bethany was founded in 1845. Until 1947 its only contacts with the Army had been when its sons marched off to war or, in later years, joined ROTC when they went away to college. Located in the Green Hills area, the main interest of the people of Harrison County has been a profitable one, raising beef cattle. Bethany boasts a small cheese factory and a concrete-block factory, plus

Captain Nickerson visits his Supply Sergeant, Bobby J. Watts, at the latter's place of business, a retail farm-implement firm

the usual other farming community businesses. Now there is a new payroll in town, the annual $35,417 that Company B distributes. So the unit has an economic as well as a civic and a social influence in the town's life.

No longer can a Congressman consider the Army not represented in his district. More and more is he made aware of the Army influence when he attends community celebrations, sees his constituents wearing the uniform, and visits the Reserve Center which he discovers has become a community center. Here various non-profit community organizations meet, and here he may find that the local Chamber of Commerce includes the Army Reserve payroll in the community's list of important assets. Probably he himself spoke at the dedication of the Center, sitting on the platform alongside of the Mayor and the Governor. Locally and nationally, the astute politician is discovering that the Reservist is an extremely important influence in his community.

Importance of USAR

There can be little question that the nation's business and civic leaders have discovered and accepted the importance in their area of the Army Reserve. Now the question arises: is the active Army fully aware of the importance to it, of its Reserve members?

How close is the tie between these Reservists and active Army?

Technically, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard compose two of the Army's three components. The Ready Reserve, which includes control group Reservists and personnel not on active duty in either Reserve component, outnumbers the active force since there are about 14 Ready Reservists to every 9 active duty soldiers. Also, it is well to note that 62 per cent of our active duty officers are Reservists.

Some 700,000 Ready Reservists are serving in units. This requires them to attend 48 paid drills, plus two weeks of summer camp. Additionally, some 30,000 Reservists who are not assigned to units go on active duty for training for two weeks each year.

Most Reservists devote considerable time, besides the period for which they draw pay, in training for possible mobilization. They are not far from the Army any day of their life. They work hard at orienting themselves on new tactics, techniques, equipment, plans and policies of the Army. They are friendly to, sympathetic to, and ready to defend, represent, and explain the Army's case whenever the occasion demands. Most important, they are in a position to represent the Army where it has long been without a "friend at court"—at every crossroads in America.

How many of us realize that 30 U. S. Representatives are Reservists, as are eight U. S. Senators, three Governors, four ambassadors, and 16 others who hold high Government positions in the executive and the judicial branches? Figures are not available as to the number on state benches, in state legislatures, or in city or county government positions. Nor are figures available as to how many Reservists are executives in the nation's business world, or leaders in the educational, scientific or professional fields. The number is impressive. It is also safe to say that the number is constantly growing, as younger men work their way upward in their own particular fields.

Active Army help

How can the active Army take advantage of this?

I think the first and most important way in which active Army people can gain by this host of friends, is to realize that the friendship exists. With this acknowledgment should come a sincere appreciation of the fact that the Reservist is a vital member of the Army team. He is not just someone to call up in an emergency. He is on the team right now, working hard for the same goals that the active Army man is striving for. He supports the Army's policies, praises its many and varied accomplishments insofar as he is properly informed concerning them, and is ready and willing to play the game if he knows the signals.

We must exert every effort, therefore, to keep this man accurately informed. Changes in Army policies must not be fed to him first through garbled and brief accounts in his hometown newspaper. He must be accurately informed of contemplated changes, the reasons for them, and their target dates, as early as possible through official and technical publications.

Certainly top Army staff officers are aware of this tremendous Reserve strength, and our national defense planners count on it. The Chief of Staff recently told a Congressional committee that "we have a mobilization base in proved Reserve strength." General Taylor was being questioned by the Senate Foreign Affairs Disarmament subcommittee and is reported to have told this group "you cannot play around in this business unless you have a lot of blue chips in your pocket."

General Bruce C. Clarke, Commanding General of Continental Army Command, said recently: "Granted that there is a difference in the degree of readiness appropriate to the mobilization priority of a Ready Reserve unit and the degree appropriate to the mission of the active Army unit. Never has the difference been so small."

Major General Ralph A. Palladino, Chief of U. S. Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, stated not long ago, "We Reservists fully intend to assume our full share of the responsibility for the defense of our country."

A vast ignorance of the Reserve potential still exists on the "Indian" level. The time has come for the men who research and write the papers, and those who command the units, and the others who serve in the units, to wake up to the fact that a vast army of fellow "Indians" marches alongside them.

Just as the citizens of Bethany accepted the Reserve, so must the average career soldier accept them. Remember General Clarke's words: "Never has the difference been so small."

The Strategy of Controlled Warfare—Soviet Style

ALVIN J. COTTRELL and JAMES E. DOUGHERTY

The casebooks of World War II exhibit ample evidence of how the Communists subordinate military operations to long-range political objectives

THE use of the term "limited war" has become widespread since the Korean war, largely because new advances in weapons technology have brought about a so-called "balance of terror." But, for the Soviets, "limited war" does not have the same meaning it has for the West. The underlying motivation of most contemporary Western concepts of limited war is to mitigate the horrors and human carnage which attend modern military conflict. The Soviets, on the other hand, control war primarily for politico-strategic reasons. Their conflict doctrine has disciplined them to regard war as an instrument of politics in the Clausewitzean sense. Even in the midst of World War II—a struggle in which their very survival was at stake—the Soviet leaders never lost sight of the relationship between war and policy, but subordinated military operations to long-range political objectives.

The Nazi-Soviet pact

The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 is a most revealing example of the Soviet concept of controlled war: the USSR embroiled the "imperialist" powers in a world war without becoming directly involved herself at the outset. When the pact was signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in August, the Soviet leaders were well aware that it gave Hitler a free hand to attack Poland, and that Nazi aggression would bring the Western democracies into the war to honor their commitment to Poland.

Before concluding the pact, Stalin could have followed either of two paths: he could have entered an agreement with Great Britain and France, or one with Germany. The consensus at the time was that an alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies would probably have reduced the risk of war. Such an alliance would have confronted Hitler with the dread prospect of a two-front war. Nevertheless, there was always the chance that Hitler still might go to war and accept the two-front risk which so appalled his generals. The Soviet Union, committed to aiding Poland, would then have been at war with Germany. The Kremlin, motivated by the low level of Soviet military preparedness at the time, decided to conclude the pact with Germany—thus sparking the outbreak of war two weeks later.

The Nazi-Soviet pact wrought havoc among the Communist parties of Western Europe, especially in France, where, during the late thirties, the Communists had greatly stressed the need for a Popular Front against the Nazis. The French Communist Party had to be sacrificed to the requirements of Soviet strategic security. So long as the "socialist base" would be safe from attack during the early stages, the Soviet leaders probably were not averse to bringing on a conflict which might turn into a costly war of attrition between the fascist and democratic camps. Such a war would render the belligerents progressively weaker while the Soviet Union continued to build its strength. As Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony have shown, Soviet strategic planning probably followed this line of reasoning:

"If the pact with Germany were signed, war would break out immediately; after the destruction of Poland, Germany would attack the West. Stalin did not think that the West would be defeated, but that the war would continue for a long time. Germany would be greatly weak-

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ened, but this would also be true of the Western powers. The contest would culminate in mutual exhaustion.

"If Germany were beaten very quickly, the Western powers would be able to march to Berlin and crush the communist regime that would emerge as the result of a German defeat. Accordingly, Germany should be supported economically by Russia, in order that the war *be protracted;* in that case, the Western powers would be unable to destroy communism in defeated Germany. If, on the other hand, war were avoided by a Russo-Western pact, Germany would be compelled to establish a *modus vivendi* with the West and Poland; such a development would constitute a danger for the Soviet Union.

"Stalin is said to have admitted that, in case of war, a German victory would also be dangerous for Russia; but he allegedly minimized this danger by pointing out that Germany would be too exhausted for a war with the USSR and would, moreover, have her hands full keeping France and England down and administering her newly acquired overseas territories. In sum, if everything went according to Stalin's plan, Russia would emerge as the dominant power in Europe." *(International Relations, in the Age of the Conflict Between Democracy and Dictatorship.)*

In his memoirs of World War II, Winston Churchill traces the devious path of Soviet diplomacy during the spring of 1939 in such a way as to indicate that perhaps Stalin did not know until the last minute which way he would turn the Soviet Union. Churchill suggests that a Soviet pact with the Western democracies might have averted the war. One of the motives behind the Soviet offer of an agreement with Britain and France was to convince Hitler that the USSR was in a position to choose either side freely.

It has sometimes been argued that Stalin actually preferred an alliance with the West, but that the West's blundering diplomacy finally forced him reluctantly to conclude a pact that was obnoxious to the Soviet Union, since it allied the Communists with a Fascist state. This interpretation, which rests upon the assumptions that the Nazi-Soviet pact was virtually forced on the Kremlin by an unfortunate set of circumstances, and that better Anglo-French diplomacy might have resulted in an alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, was anticipated as early as 1934 by one of the Soviet's leading theoreticians, Karl Radek.

Soviet grand strategy

It was not by Stalin's choice that the Soviet Union was plunged into a full-scale war in June 1941. He had thought the West would either be able to defeat Germany or to engage her undivided military attention for a considerable time. This would make the Soviet Union safe long enough to throw its weight onto the scales. From the very beginning of the war, Stalin was careful to conserve Soviet strength even in the face of the Nazi onslaught. It is worth noting that, of the major anti-Axis allies, the Soviet Union alone managed to avoid fighting on two fronts.

Although the USSR and Japan confronted each other as members of military coalitions which were locked in mortal struggle, they remained at peace until one week before Japan's surrender. Thus the Soviet's effort in World War II was geographically confined. Her eastern front remained inactive; the Red Army was able to concentrate on the western front. Moreover, Soviet planning left Japan relatively free to bring all her military power in the Pacific against the world's two leading capitalist states, the U. S. and Great Britain. Stalin undoubtedly sought to make certain that the United States would find its forces widely deployed both in Europe and in the Far East. Thus the U. S. would not be able to defeat Germany before the Soviet Union could achieve its objectives in eastern Europe. Nor could the U. S. defeat Japan without finally calling for the assistance of the Soviet Union, thereby permitting the USSR to share in the postwar occupation and administration of Japan and her island territories.

During its early stage, the Soviet war against Germany consisted mainly of strategic retreat. The German generals agree that the primary explanation of their defeat in Russia was the Soviet high command's refusal to commit the Red Army to a decisive battle during the early years of the war. Once the Soviet Union began to mount its counteroffensive with sizable air and armored forces, it fought as aggressively as the other allies.

The fierce pressure against the retreating Germans was dictated by strategic considerations defined by Stalin. Russia's full weight was thrown against the Germans in order to secure Soviet territorial objectives in eastern Europe, lest Anglo-American power bring Germany to her knees while the Red Army was still fighting on Soviet soil. In brief, Stalin realized that this war gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to achieve the goal of nineteenth century Tsarist policy which, in the words of Dostoievsky, "had to consist in the unification of the whole Slavdom . . . under Russia's wing." Thus Stalin, while demanding that his allies open another front so as to increase the pressure against the Germans and reduce their pressure against the Soviet Union, wished to make certain that the second front be established in such a way as not to interfere with the attainment of Soviet goals in eastern Europe.

Strategy beyond military victory

As the defeat of Germany became imminent, Stalin became increasingly concerned about how it was to be brought about. He was interested not merely in annihilating Nazi Germany and in rooting out fascist ideology from Europe—goals with which the Western democracies seemed exclusively preoccupied. In order to realize his objective—the advance of Russia into the heart of Europe—he had to exert his utmost to impose his strategic conceptions upon his allies. There is reason for believing that Stalin was determined to have the capital of every country in eastern Europe be liberated by Communist forces. He successfully opposed a proposal, advanced by Churchill, for an Allied second front in the Balkans. In late 1944, after the British had withdrawn their logistical support from the Greek EAM-ELAS, these Communist partisans besieged Athens, then occupied by the British and the Greek royalists. Thus were revealed for the first time Communist designs for postwar Europe.

Even though there had been no prior political agreement among the major allies as regards the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the Russians protested vehemently against a U. S. advance on Prague, even though Patton's Third Army could have entered the city at least two weeks sooner than the Russians did. Since the Communists seized power in 1948, Czechoslovakia has proven to be the most reliable of all the Soviet's European satellites. This may be due, at least in part, to the fact that, of all the capitals of eastern

Europe, Prague experienced the least destruction during the fight for liberation.

Through the days of the fiercest fighting against the Germans, the Soviet Union never lost sight of the type of governments it wished to see installed in the countries of eastern Europe once the war was over. During the latter part of 1944, the military operations conducted by Marshal Rokossovsky in Poland and Marshal Malinovsky in Hungary seemed unnecessarily costly and quite puzzling from an orthodox military standpoint. Only when the Soviets' broader political strategy is examined can the strange tactical movements of the Red forces be fully understood. These operations were dictated solely by political expediency. They aimed at eliminating anti-Fascist and pro-Allied forces which because of their anti-Communist attitudes might subsequently block the seizure of power by the Communists.

Soviet strategy exhibited virtually the same pattern with respect to the liberation of every other country. Almost invariably, the Russians disdained armistice offers from the governments of the once Nazi-occupied countries as the Germans retreated westward. Instead of negotiating armistices on any terms whatsoever, they declared war and undertook a type of military action against those countries which was designed to insure their complete occupation by the Red Army and the elimination of all non-Communist elements which were capable of forming independent postwar governments.

While the Red Army was advancing toward the Hungarian border during September 1944, the government of Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, tried to break with Germany. Horthy, toward the end of September, secretly sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate an armistice on these conditions: immediate cessation of hostilities; British-American participation in the occupation; and unhindered withdrawal of German troops. Aware that the Nazis were preparing to seize his government in order to prevent agreement with the Soviet Union, and having had no word from his envoys, Horthy decided to enter into direct negotiations with the advancing Soviet army under Malinovsky, then 45 miles from Budapest. When requested to proceed with his forces into Budapest, Malinovsky refused to discuss military matters and immediately halted his offensive. A second Hungarian team succeeded in obtaining an armistice agreement in Moscow on 14 October. But when Horthy proclaimed the armistice the next day, the Nazis overthrew his government while the Soviet army continued to mark time outside of Budapest. With the fall of Horthy, his imprisonment by the Germans, and the "possession" of an armistice government in Moscow, the Russians were able to proceed with their occupation of Hungary in a "constitutional vacuum," thereby paving the way for the establishment of a new, Communist-dominated government.

The case of Poland

The most notable and clear-cut instance of controlled warfare by the Soviet Union during the closing phases in Europe can be seen in the case of Poland. The Soviet forces launched their great offensive in central eastern Europe on 22 June 1944. The Polish Home Army—the chief instrument of resistance against the Nazis, and the military arm of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London—expected fully to coordinate its long-planned uprising with the operations of the advancing Red Army. As a matter of fact, the Soviet radio during the latter part of July repeatedly appealed to the people of Warsaw to rise and harass the German occupation forces in their efforts to retreat across the Vistula River. On 31 July, when Soviet troops were less than 10 miles from Warsaw and the Polish Underground received reports that Soviet tanks had already penetrated German defenses east of the city, General Bor, Home Army commander, ordered a general uprising to begin at 1700 next day. Once it became known to the outside world—that is, on 2 August—that the insurrection, involving approximately 40,000 of the Home Army's forces, had actually been launched, the Moscow radio suddenly lapsed into silence. Soviet air activity over Warsaw ceased and the ground offensive was suspended. Stefan Korbanski, in *Fighting Warsaw*, wrote: "During the initial period it never even occurred to anyone that the Soviets might deliberately stop their offensive so as to enable the Germans to destroy the city of Warsaw." According to another account, the Red Army was actually in the outskirts of the city before it got the order to withdraw.

To outside observers it was clear that General Bor's

(*Continued on page 42*)

The case of Poland was a typical and tragic example of the Soviets' use of warfare controlled to gain a desired political end. Here Red Army artillery rolls through Breslau



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

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(*Continued from page* 39)

forces could not by themselves defeat the Germans. The Underground had planned to coordinate its insurrection with the Soviet offensive. Furthermore, it was obvious that without supplies from outside, the Home Army could not survive for more than a week or ten days. General Bor sent urgent appeals to London for assistance, but as Herbert Feis (in *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*) has asked, "who could have given substantial relief quickly except the Red Army across the Vistula?" Churchill too was quick to point out that for the Soviet Union to furnish the guns and ammunition necessary to sustain the uprising required a short flight of 100 miles. Churchill notified Stalin that the British intended to drop 60 tons of equipment and ammunition into the southwest quarter of Warsaw, where the fighting was fiercest. Stalin replied grimly that he thought the information which had reached the British government about the extent of the insurrection was "greatly exaggerated." Churchill continued to entreat Stalin to send help to the Home Army. On 12 August he sent Stalin excerpts from a message he had received from the hard-pressed fighters in Warsaw.

The RAF tried to fly supplies to Poland but, as Churchill reminded Stalin, the distance from Italy to Warsaw—700 miles—was too great. After President Roosevelt had received an appeal from the Polish Government, he authorized the use of Army Air Forces bombers based in France to fly supplies in to Warsaw at high altitudes. Since these planes would have to fly beyond Soviet battle lines to land at the airfields which were already being used by the AAF in shuttle-bombing missions, the U. S. Government asked permission to use these same airfields to aid the Polish Home Army. On 16 August Vishinsky replied to Ambassador Harriman's request for use of these airfields by planes flying aid to the Poles:

"The Soviet Government cannot, of course, object to English or American aircraft dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, since this is an American and British affair. But they decidedly object to American and British aircraft, after dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, landing on Soviet territory, since the Soviet Government do not wish to associate themselves either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw."

The Soviet response to all pleas for aid to the Home Army contended that "the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet command had been informed before the beginning of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it. . . . [The Soviet command] must disassociate itself from the Warsaw adventure, as it cannot take either direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action."

Stalin charged that the Poles had failed to coordinate their action with the Soviet command, despite the fact that the Polish Premier had arrived in Moscow on the eve of the uprising, precisely to discuss the question of aid to General Bor. It is also very likely that the Moscow broadcasts encouraging the revolt and announcing Premier Mikolajczyk's arrival had prompted the Home Army to launch the attack earlier than it might have done otherwise.

The USSR and the Pacific War

A major diplomatic problem among the Allies turned on the question of the Soviets' entrance into the war against Japan. As early as October 1943, an American mission consisting of Major General John R. Deane and Averill Harriman went to Moscow with the primary objective of inducing Soviet participation. The USSR, however, was extremely reluctant to make a definite commitment because it did not wish to become involved at that critical stage of the war in operations on two fronts. At the Teheran Conference (28 November to 1 December 1943) Stalin promised that he would enter the war as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Meanwhile, he was determined to keep the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of April 1941 in force and to continue diplomatic relations with Tokyo. No doubt he feared that any outbreak of hostilities between the USSR and Japan at that time would lead to the closing of the vital Pacific supply route and might even force Russia out of the war. Nevertheless, although he was in no way ready to go to war in the Far East, Stalin was anxious to talk at Teheran about Soviet postwar aims there, particularly about securing access to the ice-free port of Dairen.

During the interval between the Teheran and Yalta conferences, Stalin created the impression that he was indifferent to the idea of Soviet participation, while the United States was trying to assign to the Soviet Union the military task of defeating the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria. On 23 September 1944, Stalin told Harriman that if the U. S. and Great Britain preferred to bring Japan to her knees without Soviet intervention, he would agree to such a strategy. In view of subsequent events, it is extremely doubtful that Stalin would have acquiesced in the adoption of such a plan. There can be little doubt that he was aware of Roosevelt's anxiety about securing Soviet participation in the Pacific war.

At Yalta (4-11 February 1945), when the end of the war in Europe was in sight, Stalin displayed considerably more interest in the war against Japan. He promised that Soviet forces would be committed in Manchuria about three months after the termination of European hostilities and agreed to allow the U. S. to establish bomber bases in Siberia. "But," writes Hanson W. Baldwin in *Great Mistakes of the War*, "he got down in black and white his price: the Curzon line for the eastern border of Poland, the Kurile Islands, and controlling economic strategic concessions in Manchuria."

After Yalta, one of Stalin's principal strategic problems was to make certain that the Soviet Union enter the war in time to gain the objectives which were contingent upon a Russian contribution to the defeat of Japan. Almost immediately after Yalta, it became apparent that Japan was on the verge of collapse as a result of U. S. conventional bombing and blockade.

The concealment of Japanese peace feelers

Obviously, therefore, it was urgent that the Soviet Union make its final thrust into eastern Europe against the crumbling German armies as quickly as possible, in order to be able to transfer 60 divisions with adequate supplies (1 million tons of which were to be delivered by the U. S., over and above the regular Lend-Lease shipments, by 30 June 1945) before Japan should surrender. Thus it is not surprising that the Soviet Union, which still maintained diplomatic relations with Japan, concealed Japanese peace overtures. Baldwin says that the Japanese "in February

1945 had approached the Russians with a request that they act as intermediary in arranging a peace with the Western powers. The Russian Ambassador, Malik, in Tokyo, was the channel of the approach. . . . The United States was not officially informed of this approach until after the end of the war."

At the end of May 1945, Harry Hopkins notified President Truman that the Japanese recognized the hopelessness of their situation and were sending out peace feelers. When Truman met Stalin at the Potsdam Conference (17 July to 2 August 1945), the Russians revealed for the first time that the Japanese were attempting to open peace negotiations through Moscow.

It would have done the Soviet Union little good and, potentially, a great deal of harm had Stalin concealed the peace feeler. The United States had already cracked the Japanese code and had intercepted and deciphered the correspondence between Premier Togo and the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. But the real reasons why Stalin revealed the Japanese approaches became obvious in retrospect: he was playing a double game. On the one hand, he skillfully sustained Japanese hopes for a Soviet intercession which would ameliorate the Allies' harsh demand for unconditional surrender. On the other, Stalin wanted to appear to the Western allies as a champion of unconditional surrender: at Potsdam, he explained his rejection of the peace feelers by saying he did not wish to compromise Allied war aims in the Pacific. Thus Stalin was able to close the door to immediate peace: while he encouraged the war efforts of the Western Allies, he held out the hope of intercession to the Japanese, thus forestalling direct negotiations between Japan and the United States.

Obviously, the Soviets had it in their power to bring the war in the Far East to a conclusion before the first atomic bomb fell on Japan. Their failure to do so was prompted by their desire to prolong the war until the USSR was prepared to enter it.

Strategy serves Russia's Far East ambitions

It is now certain that the Soviet Government had no wish to see the war come to such an untimely end, under conditions that would preclude a strong Russian voice in the Far East postwar settlement. We can recall that at Yalta Stalin had received far-reaching concessions which would assure Russia a stronger position in the Far East than she had ever enjoyed throughout her history. The granting of these concessions hinged upon a major contribution to the defeat of Japan. Had Japan surrendered before the Soviets attacked, the U. S. would then have been able to question the applicability of many provisions of the Yalta agreement. Indeed, it is highly probable that the Kwantung Army would have then surrendered to the United States, thereby preparing the way for U. S. occupation of Manchuria.

It has been sometimes argued that the Soviet Union was in a good position by midsummer of 1945 to enforce its territorial claims on the Far East mainland regardless of the technical terms of the Yalta agreement. But the point is that if Japan's surrender came prematurely, the Soviet Union would not have been able to establish its influence over Manchuria without committing an overt act of intervention or aggression which would alert the Western democracies to her postwar expanionist aims.

The existence of a large Japanese army in Manchuria created the conditions that led to Russia's entry into the Pacific war. To the U. S., Soviet Russia's intervention was desirable for military reasons. To the Kremlin it was politically desirable, and the timing of the act was dictated by the Kremlin's political objectives.

There was no reason to believe, at the time of the Potsdam meeting, that the end of the war in the Pacific was imminent. Indeed, the draft plans for an American invasion of the Japanese home islands indicated that the allies did not expect a Japanese surrender much before autumn of 1946. Therefore, at Potsdam Stalin felt safe in pressing for more far reaching political objectives than had been agreed upon at Teheran or Yalta, and to extract the highest possible price for his entrance into the war.

The two principal objectives which Stalin had in view were designed to extend his postwar influence in China and Japan. Stalin wanted agreements which would legalize the Soviet Union's postwar presence in China, by making China dependent upon Russian concurrence for the operation of Manchuria's industry. Moreover, as G. F. Hudson writes in *St. Antony's Papers No. 2: Far Eastern Affairs* (London, 1957), the Chinese Communists "had long ceased to obey strategic directives from Chungking, as they were supposed to do under the original united front agreement, and carried on operations on their own initiative, organizing areas behind the Japanese lines under their own political control wherever they could. The strategic positions which they thus gained made it possible that in the event of a collapse of the Japanese forces in North China they might get into Peking, Tientsin, Tsinan and other key cities in advance of the National government armies, and if Russian forces were at the same time to overrun Manchuria, the combination of external and internal communist powers might dominate all China between the Amur and the Yangtse."

Consequently, with such a prospect even remotely in view, it was desirable for Russia to secure some legal basis

for her postwar operations in China. At Potsdam, Stalin hoped to obtain U. S. support for a speedy Russo-Chinese treaty as a prior condition to his entrance into the war. "Stalin had said that Russia would not come into the war against Japan," writes President Truman in his memoirs, "until she had concluded an agreement with China. It was for this reason that I urged Chiang Kai-shek to continue the talks in Moscow."

Stalin's second objective was to insure a Soviet foothold on the Japanese mainland. Soviet occupation, had it been permitted, would have led to a partition of the country into two separate political entities as happened in Germany and Korea. Stalin's eagerness to have Soviet forces participate in the occupation and administration of Japan was revealed in a sharp exchange of dispatches between himself and President Truman within a few days after the Japanese surrender.

The situation in the Far East was quickly altered, however, by the first atomic attack on 6 August 1945. Although no final agreement had yet been reached with Chiang, Stalin was convinced that he must enter the war immediately in order to establish Russia's right to a victor's voice in the distribution of the spoils. Two days after Hiroshima, Foreign Minister Molotov unexpectedly notified Ambassador Harriman that the Soviet Union would consider itself at war with Japan on 9 August. President Truman concluded: "Our dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan had forced Russia to reconsider her position in the Far East."

The 'one-week' war

The Soviet "one-week-war" against Japan was a classic example of controlled-protracted warfare. The Soviet Union did not undertake the war because it had any specific grievance against Japan. The five-year neutrality pact with Japan had been mutually advantageous for it allowed both powers to concentrate on a one-front war. Although the Soviet Union in April 1945 had given the required one year's notice that it did not intend to renew the pact, the notice contained no suggestion that Moscow entertained the remotest intention of declaring war. As a matter of fact, at the time hostilities were launched, Molotov adopted a conciliatory—almost apologetic—tone toward the Japanese Ambassador, assuring him that the Soviet motive was to shorten the duration of the Pacific war. Some writers have implied that the Soviet Union entered the war "punctually and precisely" three months to the day after the defeat of Germany, as though she were motivated primarily by a desire to observe her Yalta and Potsdam promises. It is important to bear in mind, however, that there is no more than circumstantial evidence to support the argument that the Soviets attacked in Manchuria to fulfill an obligation to their ally. There is nothing in the Soviet doctrine of war which indicates that strategic planning should ever be based merely on compliance with a previous agreement. In fact, in order to fulfill the promise given at Yalta, Stalin had to abrogate his neutrality pact with Japan nine months before it was due to expire.

Soviet policy in the Far East during the summer of 1945 was fraught with ambiguity. First, the Russians had refused to take steps to advance the peace negotiations profferred by the Japanese between February and April 1945; but when war was declared, Molotov asserted that the Russians were interested only in seeing the war brought to a swift end. Secondly, although Stalin had consistently taken the position that the Soviet Union would not enter the Pacific war until after the conclusion of an agreement with the government of Chiang Kai-shek, the Russians decided, within 48 hours of the dropping of the first atomic bomb, to plunge into the Pacific war immediately, despite the fact that no agreement had yet been reached. From the events we have reviewed, and also from the self-evident fact that Stalin wished to have Soviet forces take part in the postwar occupation and administration of Japan, it is reasonable to infer that the timing of the Soviet attack on Manchuria was based upon a careful calculation of strategic objectives which might have been thwarted had Moscow delayed its decision to enter any longer.

The Kremlin displayed considerable irritation at the American suggestion that General MacArthur should determine when hostilities were to cease. Despite the fact that Japanese sources reported that the Kwantung Army was but a shell of its former self and offered practically no resistance, the Soviet Government reported furious fighting resulting in 8,219 dead and 22,264 wounded Russians, and an estimated 80,000 dead and wounded Japanese. It is clear from these statistics, accurate or not, that the Russians were anxious to convey the impression that their contribution to the defeat of Japan was an important one. One of the best summary interpretations of the closing days of the war in the Far East and the conflicting motives that lay beneath the surface is given by Edwin O. Reischauer in *The United States and Japan.*

"After desperate soul searching and frantic intrigues, the Japanese government naively decided to seek peace through Soviet mediation, but the Russian authorities, backed by the highly advantageous agreement with the United States and Great Britain at Yalta, were the last people in the world to desire the war to end before they had a chance to enter it. Thus the summer of 1945 witnessed one of the strangest races in history, a race between the Japanese trying to get out of the war and the Russians trying to get in, but, since only the Russians fully realized that a race was on, they of course won."

Communist attitudes towards war

Unlike most Western strategic planners, who have traditionally equated war with the clash of arms, Communist leaders are trained to think of conflict in much larger dimensions. For them, military action is but one of many forms of warfare. Other forms—political, sociological, ideological, psychological, technological, and economic—are just as important or, under certain conditions, *more* important. Quick, decisive military victory, which for centuries has been the prime mover of Western strategic planing, holds no equally exalted place in Communist conflict science. The Western planner is inclined to consider his job done once he has won crushing victory on the battlefield; the responsibility for advancing his nation's political objectives is then shunted conveniently from the military commander to the statesman. This delineation of functions is symptomatic of the Western democratic tradition which regards war as an aberration from international normalcy, the result of a breakdown in orthodox diplomacy. Communist doctrine, by contrast, does not separate so completely the functions of the military planner and the diplomat. Policy and war are two sides of the same coin. The coin is strategy.

TRAINING IS BASIC

says this officer who has had experience in two training divisions. The frustrations come from a system that imposes so much more that fundamentals are lost in the shuffle

Major HARLAN G. KOCH

HAVING recently served in two training divisions, I think I can throw some light on the basic training problem, from the viewpoint of the company officer. I believe I can point out deficiencies which are an outgrowth of our current system and which can be easily corrected. Correction, however, cannot come from within company, battle group, division, or even army. It has to come down from the Pentagon. Some of my criticisms may seem puerile to officers who see the whole picture, but they relate to conditions that exist and as they are seen by company officers.

First off, additional means placed at the disposal of training centers and divisions will not materially improve the morale and effectiveness of those establishments. In view of the Army's current financial bind, let's waste no further words on hopes for added resources.

The senior officers at the two training divisions in which I have served were splendid; I have encountered none better. It would be difficult indeed to find men more dedicated to the trying task at hand or to their profession. They are of the best, and behind them are years of experience. If a few Supermen could be assembled to energize a training center, they would do no better at improving either morale or the product of our training. What then?

It is neither the trainer nor his resources. It's the system that is at cross purposes with what we're trying to effect: esprit, noncommissioned officer prestige, reenlistments, happiness with our lot, better training, and many others. Let's analyze the problem.

The MOS jungle

Our training system is influenced in large part by the forecast of job-title requirements from overseas. We need so many 130.0, so many 640.0, and so on. This brings a nightmare to a division G3 or a battalion S3 because each MOS requires its own training program. Consequently, a training program for the simple duties of a prospective filler has become almost as complex as the logistical problem of resupplying an army moving through Tibet.

In order to better effect specialization, subordinate units in some training divisions are organized according to the MOS training programs. For example, Company A will train MOS such-and-such and MOS this-and-that. Company B or X Battalion will train all of MOS X, Y and Z. Elaborate charts (by necessity) are compiled by G3 and S3. These charts indicate the progress of recruits in the various job titles—say, armor specialties, or infantry specialties. Unit integrity? "This is Company 111.0." Imagine the frustration of a reconnaissance company commander whose TOE requires riflemen, tracked-vehicle mechanics, mortarmen, tankers, scouts, and all the rest. Each type of job requires different training.

Feed 10 or 11 thousand recruits (and their cadres) into this complex machinery and everyone commences galloping atop a vast treadmill. This treadmill is geared directly to the numerous Army Training Programs and is packed with 44 hours of subject schedules and lesson plans!

To make things worse, the overseas requirement for MOS, by type, has been known to change mid-cycle. The flash goes out through the division that we have 500 more armor recruits than are required overseas, but that a shortage of infantrymen exists. All these tankers must be suddenly converted to the infantry program in midstream. Since the tankers have fired only carbine and pistol, a lot of make-up training commences for Saturdays and Sundays. "They've got to fire the rifle! They ship out before long."

Staff officers burn the midnight oil revamping the master plan, the MOS charts, and rescheduling or juggling over-committed training facilities. G4 looks around for extra rifles. "What will we do with all these carbines?" Because of the Army's size and the magnitude of all the problems naturally associated with a large enterprise, topside planners can understand why sudden changes of this nature sometimes occur. Unfortunately, the captains, lieutenants and sergeants, who have

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Major Harlan G. Koch, *Armor,* has commanded rifle, reconnaissance and tank companies, and was training inspector of an armored division. A 1946 graduate of West Point, he has been as assistant Army attaché in Bangkok, and is now at Fourth Army Headquarters. This is his fifth appearance in this magazine.

sweated to make tankers of their charges, do not. Much less the recruit, whose comprehension at best is usually rather foggy.

We need followers who will follow

Why should the recruit's basic training be so complex and long, so filled with complicated, unnecessary subjects? He is oriented and crammed with almost everything basic to the Army and to his specialty. Few recruits master any of it. For example, those trained to be tankers must fire the pistol, the carbine, the submachine gun, the light machine gun and the caliber .50, and the 90mm cannon. Not only must they fire them; they spend hours learning how they work, and how to disassemble and assemble each weapon, memorizing names of parts.

In addition to intensive weapons training, our combat-arms recruits get many hours of squad, platoon and company tactics. We spend hours teaching the recruit how to fill the role of a five-stripe sergeant, how to fight a tank, how to lead a nine-man patrol, or how a platoon leader stages a night attack. This is pumped into a civilian, recently turned soldier, during the phases we call basic combat training, advanced individual training, and basic unit training. At most training commands this complete cycle takes approximately 20 weeks of the new soldier's time. Some recruits move on to specialist schools for much longer periods. Practice varies from place to place.

The "blurb" the editors put on to Colonel Swift's article in the November 1958 issue of ARMY read: "The big job always of the U. S. Army is the making of followers who will follow." We seem to have lost sight of this. We are attempting to make leaders and tacticians out of boys, recently turned men, and in the space of a few short weeks. We spend a lot of extra hours doing it. Where are the "followers" to fill those ammo bearer, loader, rifleman, cook's helper, and cannoneer slots?

Let's dig a little deeper to see how this affects esprit, noncommissioned officer prestige, happiness with our lot, and the rest.

Committees are a taxicab army

Remember the stories of the taxicab army and how comical or incongruous they were? The taxicab army is still with us, only now its vehicles have fins. If you visit the rifle range or other training site at most major centers you can count at least 40 private cars parked nearby. These belong to the cadre—the committeemen. The officers and noncommissioned officers of this group didn't march to the training area with their 200 recruits. They are more closely identified with the committee than with the recruit unit. The bird dog detailed to march recruits from class to class is considered unfortunate indeed. The committee is divorced from the unit; it reports to the company only for pay and to get the poop. Committee members are on the unit's morning report, but little else.

Captain Delta can't count on Sergeant Zebra of his company because Zebra works with Lieutenant Golf's weapons committee. Golf belongs to another company. Although he works daily with Zebra, he has little command or administrative control over him. When promotions come around, Zebra is pretty deep in left field; Captain Delta has lost track of him. That is, he has lost track unless Lieutenant Golf continually sends out efficiency estimates to the several unit commanders of the 18 noncommissioned officers who work with him. Golf is not too interested in doing this, because from sunrise to sunset he is on the go with his daily instruction. Zebra has no particular interest in helicopters, but he soon applies for a copter maintenance school—for no other reason than to get out of the rat race. He's fed up to the eyebrows with this outfit, and he associates his unit with the Army in general: "It ain't like it used to be."

No unit commander is too interested in any of Lieutenant Golf's complaints or comments about his noncommissioned help. That is, unless Golf intends returning one of them. Cold and impersonal as it might seem, even Golf's company commander isn't too interested in *him* any more. "The Lieutenant is always out with that committee; he really works for battalion S3." Golf can never lend a hand with company paperwork unless he is drafted for a weekend. "By golly, let's do that. The supply room inventory is long overdue." Golf's reaction becomes readily apparent. He worked hard with that committee all week and no one seemed too interested in his virtues, shortcomings, or problems—except the training inspectors. He doesn't associate himself too closely with his company commander because actually he doesn't work for him. No one can understand why Lieutenant Golf wants to leave the Army. He was doing one helluva swell job, too.

Senior officers know that committees have an adverse effect on morale and unit pride. Topside has sent down directives pointing out that the unit system in training is superior to the committee scheme. Why, then, are these lieutenants and captains the very ones who beg to be organized into committees—the committees that will soon wreck their companies and battle groups? The reason is that the current system makes it necessary. If you want quality instruction you have to group all available teachers into committees. Subjects are so varied that it is next to impossible to present all of them expertly with only the company cadre. "Leave a couple of bird dogs to march the company." The rest are organized into committees.

What leads to committees?

In BCT alone there are more than 300 hours of scheduled subjects; there is a like number in AIT. This instruction deals with scouting, radiotelephone operation, combat formations, and many other skills. Each of us has taught all these subjects at one time or another,

or they've been taught to us; we're familiar with them all, though not expert. Plan all this instruction for a company that can use only a captain, a couple of lieutenants, and 10 enlisted cadremen. Either the quality of your instruction will be lowered or your cadre will be looking for the nearest school.

If you haven't handled a caliber .50 machine gun during the past couple of years, prepare a two-hour course in disassembly and assembly, timing and headspace adjustment, for 200 recruits. You'll have to prepare the lesson plan, get hold of at least 25 guns, a podium, tarps, a visual training aid, and a platform. Your class, to be topnotch, will need 15 to 20 assistants who must be rehearsed. You have only 10 cadremen in your company, all pretty rusty on their .50 instruction. Three are setting up the next class, and Sergeant Jackson is scheduled for sergeant of the guard. Rehearsal, by necessity, normally is done during after-duty hours. Also, keep in mind that the assistant division commander is always dropping in, and when he arrives so do a few others along the chain of command. Your class had better be good! Try relying on your past experience to equip you as principal instructor. The preparation of this instruction will require a good deal of time. And don't forget: there are six other instruction hours scheduled for that day. Committees become the solution. Even with committees, the preparation and planning for a day's varied instruction takes considerable time.

Generally, most officers of a training division's staff work from 50 to 65 hours a week; company and battery personnel do from 60 to 90 hours. That's not portal-to-portal time; it's time actually spent in the unit. During some really busy weeks the 30-miles-off-post people meet themselves coming and going. It is rather amusing to read directives such as: "Full utilization must be made of all available time. The program should not be limited to a 44-hour week."

One last note on committees. So that a single company's recruits can learn to drive tanks or APCs or tracked artillery vehicles, for this instruction sometimes it is necessary to pool all battalion vehicles of a type. This constitutes a driving committee, no less. Although we abhor the practice, sometimes it happens that persons responsible for vehicles or preventive maintenance become separated from them. The upshot is obvious. Vehicles commence breaking down in crippling numbers, and the chain of command goes on the carpet again. Poopsheets (it takes a lot of time and thought to write them) rain down from headquarters. Oftentimes the vehicles receive their best care long *after* the colors have slipped down the pole.

Now back to the company.

Noncommissioned prestige and details

"Why is that sergeant mowing grass?" "Why are those noncommissioned officers digging that permanent latrine when there are 10,000 trainees here?" Questions like these come only from observers who are not serving with the division, although sometimes they are asked even from within. The answer is a simple one: privates and privates first class are scarce in a training unit. This condition causes considerable unhappiness among the noncommissioned officers and officers of a training division. In one DA poopsheet the future and the prestige of the noncommissioned officer are explored; guidance and counsel are suggested. Another discusses the young officer and the fact that his authority is being diminished. I've seen sergeants cleaning tank cannon that were fired by trainees because there were no recruits to do the job. I've seen lieutenants pitching in because there weren't enough sergeants.

If recruits are used, it's in violation of current directives. Recruits cannot do fatigue during training hours. Naturally. Each hour of the recruit's schedule is very carefully planned. You just don't put him on a detail that will last two or three days. He has very little opportunity for make-up training. If you want a recruit to do a little labor, you must wait until after supper—and before 2100 or 2200 (the time varies with each command). Anyway, the recruit has plenty of his own work to do. His sweaty fatigue clothing must be washed, his weapon must be cleaned, his barracks floor needs scrubbing, his boots are heavy with mud. Besides it's too dark to mow grass.

The generals say the sergeants shouldn't have to do hard labor or even menial tasks. The sergeants agree. The trainees just don't have the time—under the current system.

Comparison with Marine Corps system

We could profitably study Marine Corps basic combat training. As you know, the Marine boot has the spirit of the Corps constantly drummed into him. During the PT and personal combat phase he is hardened physically; he develops aggressiveness and confidence. Dismounted drill, a forgotten art in the Army, is invaluable to the Marines in a number of intangible ways. Quite naturally it increases the ability to move sharply in formations. Most important, it develops instant response to orders.

The hours a Marine boot devotes to personal affairs is done on a schedule, as part of training time. Sick call, PX trips, haircuts, washing and ironing, all are done on schedule. Boots are marched off in formation by a DI. When not in formation they move on the double. All boots in their eighth week do KP and fatigue for the entire post. They do not perform these duties at any other time during recruit training. The most important advantage in this is that no Marine noncommissioned officer has to mow grass or dig latrines. Their recruits do not miss scheduled instruction as their Army counterparts do when they pull KP. The Marine Corps drill instructor enjoys considerably more prestige than does his Army counterpart. I understand that the commander of a Marine recruit company has no administrative responsibilities other than verifying his morning report. He is a commander for all of his time.

The commander of a Marine training battalion has authority to set back less progressive recruits to the cycle behind. Boots who miss as little as three days of training are turned back. The Marines spend little time in teaching their boots individual tactics, or what I would call "techniques."

I think a soldier should leave the training center fully trained to handle himself in combat. He should know how to move by day or night, how to negotiate wire obstacles, select cover, his responsibilities in a bivouac area, and so on. However, we must not waste time in taking him through squad, platoon and company tactics. Possibly nothing more than a demonstration or training film is enough to show him how he fits into the big picture.

Shorten training time

In order to get the filler to the overseas unit, we must shorten our training time. This will save training dollars and will also get him quicker to where he's needed most. It will also give the overseas or STRAC unit a chance to integrate the filler into its organization. But a loud howl goes up: this soldier is not thoroughly trained! Reasonable numbers of such replacements will not seriously impair a ready unit's combat effectiveness. Seven or eight reporting to a company-sized unit overseas will be absorbed in four or five weeks. Their influence on a unit should make little difference. The old hands will be quick to show them the ropes. If the balloon should go up tomorrow, these overseas units will get replacements who won't be trained nearly as well.

I've heard recruits say: "My old man told me this Army stuff was going to be rough. It hasn't been very tough so far." Most men actually convey the impression that they are being denied a challenge. It's too soft. I've seen recruits become enthusiastic over training even more rigorous than any Marine's. They didn't particularly adore their cadre, but they respected them and they understood the necessity for basic training. This particular training, however, was not conducted entirely within the framework of the current ATP. There was no war on, either. Motivating trainees is an interesting challenge to the worth of the cadreman.

Burn in the fundamentals

Before we teach a man to become a specialized infantryman, tanker, artilleryman, or ordnance mechanic, let's show him how to be an individual soldier. Let's see that he learns to defend *himself* in personal combat, how to drill and respond to command, how to use his own weapon (preferably that commonly used in battle—his rifle), how to take care of himself in the field, how to use cover and concealment, how to creep and crawl, and how to move animal-like by night. Don't brush over these subjects; burn them in! Top this off with thoroughly integrated and rigorous physical training, meticulous inspections, and interesting orientation in the traditions, history, and customs of the Army. The stress should be on the individual soldier. A trained product that can fit into almost any unit. A man who can care for himself and who can conduct himself as the U. S. Army expects him to do if he becomes separated from his outfit. Our current basic training system is not producing this kind of filler.

I believe we can turn out combat-ready soldiers if we do these things during basic training:

Lengthen the BCT phase to 12 or 13 weeks, as in the Marine system. Eliminate AIT and BUT. Inaugurate a fatigue week similar to the Marine system, and schedule personal affairs. To neglect to do so is to unduly harass the cadre's personnel as well as the people we're introducing to Army life.

Fill the program with PT, dismounted drill, traditions and history, and schooling in the skills of the individual soldier. Eliminate the too many subjects that recruits do not immediately need to know.

Eliminate committees and revert to the unit system of training. Two or three officers and 10 to 12 field cadremen can handle this reduced scope of instruction for a 220-man company. This will return company training to the company commander and his team. It will give the team every opportunity to develop an enthusiastic unit.

Give the battalion or company commander authority to turn recruits back a cycle if they miss three or four days of training or if they appear to need additional instruction. If our entire program is thorough, we won't have many to set back.

Investigate the Marine Corps system of training center administration. Our company commanders, and particularly our first sergeants, have lost much of their command effectiveness. Operation Paperchase produced few improvements in companies.

Allow no filler to go off to a specialist school. This wastes too much of his utilization time. If after his first overseas tour he wants to sign up for another hitch, let's then consider him a good investment for schooling.

The word is out that we must bear down on developing a "hard core peacetime Army." Although headquarters strength charts may indicate an imposing array of military units, the harried noncommissioned and junior officer could give an interesting account of just how soft the supposed hard core is. I have outlined most of the reasons. Amazingly enough, we're working at breakneck, wartime speed. Leaders in companies are experiencing the same frustrations and family problems that were met during wartime; the volume of current IG checks attest to that fact. Yet we do not seem to be accomplishing results commensurate with the sweat being expended.

We need to change our training system. To be effective that change must be drastic, not just the juggling of a few hours here or there. Our training difficulties merit topside attention—the same careful scrutiny our missiles systems receive. As General Trudeau said at AUSA's 1958 meeting: "The weapon isn't any more effective than the soldier who has to operate it."

1959 REUNION CALENDAR

June

4th Armd Div: 25-27 June. Shoreham Hotel, Washington, DC. Write A. J. Passanante, PO Box 42, Kearny, NJ.

26th Inf Div: 18-21 June. Hotel Northampton, Northampton, Mass. Write A. J. Mantenuto, 200 Huntington Ave., Boston, Mass.

28th Inf Div: 30 June-3 July. Brunswick Hotel, Lancaster, Pa. Write Harry G. Weber, 505 Burmount Road, Drexel Hill, Pa.

33d Inf Div: 19-20 June. Morrison Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write Geo. D. Radcliffe, Room 508, 79 W. Madison St., Chicago 2, Ill.

76th Inf Div: 13 June. Commodore Hotel, NYC. Write Maj. Gen. Henry C. Evans, 6 S. Calvert St., Baltimore 2, Md.

Persian Gulf Command Veterans: 20-21 June. Cherokee Dude Ranch, Livermore, Calif. Write C. T. Perkins, Box 482, Tempe, Ariz.

July

2d Armd Div: 31 July-1 Aug. Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, DC. Write Col. R. F. Perry, Box 172, Alexandria, Va.

2d Inf Div: 23-25 July. Penn Sheraton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write Col. C. J. Hirschfelder, 214 W. Agarita, San Antonio, Tex.

3d Armd Div: 23-25 July. Hilton Hotel, Dallas, Tex. Write Paul W. Corrigan, 80 Federal St., Boston 10, Mass.

3d Inf Div: 15-18 July. Hotel New Yorker, NYC. Write Harry Cedar, 1129 Warner Bldg., Washington 4, DC.

6th Armd Div: 3-6 July. Hotel Sheraton, Louisville, Ky. Write Edward F. Reed, Box 492, Louisville 1, Ky.

8th Armd Div: 3-5 July. Penn Sheraton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write Henry B. Rothenberg, 134 N. LaSalle St., Chicago 2, Ill.

9th Inf Div: 30-31 July. Statler Hotel, NYC. Write Stanley Cohen, Box 66, Livingston, NJ.

25th Inf Div: 24-26 July. Statler Hotel, Washington, DC. Write Major A. R. Clark, Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

30th Inf Div: 8-10 July. Ellinor Village, Ormond Beach, Fla. Write Major Saul Solow, 42 Parkway Drive, Hicksville, NY.

38th Inf Div: 17-18 July. American Legion Post 180, St. Matthews, Ky. Write Maj. T. W. O'Leary, 4th & Walnut, Louisville, Ky.

41st Inf Div: 17-19 July. Chicago, Ill. Write S. B. Huntting, 526 NW Broadway, Portland 9, Ore.

42d Inf Div: 12-14 July. Towne House Hotel, Kansas City, Kans. Write R. Allen Gibbons, Box 342, Roanoke 3, Va.

63d Inf Div: 24-26 July. Penn Sheraton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write Robert C. Capasso, 34 Lincoln St., Norwood, Mass.

82d Abn Div: 2-4 July. Pick Carter Hotel, Cleveland, Ohio. Write Carl A. Helgren, 3968 Katherine Ave., Dearborn, Mich.

94th Inf Div: 8-12 July. Hotel Thayer, West Point, NY. Write A. E. Rodriguez, 1417 W. Addison St., Chicago 13, Ill.

99th Inf Div: 10-12 July. Penn Sheraton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write John E. Cummings, 3022 W. Cary St., Richmond, Va.

102d Inf Div: 30-31 July. Congress Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write George Ross, 413 Miller Ave., Brooklyn, NY.

106th Inf Div: 24-26 July. Edgewater Beach Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write John I. Gallagher, 4003 Frances St., Temple, Pa.

August

1st Armd Div: 21-22 Aug. Severin Hotel, Indianapolis, Ind. Write Col. Leo B. Conner, 1529 18th St. NW, Washington 6, DC.

1st Inf Div: 21-23 Aug. Hotel Manger, Rochester, NY. Write Arthur L. Chaitt, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 42, Pa.

1st SSF: 14-16 Aug. Hotel Paliser, Calgary, Alta., Canada. Write Eugene McCormick, 1901 S. 4th St., Lafayette, Ind.

4th Inf Div: 13-15 Aug. Ben Franklin Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. Write Iz Goldstein, 1276 E. 54 St., Brooklyn, NY.

5th Armd Div: 6-8 Aug. Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, DC. Write Mrs. Clair E. Watrous, 8549 Lowell St., St. Louis 15, Mo.

6th Inf Div: Early Aug. St. Louis, Mo. Write James E. Wittstruck, 4201 B St., Lincoln 10, Neb.

7th Armd Div: 14-16 Aug. Willard Hotel, Washington, DC. Write Johnnie Walker, 375 Valley Road, Haworth, NJ.

11th Armd Div: 13-15 Aug. Edgewater Beach Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write Ray Buch, Box 177, Clinton, NJ.

12th Armd Div: 6-8 Aug. Palmer House, Chicago, Ill. Write Lawrence C. Mintz, 4310 Buena Vista Ave., Detroit 38, Mich.

16th Armd Div: 7-9 Aug. Hotel Secar, Toledo, Ohio. Write James E. Austin, 100 Dee Drive, Linwood, NJ.

17th Abn Div: 7-9 Aug. Ben Franklin Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. Write W. A. Rancone, 802 Hiland Ave., Corapolis, Pa.

24th Inf Div: Date indefinite. Philadelphia, Pa. Write Edmund F. Henry, 402 First Nat. Bank Bldg., Attleboro, Mass.

31st Inf Div: 1-2 Aug. Springfield, Ill. Write W. A. Anderson, 4913 N. Hermitage Ave., Chicago 40, Ill.

43d Inf Div: 7-8 Aug. Statler-Hilton Hotel, Hartford, Conn. Write Joseph E. Zimmer, State Armory, Hartford 15, Conn.

69th Inf Div: 21-23 Aug. Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, DC. Write Irving Botkin, 287 First Ave., New York 9, NY.

78th Inf Div: Date indefinite, Fort Dix, NJ. Write John E. Chegan, 697 President St., Brooklyn 15, NY.

80th Inf Div: 5-8 Aug. Hotel Netherlands, Cincinnati, Ohio. Write M. H. Levine, 205 House Bldg., Pittsburgh 22, Pa.

83d Inf Div: 20-22 Aug. Statler-Hilton Hotel, Detroit, Mich. Write George Cooley, 1459 Beachwood St NE, Warren, Ohio.

84th Inf Div: 13-15 Aug. Hollywood Knickerbocker Hotel, Hollywood, Calif. Write Lee C. Allen, 3815 Westview NW, Canton, Ohio.

86th Inf Div: 30 Aug-1 Sept. Hotel Seelbach, Louisville, Ky. Write James B. Dickerson, 1049 Park Ave., Paducah, Ky.

88th Inf Div: 14-16 Aug. Shoreham Hotel, Washington, DC. Write Sidney Heyman, 2017 Forest Dale Drive, Silver Spring, Md.

95th Inf. Div: 21-23 Aug. Hotel Knickerbocker, Chicago, Ill. Write Francis E. Safarik, Box 1274, Chicago 90, Ill.

101st Abn Div: 14-15 Aug. Statler Hotel, NYC. Write Col. Leo B. Conner, 1529 18th St. NW, Washington 6, DC.

CBI Veterans: 5-8 Aug. Sheraton Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. Write Eugene R. Brauer, Box 1848, Philadelphia, Pa.

Merrill's Marauders: 29-31 Aug. Wentworth-by-the-Sea, Portsmouth, NH. Write David Hurwitt, 22 Basket Lane, Hicksville, NY.

September

5th Inf Div: 5-7 Sept. Mark Twain Hotel, Elmira, NY. Write Lloyd A. Rader, 451 E. Clay Ave., Roselle Park, NJ.

10th Armd Div: 5-7 Sept. Penn Sheraton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write J. Edwin Grace, 108 Langdon Ave., Watertown 72, Mass.

27th Inf Div: 25-26 Sept. Hotel Queensburg, Glenn Falls, NY. Write Lawrence Reagan, Box 1403, Albany, NY.

32d Inf Div: 5-7 Sept. Stevens Point, Wis. Write Edward T. Lauer, 8035 Stickney Ave., Wauwatosa 13, Wis.

34th Inf Div: 11-13 Sept. Sheraton-Montrose Hotel, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Write Lt. Col. Junior F. Miller, Red Horse Armory, Des Moines, Iowa.

35th Inf Div: 19-21 Sept. Marion Hotel, Little Rock, Ark. Write Maj. Gen. Mahlon S. Weed, Box 1001, Kansas City, Kans.

36th Inf Div: 4-6 Sept. Hotel Roosevelt, Waco, Tex. Write Harold D. Loftus, Box 5068, West Austin Sta., Austin, Tex.

37th Inf Div: 4-7 Sept. Carter Hotel, Cleveland, Ohio. Write Jack R. McGuire, Room 1101, 21 W. Broad St., Columbus 15, Ohio.

65th Inf Div: 25-26 Sept. Penn Sheraton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. Write Albert J. White, 712 Highland Ave., Canonsburg, Pa.

91st Inf Div: 26 Sept. (tentative), Seattle, Wash. Write Archie Walker, Drawer 22-19, Seattle 11, Wash.

100th Inf Div: 11-13 Sept. Ben Franklin Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. Write Thomas C. Burdett, 114 S. Main St., Taylor, Pa.

104th Inf Div: 5-7 Sept. Deshler-Hilton Hotel, Columbus, Ohio. Write Howard S. Bedney, 695 Hewlett St., Franklin Square, NY.

VII Corps Veterans: 20-24 Sept. McAllister Hotel, Miami, Fla. Write S. C. Hutchinson, 706 Lafayette Ave., Colonial Heights, Va.


THE

INCHON LANDING

PERILOUS GAMBLE OR EXEMPLARY BOLDNESS?

Lieutenant Colonel JAMES F. SCHNABEL

THE amphibious assault at Inchon in September 1950 is considered to have been skillfully executed and extremely successful. Yet, among those who concede the brilliance of the operation, some regard the landing as an "exemplification" of bold strategy, while others call it a gamble that "should not be accepted, *per se* as a yardstick of future capability." Quite clearly, these contrasting views are judgments of the conditions facing General Douglas MacArthur at the time he conceived and planned the landing. For after examining the uncertainties posed at the time by the tactical situation, the availability of landing forces, knowledge of the enemy, and the hydrographic and topographic conditions in the target area, it is easy to describe MacArthur's action either as a perilous gamble or as an instance of exemplary boldness.

MacArthur pondered the efficacy of an amphibious landing in rear of enemy forces even before the first U. S. ground troops entered the Korean conflict. At that time, after having seen the Republic of Korea's forces steadily disintegrate under the enemy's initial attack, he expected the North Korean Army to push some distance down the peninsula before he could commit sufficient forces to turn it back. But this same gloomy prospect offered a possible tactical advantage. MacArthur perceived that the deeper the North Koreans penetrated, the longer their supply lines would become; and if these lengthy lines were not well guarded, the enemy would be vulnerable to an amphibious envelopment. An amphibious force might isolate the North Koreans by landing behind their lines and cutting their supply routes; and a continuation of the attack by the amphibious force, coupled with an overland drive from the south, might destroy the North Korean Army, or at least shove it back into North Korea.

MacArthur considered Inchon, the Yellow Sea port halfway up the west coast of the peninsula, to be the best place to make an amphibious assault. Only 25 miles to the east is the city of Seoul, which, because most of Korea's main roads and rail lines converge there, would be a key center of the enemy's principal line of communications. Thus, after seizing Inchon, the assault force would have to advance inland only a few miles to sever the North Koreans' supply routes. Moreover, the recapture of Seoul, since it was the ROK capital, could have a helpful psychological impact.

Planning on credit

At this early stage of the conflict, MacArthur instructed his Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), headed by his G3 (Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright), to prepare plans for such an operation. Wright's group worked toward a landing date sometime late in July 1950. MacArthur estimated at the time that an overland attack and amphibious envelopment could be made successfully by a force of roughly two and a half divisions. Since he then had four Army divisions in Japan, he may have been confident that he had sufficient numbers—even though these divi-

Heading for the beach in amtracs. Inchon harbor has difficult sea approaches and is one of the worst possible places to conduct a landing operation

Wolmi island which lies in Inchon harbor has a causeway leading to the mainland. The island received intensive naval bombardment before invading units landed

sions were understrength—to carry out the operation he had conceived. Yet, any planning by Wright's group had to be done at least partially on credit, since none of the available ground units were adequately trained for an amphibious strike. Earlier, Navy and Marine Corps specialists in amphibious warfare had come at MacArthur's request to train one regiment from each of the four divisions. This instruction had just started when the opening of hostilities in Korea required most of the specialists to take up new duties connected with sea-lifting the 24th Division to Korea. While these jobs occupied the amphibious specialists, the 1st Cavalry and 7th and 25th Infantry Divisions received no amphibious training, and all three lost key personnel to the 24th.

After learning from Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander of Navy forces in the Far East, that a regimental combat team from the 1st Marine Division could be dispatched to the theater, MacArthur cabled Washington on 2 July, asking for these Marines. He received word on the 3d that a Marine RCT (the 5th), accompanied by supporting tactical air, would be sent. MacArthur responded to this grant with new requests, some for troops to be used in his amphibious assault, others for units to help block the advance of the North Korean Army, which, by then, was beginning to display unsuspected power. The forces requested included the 2d Infantry Division, three medium tank battalions, an airborne RCT, an engineer special brigade, and 1,200 specially trained operators for amphibian landing craft.

By the time these requests were dispatched, the 1st Cavalry Division had been selected to make the amphibious assault after receiving some amphibious training from the Navy and Marine specialists in Japan. General Wright's group, meanwhile, outlined an attack plan in some detail. This plan was code-named Operation Bluehearts. It called for the 1st Cavalry Division to hit Inchon about 20 July in concert with an overland attack from the south by the 24th Division, already in Korea, and all but one RCT of the 25th Division, which MacArthur ordered to Korea on 5 July.

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The 5th Marine RCT, after arriving in the theater, would either reinforce the 1st Cavalry Division ashore or make an additional amphibious assault.

But while the Bluehearts plan was being considered in Tokyo, the 24th Division and remnants of the ROK Army fell back so steadily under North Korean strong attacks that MacArthur was compelled to send the 1st Cavalry Division as well as the entire 25th Division into Korea lest his forces be driven off the peninsula. Consequently, the Bluehearts plan was abandoned on 10 July. By the 18th, three of MacArthur's divisions were in Korea, all under Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army; and the 7th Division, though still in Japan, was virtually stripped of effectiveness after having provided fillers for the three divisions committed.

Attack from two directions

Though events in Korea forced the cancellation of Bluehearts, MacArthur insisted that the only hope of an early UN decision lay in an amphibious assault in the enemy rear. He judged that any program of building up strength in front of the North Korean Army until the direction of battle was reversed portended a slow and costly campaign. On the other hand, the North Korean Army, in penetrating deeper into South Korea, had, as MacArthur had anticipated, become vulnerable to an envelopment. By mid-July, according to intelligence estimates, the North Koreans had committed 80,000 troops, the majority of which were on the front line facing General Walker's three divisions while the line of communications was only lightly guarded by security troops. Thus, MacArthur could see a real opportunity to strike deep behind the enemy's mass to cut his supply lines, and then to envelop and annihilate his front-line divisions by attacking from two directions.

According to the basic premise of amphibious assault, "any beach can be seized by properly trained landing forces provided first that it can be isolated by air power and neutralized by sea-power; and second that surprise can be achieved." In the matter of surprise, MacArthur speculated that the North Korean commander considered a landing at Inchon to be impossible because of the region's natural obstacles. Supporting this contention was an intelligence estimate that only 6,500 North Korean troops garrisoned the Seoul-Inchon area. UN air and naval power, moreover, gave MacArthur complete control of the skies and seas around Korea and, thereby met the other essential condition.

One of the world's worst areas

Holding to his original concept of a landing at Inchon and an overland drive from the south, MacArthur established 15 September as the new target date for the amphibious phase of the operation. Though an arbitrary date, so far as it pertained to halting the North Korean advance and assembling an adequate amphibious force, this was the next date on which the Yellow Sea would offer favorable landing conditions at Inchon.

From the standpoints of sea approaches and landing conditions, Inchon harbor ranks among the worst areas in Korea. Many islands bracket Inchon to seaward, forming a natural pocket and restricting naval maneuver to narrow channels. Navigation through these channels, even in daylight, is treacherous. This is especially true of the twisting, dead-end "Flying Fish" channel, the main path into the inner harbor. Besides these hazards, the tidal range at Inchon is extreme, the changes exceeding 30 feet; the Yellow Sea, in making its periodic, heavy surges into the harbor, has built up broad mud flats in the inner harbor area. The muck of these flats being too soft and deep to support foot troops, an assault force would have to be put ashore by landing craft. Since the mud flats stand nearly 16 feet above the low-water level, this would be possible only when the tide measured at least 23 feet for small landing craft and 29 feet for LSTs. These tidal obstacles would next be met on 15 September, when the tides would reach 31 feet. After that, the possible dates were 27 September, when the tides would hit 27 feet, and mid-October, when they again would reach the 30-foot stage.

In the matter of forces, MacArthur knew by 11 July that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (the 5th RCT of the 1st Marine Division, plus three squadrons of Marine Air Group 33) and the lead RCT of the Army's 2d Infantry Division would reach the Far East early in August. Consideration was given to using these two units as the landing force. An even more promising possibility was offered by Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commander of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, who suggested that MacArthur requisition the remainder of the 1st Marine Division. Though he realized that bringing the 1st Marine Division to full strength would require nearly as many men as were then in the entire Fleet Marine Forces, General Shepherd was certain the division could be sent to Korea by 15 September. MacArthur's request for a full Marine division went in on 10 July; and in the nine days following, while his first request was being considered in Washington, MacArthur asked twice more for the division, stipulating in his last request that it should reach the Far East by 10 September.

Alternate landing sites

On 13 July, three days after MacArthur first requested the remainder of the 1st Marine Division, General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, reached Tokyo for a conference with MacArthur on the worsening situation in Korea. In the discussions that followed, General Collins learned for the first time how heavily MacArthur was counting on an amphibious assault to turn the tide of battle. MacArthur outlined his tentative scheme of attack, pointing out that Inchon would be the best place to land, but that he was con-

sidering alternate landing sites at Haeju and Chinnampo, both north of Inchon. Collins, without committing himself as being either for or against the operation, questioned any landing at Inchon in view of the extreme tidal conditions there. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, key assistant to Admiral Joy and an expert in amphibious warfare, while agreeing that a landing at Inchon would be difficult, told Collins that it could be made. In discussing the need for forces, Major General Edward M. Almond, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, asked Collins for a two-division corps of Marines. Collins replied only that the Marines were as short of troops as the Army, but before returning to Washington he told MacArthur privately that he felt one full Marine division could be sent to the Far East. Otherwise, Collins told MacArthur, the only additional forces to be counted on were the Army's 2d Infantry Division, the 5th RCT from Hawaii, the 29th RCT from Okinawa, and an airborne RCT from the 11th Airborne Division. To this MacArthur replied that, barring Soviet or extensive Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, he would make his plans fit the anticipated strength outlined by Collins.

In Korea, the commitment of the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions slowed but did not stop the enemy advance. The important communications center of Taejon fell to the enemy on 20 July, and the continued slow but steady withdrawal of General Walker's forces threatened to make MacArthur's concept of an amphibious operation in September purely academic. Nevertheless, by 20 July, MacArthur had ordered detailed plans drawn up for the amphibious envelopment, directing that Inchon be favored as the assault site, but also that alternate sites be considered. By 23 July, General Wright's planning group had shaped the basic framework, based in large part on the Bluehearts concept, of an amphibious assault landing at Inchon, and had drawn up several alternate plans as well. (The alternate plans called for a landing at Kunsan on the west coast, and for a landing on the east coast near Chumunjin. Landings at Wonsan and Chinnampo were also being considered.)

The alternative: frontal attack

On the 23d, MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff of these plans. He explained that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 2d Infantry Division, then en route to the Far East, would be held in Japan where the Navy would train them in amphibious tactics. Then in mid-September, a two-division corps (MacArthur was assuming that the 1st Marine Division would be complete by then) would launch an amphibious assault in rear of enemy lines. Without naming the objective area, he explained that an airborne RCT would drop soon after D-day to seize key communications centers immediately ahead of the advancing assault forces. After the beachhead had been seized, he continued, the Eighth Army would attack from the south.

"Although the exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during the month of August," MacArthur concluded, "I am firmly convinced that an early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main line of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th parallel."

This description of MacArthur's plans reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the heels of the grim news that Taejon had fallen and at a time when the North Koreans were obviously preparing a double envelopment of Walker's defenses. Summoning MacArthur to a teleconference on 24 July, the Joint Chiefs asked him whether he still believed it wise, in the face of the increasing enemy pressure, to schedule an amphibious landing for mid-September. To this MacArthur replied that "barring unforeseen circumstances, and with complete provision of requested replacements, if the full Marine division is provided, the chances to launch the movement in September would be excellent."

MacArthur actually had no reason to expect the full Marine division in time for the amphibious assault. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed, during the time that General Collins was in Tokyo, to raise the 1st Marine Division to war strength. On 19 July President Truman had authorized the Marine Corps to call its Organized Reserve to active duty to accomplish this build-up. Since it was impossible to meet MacArthur's 10 September deadline without stripping Marine units in the Atlantic area to an unacceptable degree, the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur on 20 July that he would have to wait until November or December for the full division.

Even after receiving MacArthur's protest over the delay and after hearing strong support of MacArthur from General Shepherd and the Army's G3 (Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolté), the Joint Chiefs worked out a compromise solution. The Marine strength in the Far East would be increased to two war-strength regimental combat teams (1st and 5th) by mid-September, and the third RCT (the 7th) would be furnished some time during the coming winter. MacArthur learned of this solution, and also that the airborne RCT he had requested could not be furnished by 10 September, during the teleconference on 24 July. He remonstrated at once, deeming the third Marine RCT "essential" to his conception of attack and asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff expedite the shipment of the airborne unit.

Separate tactical headquarters

Amid these efforts, to assemble a suitable landing force, MacArthur also sought to establish a higher headquarters to direct operations once the assault forces were ashore. Since General Walker had his hands full in Korea and therefore could not be expected to divide

his efforts and those of his staff, MacArthur believed that these operations should be directed by a separate tactical headquarters.

Originally, MacArthur intended to use the headquarters of I Corps, which at his request was being sent to the Far East in late July. His plan was nullified by Walker's greater need for the I Corps staff in the Pusan Perimeter. On 7 August, JSPOG members suggested to General Wright that a provisional headquarters be organized locally, or that MacArthur obtain the use of the headquarters of General Shepherd's Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, then at Pearl Harbor. General Wright favored using the Marine headquarters and presented this proposal to General Almond. When Almond disapproved, Wright presented the alternative of organizing a provisional headquarters from GHQ sources. His

Inchon harbor after the invasion. Four LST's are unloading men and gear. The beach scene is typical of post-assault landings

recommendation was accepted. MacArthur directed the formation of a provisional planning staff, using officers from his own GHQ staff, and named this group, for purposes of secrecy, the Special Planning Staff, GHQ. Late in August, authority came from Washington to redesignate this group Headquarters, X Corps, and MacArthur appointed General Almond corps commander. Meanwhile, Major General Clark L. Ruffner, who arrived in the Far East on 6 August, became Chief of Staff of the provisional group, and on 15 August collected his staff to begin working on a troop list for the landing operation.

By the time Ruffner started his troop list, there had been more changes in the forces available. First, because Walker's forces continued to withdraw, finally pulling back behind the Naktong River, MacArthur found it necessary to divert the units of both the 5th Marine RCT and 2d Division to Korea. These forces reached Korea during the first week of August and soon thereafter entered the line to reinforce Walker's hard-pressed troops.

Secondly, and a more favorable development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed their decision to wait until winter before sending MacArthur the third RCT of the 1st Marine Division. On 10 August, they directed that this unit be organized and shipped to the Far East so as to arrive during September. Seven days later, two battalions of the 7th Marine RCT began to gather at Camp Pendleton, California, and the remaining battalion, a peace-strength unit then on duty in the Mediterranean, was ordered to sail directly to Japan from its post with the Atlantic Fleet.

The commitment of the 5th RCT and 2d Division troops to Korea, meanwhile, led the JSPOG staff to recommend changing the date of the proposed landing to 15 October. They pointed out to MacArthur that to make the assault in mid-September, both the Marines and the 2d Division would have to be taken away from Walker. They were especially concerned over withdrawing so large a unit as the 2d Division, reasoning that if Walker needed another division during August he probably would still need it in September. The alternative visible to the JSPOG members would be to pull out the 5th Marine RCT and team it with the 7th Infantry Division. But any decision to use the 7th Division in September, they believed, would be "visionary and impracticable" since, though the unit was being built up, it would not reach full strength before 1 October.

Speed the Keystone of Victory

MacArthur, nonetheless, refused to abandon his choice of landing date. Speed, he maintained, was the keystone of victory over the North Koreans. MacArthur feared that if UN forces did not defeat the North Koreans quickly and decisively, the Soviet Union and Communist China would be able to strengthen their junior partner by shipping in more arms and supplies. He also saw political dangers in failing to settle the matter speedily: United Nations members might grow discouraged, and Oriental peoples might lose confidence in the United States.

Beyond those reasons, his refusal undoubtedly was shaped by his knowledge of the Inchon area, as well as a desire to relieve the pressure against Walker's forces as soon as possible. Though tidal conditions at Inchon would be satisfactory for a landing in mid-October, the seas at that time might be too heavy, Pusan might have fallen, and there would be little good weather left for Eighth Army's breakout and pursuit.

Though Walker's forces were hard pressed in the Pusan Perimeter and though he had no amphibious force in being, MacArthur went ahead with plans to land at Inchon on 15 September. On 12 August, a more fully developed plan of attack was published, proposing the commitment of "GHQ Reserve" and the 1st Marine Division in the amphibious phase to seize the

Inchon-Seoul area. By "GHQ Reserve" MacArthur meant the 7th Division. At his instigation, the 7th had been in the process of recovering its strength and battle effectiveness since mid-July. He had intended originally that the 7th Division would be rebuilt and sent to Korea by October, although not specifically for the amphibious landing he had conceived. But by 4 August, after Walker's forces fell back behind the Naktong River, it became clear to MacArthur that if the amphibious force for the Inchon landing was to include an Army division, it would have to be the 7th. He therefore accelerated the refurbishing of the division so as to have it ready by 15 September. To compensate for the division's understrength in Americans, MacArthur raised its total numbers by taking the unusual step of attaching to it more than 8,000 Korean troops.

Thus, at the time he published his 12 August plan, MacArthur expected to shape his landing force from "the 7th Division . . . , the Marine Brigade in Korea, other Marines from the United States, and a battalion of Marines from the Mediterranean." But before the final troop list was made up, one more change in the list of available units developed, and a problem arose in pulling the Marine RCT away from General Walker.

Controversy over troop list

First of all, MacArthur learned in late August that, while the 7th Marine RCT's battalion from the Mediterranean would reach Korea on 12 September, the two battalions in the States, because of training needs, could not arrive in the Far East before the 19th. There could be no argument against the reason for this delay. MacArthur could only adjust his plans to fit the Marine troops that would be available: the Mediterranean battalion, the 1st Marine RCT (which began outloading from San Diego on 14 August), and the 5th Marine RCT in the Pusan Perimeter.

A minor controvery arose when General Walker learned that he would lose the 5th Marine RCT. Since this unit had become a mainstay of Eighth Army's defense in the southern sector of the perimeter, Walker was understandably reluctant to release it. Apparently because of objections raised by Walker, an order issued by MacArthur on 1 September making the 5th Marine RCT available to the 1st Marine Division was rescinded on the same day.

But Major General Oliver P. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, who had arrived in Tokyo on 22 August, was just as determined as Walker to have the RCT. Backed by the top Navy officers in the theater, Smith demanded of General Almond that the RCT be released to his control. Almond attempted to settle the issue on 3 September by offering Smith the 32d Infantry of the Army's 7th Division. A last-minute substitution of an untrained and untried unit for a specially trained and tested regiment of Marines was not acceptable to Smith. Moreover, Smith doubted that it would be physically possible to make the substitution since the shipping to pick up the Marine RCT already had left for Korea and would have to return to Japan if it were to pick up the 32d Infantry.

The final answer was a compromise hit upon by Admiral Arthur D. Struble, commander of the Seventh Fleet. Struble suggested that Walker's loss of the Marine unit be compensated for by sending a regiment from the 7th Division to the port of Pusan as a floating reserve. MacArthur accepted this proposal and on 4 September instructed Walker to pull the Marine unit out of the perimeter not later than the night of 5-6 September and send it to Pusan. At the same time, he informed Walker that the 17th Infantry (7th Division) would arrive in the Pusan harbor not later than 7 September.

Navy and Marine Corps objections

As MacArthur gradually resolved the problem of assembling a landing force, certain features of his landing plans were contested by Navy and Marine officers who would be participating in the operation. From the time they first learned of MacArthur's concept, these officers had opposed any landing at Inchon. Besides objecting to the difficulties in navigation at Inchon, they pointed out that assault forces would have to scale seawalls from twelve to fourteen feet high, which fronted almost the entire width of the port. Moreover, they wished to avoid, if at all possible, a landing in the middle of a built-up area. Making Inchon even less attractive to these officers was Wolmi-do, a small but heavily fortified island dominating the harbor. Therefore, this island would have to be seized before any landing in Inchon proper could succeed.

General Smith repeated these objections to MacArthur when he arrived in Tokyo. Before talking with MacArthur, General Smith had conferred with Admiral Doyle, who as commander of the attack force would be Smith's immediate superior during the scheduled landing. Smith then talked with General Almond, who would be his commander once forces were ashore. The Marine division commander found Doyle very skeptical of a landing at Inchon, across mud flats, over docks and sea walls, and into the heart of a city of sizable population. Having sent in reconnaissance parties at various points along the west coast of Korea, Doyle believed the Posung-Myon area, about 20 miles south of Inchon, to be a much better landing site. He told Smith the Posung-Myon beaches were better, the tides would not restrict the time and date of a landing, the area was not built up, and it was within striking distance of the enemy's line of communications south of Seoul.

Smith did not mention Posung-Myon when he talked with Almond, but did voice objections to Inchon. Almond dismissed these protestations, telling Smith that there were no organized enemy forces to speak of at Inchon; that the difficulties to be encountered were purely mechanical; and that the place of landing already had been fixed. When Smith talked with MacArthur, he learned that MacArthur shared Almond's

view that no heavy opposition would be met by the assault force. When Smith objected to the date of the landing, which at the time he judged too early to allow him to assemble his force, MacArthur made it plain that no other date would be considered.

On 23 August, Smith approached Almond on the possibility of landing in the Posung-Myon region instead of Inchon. Almond made it clear that he was not interested in making a major landing there, pointing out that his staff, after examining that area, found the road net inadequate to support heavy vehicles in a breakout from the beachhead.

"Approval" by JCS

Meantime, since they knew only the bare essentials of MacArthur's plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent two of its members, General Collins and Admiral Forest P. Sherman (chief of Naval Operations), to Tokyo for a fuller briefing. Heretofore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had entered operational planning mainly in matters involving the allotment of forces and supplies, otherwise passing on to MacArthur only the broad objectives of operations. Because they were sharply aware of the weakened condition of U. S. military resources while observing the continued and disturbing North Korean successes, they wished to know the details of MacArthur's proposed operation.

The assault moved inland and into the city of Seoul. By 27 September resistance within the city had ceased and a link-up had been made with forces from Pusan

Collins and Sherman were briefed on 23 August. Navy officers of Admiral Doyle's staff began by covering the problems faced by the Navy in the landing, emphasizing the risks involved. Admiral Doyle concluded this portion of the briefing by stating that, although the operation was not impossible, he did not recommend it. Without mentioning the hazards, MacArthur defended his plans by dwelling on the enemy's vulnerability to an amphibious envelopment and on the reasons why the landing should be made at Inchon. He also pointed out that there were tremendous political and psychological advantages to be gained in recapturing the capital city of Seoul. Collins and Sherman suggested that a landing at Kunsan (almost a hundred miles south of Inchon) would involve less risk and might be just as effective. MacArthur replied that such a landing would result in an envelopment too shallow to sever the enemy's line of communications or to encircle his fighting divisions. The briefing ended there, MacArthur neither asking for nor receiving the approval of his plans by Collins and Sherman.

On 24 August, Navy and Marine officers prevailed on General Shepherd, who was reputed to enjoy particular influence with MacArthur, to try to convince him that Posung-Myon was the better landing site. Shepherd's presentation was to no avail, and from that time on these Navy and Marine officers concentrated on planning for Inchon.

Meanwhile, General Collins and Admiral Sherman returned to Washington and presented MacArthur's plans to their fellow staff members. After examining these plans and arriving at no real disagreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 August notified MacArthur that they approved. They suggested, though, that he also prepare plans for an amphibious envelopment near Kunsan.

It is difficult to understand why the JCS found it necessary to send MacArthur approval of his plans. Perhaps it was because the contemplated landing, though a purely tactical maneuver, could have repercussions of more than theater significance since it would involve a major portion of the ready combat forces of the United States. Or perhaps the JCS merely wanted to show that they favored the landing in view of the strong Navy and Marine objections heard in Japan by Collins and Sherman.

Having received this approval, on 30 August, MacArthur issued his operations order for the landing. X Corps would land on 15 September to seize Inchon, Kimpo airfield, and Seoul; on D plus 1 Eighth Army would attack from the south to destroy the North Korean forces below the Inchon-Seoul line. However, during the next week, as this order was being transformed into action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked General MacArthur for a current estimate on the feasibility and chance of success of the operation if initiated on planned schedule. First of all, they considered Eighth Army's situation still precarious, for North Korean gains along the Pusan Perimeter had continued into September. Moreover, in making the landing, MacArthur would commit almost all of his reserves. Since all available General Reserve units in the United States, except the 82d Airborne Division, already had been sent to the Far East, MacArthur would be committing his reserves at a time when he had no prospect of immediate reinforcement. In the minds of the Joint Chiefs, this fact portended grave consequences if the enveloping operation failed. For these reasons, they called on MacArthur to re-examine his decision.

MacArthur's defense of his decision was strongly worded. There was, he said, no question in his mind as to the operation's feasibility. Though he conceded that Walker might have to pull back into a tighter perimeter, he told the Joint Chiefs, there was not the slightest possibility of Walker's being ejected from Korea. On the other hand, the landing operation was, in MacArthur's mind, the only way in which UN forces could seize the initiative. Otherwise, UN forces faced a war of attrition, which the enemy, with a greater potentiality for immediate reinforcement, might win. MacArthur pointed out that his forces were already embarking for the landing, and that preliminary air and naval bombardment was taking place on schedule. Finally, he assured the Joint Chiefs, "I and all of my commanders and staff officers without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the success of this enveloping operation."

When faced with these views of the one man who was in a position to more accurately judge the theater situation than any one else, the Joint Chiefs agreed to the landing. Carrying their action one step farther than in the past, they obtained President Truman's approval of the operation. On 8 Septembeer they gave MacArthur the final green light for the landing which took place one week later.

Results are what count

The best summary of MacArthur's action is that he decided early in the Korean conflict to land at Inchon, and let nothing prevent him from carrying out that plan at the earliest possible moment. He willingly accepted certain risks. To assemble the last of his assault force, he weakened further Walker's precarious defenses in southern Korea. He overrode the counsels of Navy and Marine officers expert in amphibious warfare who argued well against Inchon as a landing site. With little positive knowledge of the enemy's strength and fortifications in the target area, he risked a possible debacle by committing the bulk of his reserves when he had no source of immediate reinforcement.

For these reasons, some applaud the Inchon decision for its boldness, while others criticize MacArthur for having accepted so many hazards. Regardless of praise or criticism of his decision, the landing went off on schedule against little opposition, and by the end of September 1950 the decisive results forecast by MacArthur were obtained. By that time the North Korean Army had been routed, some o fit cornered in southern Korea, part of it driven back into northern Korea. and all of it so disorganized and depleted that it never fully recovered.

The Sword and Buckler of Freedom

(Continued from page 32)

seen by both friend and foe, and the Soviets know, down to the last conscript from Inner Mongolia, that they cannot attack these troops without suffering swift retaliation.

That is why the Soviets during coming months will redouble their efforts to have these troops withdrawn from Berlin and, if possible, from Germany. It is like the wolf demanding that the shepherd tear down the fences around his flock because they give him a feeling of claustrophobia and an insecurity complex.

The larger picture

The question before the free world is whether the evil game of twenty years ago is to be repeated, when Stalin concluded his infamous pact with Hitler that unleashed the Second World War. Hitler was destroyed, but Stalin came away with tremendous gains that incorporated 570,000 square miles into the Soviet orbit and brought more than 115 million people in Europe alone under the communist yoke. His forward march was stopped ten years ago, at the gates of Berlin, by the determination of the Western Powers and the courage of people who refused to be enslaved.

Surely the West is aware that Khrushchev, were he permitted to block the road to Berlin today, would block the Atlantic tomorrow. It is obvious that this is a move the free world could never tolerate. The sooner he is made to realize that should he ever venture into aggression, his fate would not be Stalin's but Hitler's, the greater the chance that perhaps he may be deterred.

It was hardly an accident that during Exercise Free Play an inconspicuous grey car with a red star on its license plates snooped about the maneuver area. No one stopped these Soviet "observers." Perhaps it was just as well they saw this powerful army in action—an army which, with its allies, not only insures the freedom of NATO's peoples and those of many non-members, but at the same time guards the peace of the world.



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THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONS

UNIT COMMAND IS BETTER THAN EVER

A reply to "The Ties that Bind"

CAPTAIN RICHARD P. FOX

Let me say at the start that I am a unit commander. It's a job I wouldn't trade for any other in the Army.

While reading "The Ties that Bind" in the February issue, I was impressed by statements which would lead one to conclude that efforts to improve the Army during the past few years have borne few results. While most of what Captain Bashore said of unit command was true five or six years ago, today's conditions are not exactly as he describes them.

For example, Captain Bashore says "commanders became more and more reluctant to allow imperfectly trained juniors the leeway of learning from their mistakes." That was true at one time, but you can't say that about commanders in general now.

To prove my point I'll use personal experience. I was inducted at 21 with no prior military experience. As a second lieutenant after a year and a half of service I was given command of a TOE battery of field artillery. At the time, when the Korean conflict was at its height, such assignments were not unusual. I don't flatter myself by thinking I was the man my battalion commander particularly wanted to command one of his batteries. The truth is that I was simply all he had. Furthermore, I don't think that I, or any other lieutenant then in the same circumstances, was as capable of commanding a unit as most officers are today.

Naturally, since I was a very young shavetail heading one of his batteries, my battalion commander (an excellent one) gave me the "detailed instructions" to which Captain Bashore refers. What else could he do? Thanks to his detailed guidance and advice I managed to do what I consider a passable job even with extremely limited experience.

Today it is exceptional to find a first lieutenant commanding a company-sized TOE unit. A second lieutenant in such a job is a rarity. I get no detailed instructions from my battalion commander (another excellent one). He feels that an experienced captain commanding one of his batteries doesn't need such instructions. I thoroughly agree with him.

I am not overly concerned about my "prestige" as a unit commander in today's Army, and neither are most of my noncommissioned officers. We *have* that over-discussed, intangible commodity, and our superiors and subordinates know it too. Most troop leaders today realize that if a man continually acts like a soldier and a leader of combat troops, he *has* prestige.

Contemporary military writing, along with the "enhanced prestige" cliché, is too damned concerned with increasing disciplinary powers and not enough concerned with increasing the quality of leadership. When proper leadership principles are practiced, discipline is never a problem. For minor infractions, withholding of the pass privilege (a prerogative given most platoon sergeants) generally suffices. As for the "legal disciplinary authority" for noncommissioned officers advocated by Captain Bashore, I prefer the old tradition of the United States Army that no enlisted man be empowered to punish another. I think that's a fine tradition.

Article 15 does allow sufficient disciplinary authority to the unit commander, but that Article need rarely be resorted to so long as good, proven leadership principles are practiced. For example, I think it's a good idea just before a long payday weekend for a commander to talk to his troops, pointing out to them why they should keep out of trouble on their forthcoming off-duty time. Such periodic pep talks are effective and accomplish more than a batch of 14-day restrictions handed out on Monday morning. Fundamentally, it's a matter of letting the troops know the Old Man cares.

Today most unit commanders don't particularly need "bust" authority. When reduction is justified in the case of a soldier above E-3, usually it can be done by consulting the field-grade commander at the next higher headquarters. Today's battalion or battle-group commander has confidence in the judgment of his subordinate leaders. If he doesn't have it, he can easily replace any of them from among many other officers who want the job.

I think the present system of administrative and punitive reduction of enlisted men is satisfactory. It protects both the career noncommissioned officer and the Army.

"The Ties that Bind" alleges that "the unit commander is submerged in a conglomeration of trivialities which have been designated as his personal responsibility." Now, I've been led to believe that a commander is responsible for everything his unit and his men do or fail to do—trivial or not. The accomplishment of minor details can be delegated and supervised. From this portion of the article I get the impression that Captain Bashore advocates allowing a unit commander to excuse failures merely by saying, "I told Ser-

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

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geant Jones to do it." I also get the impression he further advocates giving such a unit commander the authority to reduce the untortunate scapegoat.

Captain Bashore asks, "Why can't the signature of the platoon leader . . . be as authoritative as that of the company commander?" This is like asking why isn't a captain the same as a major? It's policy in many outfits, including mine, to direct commissioned leaders to draft letters and indorsements pertaining to their men. In many instances I have had to return such drafts to my lieutenants for amendment because either their correspondence or their action in the matter did not comply with the appropriate regulation. I feel that in such cases not only my unit and the Army avoided being embarrassed by the lieutenant's inexperience, but that the officer also learned a valuable lesson. I don't believe a lieutenant's prerogatives as a platoon leader are being diminished by his unit commander's review of administrative actions before they're dispatched.

Supply responsibility—"that administrative albatross"—of necessity is and always will be a command responsibility in both its accountability and economy aspects. The Modern Army Supply System (MASS) has removed the necessity of actually maintaining a supply room in the company. It provides for direct issue of property from the higher headquarters property-book officer to the user.

The problem of supply in the company described in "The Ties that Bind" does not exist, nor did the company commander ever have "formal accountability" as the article says. Formal accountability ends with the officer responsible for maintaining stock-record cards.

Captain Bashore recommends slowing down the operations of a unit during a command change-over, apparently because the incoming officer does not have time to adequately supervise the outfit during this period. It's been my experience lately that there's a pretty good company or battery executive officer around to run the outfit during just such periods. He is the same man who runs things when the unit commander goes on leave. (Don't commanders take leaves?)

It is true that a platoon leader's ratings of a noncommissioned officer's efficiency should be as effective as the company commander's. It also happens that today the platoon leader *does* rate his noncommissioned officers' efficiency. AR 623-201 says, "The efficiency rating will be given by the commissioned or warrant officer who is first in line of supervision over the enlisted person."

Now let's consider the number of hours a unit commander works. "Another reason for the unpopularity of unit command is that while the lowliest clerk at battalion or battle group headquarters observes bankers' hours, the same time schedule is rarely practiced in the company." This is indisputable. However, unit commanders have more responsibility than headquarters clerks. They're paid more. They are officers. More, both in time and work, rightfully is expected of them. Enough said!

Efficiency reports on commanders, according to a representative of Officers Assignment Division, are weighted. This simply means that if an officer does a good job as commander, his OEI benefits more than that of a contemporary with an identical efficiency report who is being rated in a staff job.

So far as "bearing in mind the differences of experience in rating" goes, this has long been prescribed by AR 623-105 for all raters. Also, it is practiced by just about every rater I've ever known.

We all know commanders are underpaid. Most of them aren't commanding units—or serving in the Army—because of the pay they are getting. They're commanders because it's a job that must be done; it rewards a man with self-satisfaction and is a source of pride.

Commanding a unit in the Army today has its troubles. It's not all gravy, by any means. Yet I know few officers who don't want the job. In general, it's easier than it was a few years ago. This is so mainly because of the overall higher quality of Army personnel, both officer and enlisted. The decline in disciplinary centers, stockades, and courts-martial proves that.

Most problems in command today are inherent in the commander himself or the *people* over him. As the old saw has it, "It's not the Army that's at fault; it's just some of the people in it." The great majority of the people in the U. S. Army today are pretty damned fine.

Captain Richard P. Fox, Artillery, *was commissioned from Artillery OCS in 1952 and served in Korea as a forward observer and infantry platoon leader. He now commands a battery in the 1st AW Battalion, 44th Artillery, in Europe.*

UNIFORMITY IN UNIFORMS

Personal whims power the patch-happy merry-go-round

LT. MADISON C. SCHEPPS

How many times have you changed patches on your uniforms during the past few years? Perhaps you've been caught in the trend toward dressing up the fatigue, field, or work uniform. Unfortunately, though they are spelled out in Army Regulations, uniform policies are not uniform throughout the Army. Commanders, from company up to corps, usually decide what articles we must wear on uniforms.

In 1955, when Gyroscope began, there were not too many problems affecting rotated units. After initially conforming to set policies, we didn't have to change articles of uniform too frequently. A soldier in a unit owning a distinctive insignia and which used a certain color on its name tag, resewed new ones on his uniforms only when he transferred or was reassigned. When this happened and the name tag had to be changed also, he incurred a considerable expense. At 10 cents a name tag and up to 45 cents a patch —not to mention the cost of sewing— he could easily spend five dollars. Airborne patches and Ranger tabs were or were not worn, depending upon the whim of the local adjutant or commander. In many units, wearing of these decorations was optional even though AR 600-70 specifies what uniforms these badges might be worn on. The fatigue or work uniform is not included. Regardless of the regulation, most people, whether Airborne or

DYNA-SOAR

Dyna-Soar (for dynamic soaring) is a joint project between the Air Force and the NASA, and is an attempt to solve the technical problems of manned flight in the sub-orbital regions. Advance knowledge on the project indicates how a boost-glide vehicle can operate from the outer fringes of the atmosphere where it can maneuver and be recovered undamaged. Studies show that by varying the original rocket boost, and thus the velocity, and with the control available to the pilot, the Dyna-Soar aircraft can circumnavigate the earth, followed by a normal and controlled landing. Boeing Airplane Company, one of the competing companies for the development contract for the complete boost-glide system, has delegated to RCA the responsibility for the development of important electronic components of Dyna-Soar.

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Ranger qualified, or both, usually wore these badges.

Airborne battle groups scheduled to replace infantry units in various parts of USAREUR spent a great deal of money before arriving in 1958 for new pocket patches and jump wings. Shortly after they arrived, Seventh Army ordered all patches removed, including wings and Ranger tabs, except for the approved articles such as name tags, "U. S. Army" patches, and division insignia. More than a thousand dollars spent to no purpose.

Before the arrival at Fort Riley of the battle groups replacing those of the 1st Infantry Division in early 1959, the name tag was worn above the "U. S. Army" patch, as required by post directives. Many people, anticipating the change, conformed to 1st Division practice in Germany. After advance parties of two battle groups had arrived, this regulation was changed and many had to move their patches back to the original position. Now that elements of five battle groups are at Fort Riley—all of them wearing pocket patches—will Fifth Army do as Seventh Army did and require all patches to be removed after many have purchased new unit patches at Stateside expensive rates?

How long will we have to ride this merry-go-round of changing and rechanging supposedly standard uniform policies and bending Army Regulations to suit whims?

Because a soldier should be proud of the uniform he wears, our policies and regulations should be explicit. Unit pride would not suffer if we eliminated pocket patches from the fatigue or field uniform. The money saved from this step alone could be used for other purposes that would improve morale. Distinctive unit insignia could be prominently displayed in the battalion or battle-group area. If the Army wanted pocket patches and blue name tags, it would say so in the AR, and there wouldn't be so much wasted effort and expense each time a soldier or officer is reassigned.

I am sure the Pentagon wants standardization in uniform policies. Let's wear our decorations on the class A uniform and use the fatigue uniform for work.

Lieutenant Madison C. Schepps, *Infantry, a 1955 graduate of West Point, Gyroscoped with the 5th Infantry from Fort Carson to Germany in 1956, and recently rotated with it to Fort Riley to join the 1st Infantry Division.*

THE TIP OF THE SWORD

The combat commander can be demanding but never heartless

CAPT. ROBERT S. HARPER

A combat leader needn't be the bravest man in his outfit, but he'd better act as though he were. In the heat of battle soldiers search for someone to show them how courageous they must be to face a deadly enemy, how tired they can be yet continue the advance, how cold and wet and hungry they can become and not despair of victory.

To perform this duty the leader must have more than a command voice and a short haircut.

During every combat action an occasion arises when the leader must order his frightened, exhausted followers into the darkness of battle to seize a map coordinate. They look at him and ask themselves only one question: "Does this man risk his life for his country as willingly as he risks mine?"

During the first days of battle the leader must be alert for signs of false courage. To steel themselves against fear of the unknown, most inexperienced soldiers tell themselves that battle is nothing more than an exciting hunting trip, a simple field maneuver; or they recall the war movie where unshaven straight-shooters always win.

These unproven heroes will discard helmets and consider digging, dispersion, or camouflage as unwarranted timidity bordering on cowardice. The leader must be firm with them. He must wait until the first combat action to gain their respect.

From the first day of battle, a soldier begins to fear that his life will be wasted—not because of a tactical error, for seldom is he able to judge the professional ability of his superiors. He fears the lack of humanity and sympathy which some leaders unconsciously display.

Every soldier needs to believe he is more than a number on a dogtag. He must know that if he is wounded his leader will not abandon him. The terrors of the battlefield are not so frightening when he knows his comrades will not desert him.

Sometimes the leader must be as demanding as combat itself. But he must never become heartless. It is easy for an inexperienced soldier to believe that his leader, and not the enemy, is the source of all his suffering. He has seen comrades fall while obeying their leader's order to advance. His superiors deny him sleep until he can no longer see and his body and brain are numbed by fatigue. He must endure rain, cold, hunger, and daily exposure to death.

Soldiers can forget an occasional lapse into indecision. They may even joke about an unwise move—if the cost is not heavy. They'll overlook a burst of temper. But any indication of selfishness or heartlessness touches them too personally to be forgotten.

Troop leaders must have compassion for their men. Without this genuine sympathy for the suffering of his subordinates the leader, in their eyes, seems cruel. They begin to believe that instead of leading them to victory, he is driving them to certain death.

The inexperienced leader frequently isolates himself from his men. Heeding that stale phrase, "familiarity breeds contempt," he becomes unapproachable. There is a wide gulf separating familiarity and aloofness in which the leader can establish a bond of comradeship with his men. When they are bleeding and still obey his orders, the rules regarding undue familiarity can be relaxed somewhat.

During long periods of peacetime many men are promoted on longevity. Some of these are merely institutional leaders who have been promoted to fill job vacancies. Find the natural leaders in your outfit and place them in positions of responsibility. It may be that since 1945 the proverbial Old Sarge has acquired a station wagon, four kids, and a deep freeze. In the process he may have lost his burning desire to close with the enemy. Will he fail you and your men in battle? When evaluating men don't mistake maturity for cowardice nor impetuosity for courage.

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

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

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tunities to evaluate men. Men react to nervous tension and fatigue in much the same way, regardless of the source. The soldier at Fort Bragg who is overcome by a feeling of helplessness when it begins to rain while he walks Post No. 3 will experience the same emotions and react in the same way when he is a sentinel near the lines of contact. Be alert for signs of defeatism or evidence of individual ingenuity. They give a reliable indication of the reaction of men in battle.

When selecting a subordinate leader, don't be too concerned if his boot laces were not tucked in at the last reveille formation. Instead, consider his actions during the last field exercise. After 48 sleepless hours, could he control his temper and retain his sense of humor? Does he have the respect of his men so that they obey him willingly? It comes as a shock to discover that sometimes the best leaders do not look at all "soldierly."

Group opinion buttresses a soldier's courage and discipline during times of danger. However, if collective opinion is subverted toward dishonorable goals, a unit loses a powerful moral force.

A unit's mood is revealed in its catch phrases. During the Civil War it was No Big Thing. If a Confederate marched 30 miles on short rations and little rest, that was No Big Thing. If a Union soldier lost an arm or a leg, that too was No Big Thing. In the last analysis, there was only One Big Thing: death itself. The other inconveniences, privations, and sufferings connected with the defeat of the enemy were taken in stride. Of course, this attitude had its counterpart in the mood of some World War II units which popularized the phrase No Sweat.

Compare these with the Let's Bug Out of Korea. Any man who wanted to stand and fight was medal-happy or nuts. Under such conditions of group opinion, what became Big Things? An enemy round within 500 yards, missing out on the beer ration, a leak in your air mattress—these were Big Things.

It is not generally realized how easily a unit—or even an army—can be led to adopt a philosophy of rationalized cowardice. If troops can find another word for coward which will permit them to flee the danger and still retain their self-respect, the majority in an army will head for the rear. When group opinion condones this action the individuals in the group are almost helpless to resist the impulse.

Cowards beget cowards. A weak company commander is satisfied with mediocre performance. In the absence of strong leadership, his men will exert their utmost to avoid danger and to pursue creature comforts.

The subtle philosophy of rationalized cowardice can attack the leader himself and convince him that his life is too valuable to risk in battle. He will hear its insidious whisper during the emotional stress and prolonged tension of combat. As he treads the lonely road through smoldering villages and deserted towns and observes the wake of battle on every side, he gets little guidance for his personal conduct.

Gradually the mortar bursts creep closer to his unit. Suddenly a machine gun opens against his left flank. His men hit the ground. Enemy fire increases. A squad leader goes down. After a bright orange flash to his front a tank crew bails out dragging a motionless figure with them. What should he do?

Vaguely and inaccurately he recalls a school conference which stressed the importance of control in battle. His brain hears just a whisper: "You can't control the action from here! Get back to that hill; perhaps you'll meet an artillery forward observer there."

In his own mind he isn't running. He is trying, conscientiously, to regain control of his unit. And so rearward go the weak and the frightened, to enmesh themselves in the mechanics of control. He will fight the radio squelch wildly. His supreme moment of triumph comes when he reestablishes communications, using a faulty headset and asks how things are going. Up the road a few hundred yards his men are being killed for lack of leadership. They are controlled, but they are not being led.

When the combat leader begins to think primarily of his own safety he becomes worthless to his unit, for he will have sacrificed his personal prestige. Only a respected leader can provide the emotional stimulus which men require to face the personal hazards of battle.

Some leaders tell us they cannot think clearly under fire. In rare cases that may be true. However, the emotional effect of enemy fire ordinarily will speed up one's reactions and thought processes. There is something about being involved in the destruction of your outfit that gives you a more personal interest in finding a solution to your difficulties.

In some ways, an ineffective leader is more to be feared than the enemy, for he can silence all his weapons with a word.

A combat leader must be willing to advance into the unknown with his meager forces, grapple with the all but invisible enemy, then revert to a confident marauder in order to exploit his success.

Imagination can be a dangerous enemy. The more fatigued we become, the less able we are to resist its false counsel. After three sleepless nights each bush becomes an enemy squad, and a herd of cattle in the moonlight becomes a tank attack. Imagination is never content to leave the enemy as he is, but will convert him instantly from a band of jackals into creatures immune to fire and lead.

Never believe your imagination. It can cause you to tiptoe toward an abandoned objective or to rush forward with inadequate reconnaissance and no fire support. Unnecessary casualties are the price of rashness, loss of prestige the result of timidity.

What is a battle like? Each is different but are all compounded of the same phenomena. We must be prepared to contend not only with the enemy but with human failure in our midst. We must carry out the combat mission with men some of whom are tired, some frightened, some even rebel lious. Incompetents and cowards complicate the task. Communications fail at a crucial moment.

In battle, events move swiftly. A workable solution now is better than a brilliant one tomorrow. If we succeed, morale and confidence soar to even unreasonable heights; if we fail, enemy retribution will be swift—and final.

While generalship creates the conditions for victory, it is here, at the bloody tip of the sword of war, that battles are won or lost.

Capt. Robert S. Harper, Armor, *had two tours in Korea with a tank battalion, commanded a company at an armor training center, and is now assigned to the 4th Cavalry. He wrote "The Proper Use of Armor" in our September 1953 issue.*



give my regards to Venus. Messages like that may become matter-of-fact sooner than we think. The field of space communications is one in which we at Bendix Radio are making exciting progress. Our engineers are developing systems to provide communication links with the first manned space vehicles, and we are already playing a major part in communications and tracking in connection with the earth satellite program. Also under study at Bendix Radio are improved systems for more conventional applications—such as speech security and forward scatter. *Your* problems in communications could well find their answer with us.

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A new "intermediate duty" truck, designed to replace the two-and-one-half-ton variety, has been tested successfully for the Army by the Chrysler Corp. The new XM410, using an aluminum, integral-body frame, will have approximately 30 percent greater payload-to-vehicle-weight ratio, 50 percent better fuel mileage and will weigh about 5,000 pounds less than its predecessor. The eight-wheeled XM410 (power is transmitted through all eight wheels) will float when empty or loaded, and its eight-cylinder, 165-horsepower engine eventually will be able to use gasoline, kerosene or diesel fuel.

Glide-Slope Lighting

A new night glide-slope lighting system that can direct an aircraft to a desired touch-down point and insure clearance of all obstacles along the final approach has been used in tactical operations at Fort Benning. De Haviland Otters were used. The system consists of a series of three lights placed on the landing strip at the point where the aircraft should touch down. They set so that a beam of light is directed into the sky at an angle which will be visible to the pilot when he turns the aircraft onto final approach. Each light, red, green and yellow, is visible only when the plane is on the slide angle at which the light is set. As long as the plane stays on the desired approach, the pilot will be able to see a green light from the strip. When he gets too low, the red light will be seen, and if the plane goes above the glide path, the yellow light will be seen. The pilot stays "in the green" until the last 100 to 200 feet, then turns on the landing light and lands the aircraft.

Getting off the Ground

The newly developed ground-and-air vehicle VZ-8P, built under the supervision of the Army by Piasecki Aircraft Corp., has undergone a successful test flight at Philadelphia International Airport. The wingless vehicle demonstrated its airborne controllability by making on-the-spot turns, in winds up to 20 miles per hour, and "quick" mid-air stops—flying at heights up to 25 feet above ground. The VZ-8P went through its series of runs with Frank Piasecki, company president, at the controls. Later, the vehicle was inspected by Lt. Gen. A. G. Trudeau, the Army's Chief of Research and Development, and Brig. Gen. Richard D. Meyer, Deputy Chief of Transportation.



General Trudeau gets VZ-8P briefing from its developer, Frank Piasecki.

Eight JATO bottles give thrust to Lockheed's new C-130B Hercules as the 350-mile-per-hour troop and cargo carrier roars into space 2,300 feet from point of run-up at Eglin Air Force Base. The new aircraft has a maximum takeoff weight of 135,000 pounds.

New Combat Radio

A new mobile multi-channel radio set in the 50-150 megacycle band has been developed by the Army for use in forward area combat communications. The new equipment, designated AN/GRC-53, was developed by Westinghouse Electric Corp., and is said to be one-third smaller and only half the weight of field equipment currently performing a similar function. The new unit, developed in conjunction with the Army's Signal Research and

Tactical Automatic Data Processing...

is being developed by the Signal Corps with technical guidance of TRW's Ramo-Wooldridge Division

ADP... the Army's Tactical Automatic Data Processing program... is a prime example of electronic research and development with industry and the Army working together for national defense. The goal is to provide tactical commanders with mobile field computers to assist in making rapid and timely combat decisions involving such elements of information as atomic fallout, fire control, enemy troop movements, capabilities, and counter maneuvers. ADP Systems will be developed and tested under direction of the Signal Corps at the multi-million dollar Computer Test Facility at the U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, which was formally dedicated in recent ceremonies.

Scientists and engineers of the Ramo-Wooldridge division of Thompson Ramo Wooldridge Inc., will provide technical direction of the program under a $13.5 million contract. Years of experience in research and development in digital computers, control systems and information processing for both military and industrial applications by Ramo-Wooldridge are to a large measure the reason why TRW has been entrusted with this vital program to equip America's foot soldier of today to meet the complexities of modern warfare.

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Development Laboratory, Fort Monmouth, N. J., provides 400 radio frequency channels and allows simultaneous transmission facilities for 12 traffic channels over paths of up to 20 miles. The increased bandwidth of the new set permits a greater number of frequencies to be used and decreases vulnerability to both friendly and enemy interference. As many as 24 persons can use the system simultaneously without interference, and it can be set up quickly: two Signal Corps soldiers set the system up and had it in operation in 24 minutes.

Space Age "Foxhole"

With eyes toward economy and also toward some of the more deadly implications of nuclear warfare, two Fort Ord soldiers have designed and built what they believe will be a typical 81mm mortar emplacement of the new era—and it "didn't cost the Government one red cent." The masterminds of this project, Lt. William R. Daknis and Sergeant First Class Billy Welch, built circular pits for the mortars with a series of connecting underground rooms and tunnels to provide shelter, storage, living quarters, and exit facilities. The pits include a 30-round ammunition niche conveniently located near the assistant gunner's position. A sloping passage leads from the pits to a central underground corridor which, in turn, connects with exit trenches and storage rooms. The underground fortress also contains rooms (12 feet square and nine feet high) equipped with bunks, ammunition storage areas, and space for emergency rations. Construction of these emplacements, Sergeant Welch said, is feasible only under defensive conditions because of the time required for construction.

Bird's-eye view of the underground fortress.

An artist's conception of Vertol Aircraft's YHC-1B "Chinook," the Army's new two-to-three-ton capacity transport helicopter which eventually will replace the current inventory of piston-powered transport helicopters. A member of the Vertol multi-turbine powered family, the Chinook's rear ramp can be left open in flight for the transportation of elongated cargo, including certain missiles.

HOT SPARKS

A new industrial X-ray generator unit, small enough to pass through a six-inch opening and powerful enough to radiograph one-and-one-quarter inches of steel in 45 seconds, has been announced by Picker X-Ray Corp. The 50-pound generator is said to be twice as powerful as conventional units of the same rating now in use. The generator has two parts—the 50-pound generator and the 55-pound control. It is designed for quick on-the-job inspections by one man and is used to radiograph pipelines, pressure vessels, castings, aircraft, missiles, storage tanks, tank cars, ships, etc., for the detection of inner flaws in the metal. The X-Ray can be operated on almost any power supply line, according to the company, and makes it possible for the operator to choose any technique in the 50-150,000-volt and 1-4 milliampere range.

Bell Helicopter Corp's contract for development of the U. S. Army's XV-3 convertiplane has been extended to cover additional company and service flight testing. The XV-3 is first of the current group of Army-sponsored VTOL projects to receive flight evaluation by a government pilot.

During a series of research and development static firings, a Nike-Zeus missile booster developing several hundred thousand pounds of thrust was test fired by the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal. The booster was designed and fabricated by Redstone Division, Thiokol Chemical Corp. It is capable of hurling a defense missile to extremely high altitudes almost instantaneously.

A 12-page condensed catalog of powered industrial trucks, listing complete specifications for all models in addition to photographs of various model types, has recently been published by the Elwell-Parker Electric Co. The catalog, which is available from that firm at 4205 St. Clair Ave., Cleveland, classifies truck types under six categories: fork trucks, with capacities to 10,000 pounds; heavy duty fork and ram trucks, with capacities from 12,000 to 80,000 pounds; low lift platform trucks, with capacities from 4,000 to 80,000 pounds; high lift platform trucks, with the same range; die handling trucks, with capacities to 80,000 pounds; and mobile cranes.

A $500,000 contract covering research and development of a warhead arming and fusing system for the Army's Little John surface-to-surface rocket has been awarded to General Electric's Missile and Space Vehicle Department. The contract is expected to be increased to more than $2 million.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Outspoken Combat Leader

ARMOR COMMAND
By Brig. Gen. Paul McDonald Robinett
Privately Published, 1959
252 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $3.95

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. EDWIN H. RANDLE, *U. S. Army, retired, who commanded the 47th Infantry (9th Infantry Division), in North Africa.*

In his foreword General Robinett says: "Now that I have experienced battle . . . I am convinced that recorded history is too smooth, too devoid of clashing interests and personalities, and unfolds in an unreal atmosphere of calmness and high reason. The winners appear too good 'owing to the partiality of historians, who generally follow the stream of fortune, and content themselves with praising the conquerors.' " (The inner quote is from Machiavelli's *The Art of War.*) After that, the reader may correctly anticipate that this book is not devoid of clashing interests and personalities.

In the spring of 1942, Robinett, then colonel, was given command of the 13th Armored Regiment (1st Armored Division), then under overseas orders. He writes interestingly of the condition of his regiment, the movement overseas, his experiences in Northern Ireland, and the preparation of plans for invading North Africa. He knew and encountered many of the American great and near-great in the United Kingdom, and was uniformly accorded the treatment due a rising young colonel. He was to command a task force (Green) from Combat Command B, and land west of Oran. He was successful, and during the brief operation experienced just enough fighting to make things interesting.

When French resistance ended, a strange lassitude and preoccupation with political affairs enveloped our high command. All sense of urgency seemed to be lacking and CCB was kept loitering about Oran for two weeks. Then it was ordered to Tunisia where, during all this time, the Germans were operating under no such self-imposed handicap.

The languor persisted for a long time. My division was kept inactive at Tlemcen, Algeria, until as late as February 1943. The combat team I commanded was ordered to Tunisia independently, by marching—900 miles! When I asked General Eddy, why march? he shrugged and answered, "They say it's to harden the troops." In December I had marched that combat team 200 miles on foot from Safi to Port Lyautey. Artillery, engineers—everyone—had marched on foot. Hardening, indeed! Rommel in person was breaching the gates of Kasserine Pass and the U. S. II Corps commander was begging Colonel Stark to "pull a Stonewall Jackson." With what? A mixed collection of battalions hastily pushed into the pass.

A big letdown follows every operation, as surely as day follows night. Combat-experienced commanders expect it and take steps to head it off. But the letdown at AFHQ, on top of all the confusion of getting started, was monumental. The high command, never before having been in battle, did not recognize it.

Eventually, CCB arrived in Tunisia; for a time it was commanded by Brig. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, later by General Robinett. It was split up, parceled out, reassembled, moved here, there, and back again, from places where it might do some good to sectors where it could do nothing, not even function as a satisfactory mobile reserve. Surprisingly, whenever CCB got the chance it managed to pull its weight, in spite of shuttling back and forth under U. S. and British and French command.

As the foreword promised, there is a great deal of criticism in this book, and most of it is just. I wholeheartedly agree that high commanders were too much inclined to consider safety (and that meant distance from the enemy) the prime consideration in selecting command post sites. As for the engineers, their first priority was given to digging holes to keep those commanders safe, even at their remote CPs. That sort of thing was so frequent in World War I the troops joked about it. I had thought those jokes would shame higher commanders in World War II into giving less consideration to their own safety. Evidently some had not heard the jokes.

I applaud the author's anger at the glib excuse that failures in Africa were due to "green troops." The fact was that our troops were as good or better than the people who commanded them and used that excuse. Commanders violated most of the organizational and tactical principles they were supposed to have learned at service schools. For example, keeping themselves too far to the rear, nearly always without any sort of advanced CP, and having no one forward with authority to issue orders and coordinate operations.

In this connection Robinett quotes Sherman. "No man can properly command an army [or any other tactical unit, if I may be permitted an interjection] from the rear, he must be at the front. . . . The directing mind must be at the very head of the army—must be seen there, and the effect of his mind and personal energy must be felt by every officer and man present with it, to secure the best results."

That statement should be painted in large letters on the walls of every classroom and auditorium at our service schools, especially at Leavenworth and the War College. As a companion piece I would paint in equally large letters on opposite walls: No Officer is Indispensable. The Army Has Plenty of Fine Talent Ready to Take Over if You Are Killed.

A really critical book like this is the best reading for ambitious younger officers. For that reason it was well worth the labor of writing, and the trouble of getting published. (And here is the place to say that the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation thought so well of it as to award a grant to make publication possible.)

Books by the Great Captains leave me cold. They are too good: both the books and the Great Captains. As Robinett points out, there are not nearly enough good books on war by captains, majors, colonels, and even brigadiers. The best personal account of Gettysburg I know of was written by a captain. It reposes quietly in Dr. Eliot's five-foot shelf.

There is another side to this book that I cannot forego mentioning: the personal side. General Robinett has spread it through his pages for all to see, so he cannot mind my mentioning it. His book possesses the elements of a great Greek tragedy. I'll illustrate. The protagonist is a youngish officer on whom the gods lavish increasing favor. He has superior mental and soldierly qualities. For his rank he had held important positions where he could display his talents. War comes. He gets a preferred assignment and departs with his chariot, confident of preferment. His expectations are not disappointed. After the first skirmish he is promoted over thousands of contemporaries. But he makes good. As he gains experience in war he justifies the acute discernment of the gods.

But coincidental with all this good fortune a weakness develops. At least it is a weakness from the point of view of the gods. He comes to realize they have feet of clay and can make mistakes. They make some rather bad ones, and he criticizes them openly. Eventually the gods hear what he has said. They do not like to be criticized, so they become critical of him in turn. He loses favor, not because he has failed on any mission, for his chariots have done all that was asked of them. His leadership has not declined; it has improved with experience. But it is enough that he has criticized the gods and the obsolescent chariots they have furnished him to fight with.

"Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad." They made Robinett plenty mad (I couldn't resist that, but I hope I'm forgiven) and he let fly with the truth. It was magnificent, but not tactful, and even a BG has to be tactful with the gods, as some have learned.

The campaign is closing. Victory is inevitable. It should have been a great victory for our protagonist too, with another star on his chelton and a much larger command equipped with all new chariots of the latest model. But by now he knew that would not happen. Achilles-like, at the very last moment he was wounded. The gods had nothing to do with that, but they laughed. Or if they did not laugh, they did not give a damn. Only one of them came to see him, a profane god wearing two stars. He too commanded chariots. This tough, stocky god gazed down at the wounded general lying despondent and disappointed in his tent. As the god turned to depart he muttered to himself, "Poor bastard!" He was not completely devoid of sympathy and understanding.

The book's designer has done General Robinett and his readers a disservice. It is printed in small type with 50 lines to the page. The maps are inadequate for a military work. The only general map is on the endsheets. It is so very general that fully half the places mentioned in the text are not to be found. Some of the tactical maps are so small that one is tempted to give up, and sometimes does.

General Robinett writes well and interestingly, and has produced a sincere and undoubtedly valuable book. His is the satisfaction of having successfully commanded American troops in battle and won out when they were superior neither in equipment nor numbers. At times he was an independent commander, for all practical purposes; this falls to the lot of very few officers in these days of mass armies. He can take great satisfaction, and undoubtedly does, that after recovering from his wound he was given command of The Armored School and exerted great influence on the tactics, organization, and equipment of his branch.

The Hot Battlefield

NUCLEAR TACTICS, WEAPONS, AND FIREPOWER
Col. Theodore C. Mataxis & Lt. Col. Seymour L. Goldberg
The Stackpole Company, 1958
254 Pages; Illustrated; Index; Cloth, $4.25; Paper, $3.50

Reviewed by
CAPT. ROBERT T. FALLON, Infantry, *student of nuclear tactics for small units and author of several articles on the subject.*

"CEP, roentgen, DGZ, warned but exposed, unwarned and exposed, negligible, moderate, T, V, X, XB, prompt, residual, nuclear. . . . Where the hell is the Special Weapons Officer?" Such may well be the exasperated but normal reaction of the harassed combat commander during a nuclear action. In addition to all the new uncertainties and complexities of the modern battlefield, he must struggle with a maze of technical, scientific jargon which is supposed to tell him what he can or can't do with his atomic weapons. It is understandable that he will lean heavily on the staff officer who is supposed to know what it's all about.

In their excellent new book Colonels Mataxis and Goldberg impress us immediately with the dangers of this situation. (The full title of their work is *Nuclear Tactics, Weapons, and Firepower in the Pentomic Division, Battle Group, and Company.*) The experienced troop commander must continue to fight the battle, not some beardless SWO who may have learned the technical secrets of this new lord of the battlefield. The authors drive home in a highly convincing manner the vital necessity for small-unit commanders to possess a basic understanding of the weapon, its effects, and capabilities and limitations, and its influence on battle tactics.

In effect, this is a handbook on nuclear tactics for the combat leader. In writing it the authors explored a forest of material to select what they consider minimum knowledge essential for leaders who must employ tactical atomic weapons. They carefully avoid intricate scientific terms and the new military jargon which have sprung up. The result is an admirably clear and concise style.

Anyone who has undergone the rigors of a special weapons course well realizes the dimensions of their task. Here, finally under one cover, is the material in compact, understandable form, for those who must use it. The leader will find information on target analysis, troop safety, delivery systems (U. S. and Soviet), and offensive and defensive tactics, all discussed with great skill and clarity.

Of particular value are the chapter on protective measures, which describes the pick-and-shovel techniques of existence in a nuclear war, and that on atomic weapons effects. These two explain the basic, unchanging facts of the new warfare. The tactics and organizations described in the rest of the book will evolve with time, but these facts are constant.

Only in the chapters on tactics can one find room for critical discussion. The concept of the impact of this new weapon on the battlefield seems never to rise above the idea that it is simply a more powerful means of fire support. Through the book there is constant reference to the nuclear weapon in such terms as "another source of fire support" and "primary fire support means." The planning and tactical employment of the weapon recommended seems too much like the methods currently in use for conventional artillery, although of course on a wider scale.

The discussion of the defense, in particular, is guilty of this limited view. A detailed discussion of a defensive position includes only one or two general remarks on the employment of the weapon to complement troop dispositions. The atomic weapon is another means of fire support, and as such is considered after all the troop positions have been planned. The atomic fires are not integrated into the scheme of defense; they are *added* to it. This smacks too much of new wine in old bottles, like the pre-World War II leaders who could visualize the tank only as a piece of mobile artillery.

Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books may appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service.

THE ANCIENT MARINERS. By Lionel Casson. The Macmillan Company, 1959. 286 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.95. Seafarers and sea fighters of the Mediterranean from ancient times to about A.D. 600: Egyptians, Minoans, Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans.

THE FORSAKEN ARMY. By Heinrich Gerlach. Harper & Brothers, 1959. 384 Pages; $3.95. A novel of the battle of Stalingrad. Gerlach was a survivor of Soviet captivity. His book, an immediate best seller in Germany, is being published in seven other countries.

GRAY GHOSTS OF THE CONFEDERACY. By Richard S. Brownlee. Louisiana State University Press, 1958. 274 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $4.95. Operations of guerrillas in Missouri, Kansas and Texas, and Union efforts to suppress them: Bloody Bill Anderson, Quantrill, the James Brothers, the Younger brothers and others, who for four years raised hell with no quarter on either side.

THE HUNTERS AND THE HUNTED. By Jochen Brennecke. W. W. Norton & Company, 1959. 320 Pages; Illustrated; $3.95. A dramatic account of the U-boats in WWII: their most celebrated commanders, their triumphs and terrors, their heroes and final defeat.

MASSACRES OF THE MOUNTAINS. By J. P. Dunn, Jr. Herman & Stephens, 1958. 669 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.95. First published in 1886, this source book of the Indian Wars of the Far West covers 60 years of merciless bloody conflict. Chronicles the difficulties behind the battles.

MOSBY'S WAR REMINISCENCES. By Col. John S. Mosby. Pageant Book Company, 1958. 264 Pages; $3.95. Not an autobiography, but lectures by the celebrated irregular leader, delivered before he wrote his memoirs. They describe some of Stuart's cavalry campaigns.

NEWMAN'S EUROPEAN TRAVEL GUIDE. By Harold Newman. Harper & Brothers, 1958. 497 Pages; Maps; Index; $4.95. First published in 1950, this has been fully revised. A leading guide to all 15 countries of western Europe, with new chapters on Greece and Turkey. Hotels, restaurants, shops, sights, country places, large tourist centers, currency conversions, and other useful data for the serviceman.

NO LEAVE FOR THE CAPTAIN. By Gerhard Rasmussen. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959. 154 Pages; $3.00. Based on an episode by Sir Winston Churchill, this war novel has been published in many countries, and won the Danish Grand Prix. It concerns the wartime role of mine-disposal units.

SAY IT IN RUSSIAN. By N. C. Stepanoff. Dover Publications, 1958. 175 Pages; Paper; $.75. Revised edition of a pocket manual that tells in sound-writing how to carry on conversations relating to travel, communications, hotels and restaurants, amusements, stores, banks, sightseeing, and other phases of everyday life.

SLEDGE PATROL. By David Howarth. Ballantine Books, 1958. 160 Pages; Maps; Paper, $.35. The epic ordeal of seven men left to fight a German invasion of Greenland, at a desolate spot 600 miles beyond the Arctic Circle.

THEY FOUGHT ALONE. By Maurice Buckmaster. W. W. Norton & Company, 1959. 256 Pages; Maps; $3.95. General Eisenhower said the work of British agents in France "shortened the war . . . by nine months." Colonel Buckmaster, who headed them, tells how he recruited, screened and trained 480 behind-the-lines agents, and the planning that made their operations effective.

UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMANAC. By Lee E. Sharff. P.O. Box 400, Washington, D. C., 1959. 130 Pages; Paper, $1.00. Facts every serviceman should know: dependents medical benefits, class Q allotments, insurance, dependency and idemnity compensation, veteran benefits, veteran preference, federal and state income taxes, social security, retirement, the Reserve forces, and many other subjects.

Although the discussion of offensive tactics is sounder, the charts still look familiar, too much like Infantry School problems back in the days of the triangular division and the brown shoe. Under the thin crust of new terms one doesn't get. the feeling that much has changed, really, other than perhaps the size of the division's sector or a greater stress on the use of the axis of advance.

In their chapter which they call "Crystal Ball Gazing," the authors present a striking picture of their conception of an atomic war of the more distant future, a war completely dominated by this weapon. They foresee an age of atomic plenty, fractional yield weapons, and everybody on wheels or wings. Their war, it seems, is little concerned with tactics, involving only a mammoth duel between atomic weapons and a thousand independent platoon actions, because no one dares mass a force larger than that.

Does not the answer lie somewhere between these two rather extreme views? The atomic weapon cannot be relegated to the position of a super 105, nor can it be looked upon as the only weapon on the battlefield. It is one of many, albeit the most deadly. Our problem is to integrate this stranger into the scheme of battle, so that its effects can be used not "in addition to" or "instead of" the other means of battle, but "in concert with" them, if you will.

Of course, any discussion of nuclear tactics to an extent must be conjectural. The subject is a broad one, and must of necessity remain so until the weapon is tested by the stern realities of the battlefield. Colonels Mataxis and Goldberg have done us a great service by placing the issues so clearly and provokingly that we are compelled to think about them.

Their most valuable and lasting contribution, however, remains the collection into a succinct, understandable form of that information on nuclear warfare which must now become as much a part of the basic combat knowledge of the battle leader as are the range of the M1, the strength of Company A, and the doughboy's rate of march. That places their book at the top of the list of military reading.

Galahad's Men

THE MARAUDERS
By Charlton Ogburn, Jr.
Harper & Brothers, 1959
307 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $4.50

Reviewed by
RILEY SUNDERLAND, *who with Charles F. Romanus wrote the Army's official three-volume history of the China-Burma-India Theater.*

One evening in September 1943, Lieutenant Charlton Ogburn, Jr., Signal Corps, was standing in a chow line, deep in the Mississippi woods. Georgia-born, Ogburn was morosely discovering that even in the Deep South woods are chill and damp in the nighttime. Brooding over this, he grumbled that he would prefer to do his fighting in a warm climate. His neighbor, an AG, knew of a TWX asking for volunteers who wanted to do just that. Ogburn realized that the Army rarely has to seek volunteers for good details, but the weatherman was against him. Two more cold nights, and he had had enough. He volunteered, to find that Burma was the place, the second Burma campaign the occasion, and now he tells of it in a very good book.

Ogburn has written a history of Merrill's Marauders (the 5307th Composite Unit, or Galahad Force), hanging the beads of detail on the thread of personal experience so that the reader is carried along from the first concept, through organization and activation, then training, and on into combat. He was careful not to rely on memory alone, but checked

Army and personal records with painstaking care and cool objectivity. This gives his story an accuracy too often lacking in memoirs prepared long after the event.

Of equal importance with his accuracy is that Ogburn never forgets he is writing about *men*, be they American, Chinese, British, or Japanese. He sees them as living, struggling, fearful, hoping, tired, frightened human beings. So we can see them too: the red-haired, gangling McElmurray with his cigar and pearl-handled revolver; Logan Weston, who could turn in a moment from the skilled command of an I&R platoon to the comfort of a dying soldier; Evan Darlington, who incarnated the British *raj* to the Kachins; and Charles Hunter and Frank Merrill as they sought to hold the unit together while disease, fatigue, and disappointment tore it apart.

Ogburn is just as sure at handling men in a group, so that as we read we see the sweaty, dirty column clambering up the muddy trail, the water gleaming on the leaves, the mules' shining sides, and then we hear the banging of the Nambu as it cuts off the low-pitched mutter of men's voices.

This is very different from the two-dimensional cardboard figures too often presented to the public as soldiers, described to the reader as all good or all bad, with the author acting as puppet-master. In this book the characters live, and the reader feels he shares their experiences. Though Ogburn describes blunders and stupidities in the handling of a regiment, one never feels he is sitting in judgment but rather that he is simply stating facts with compassion and accuracy.

Ogburn sets his stage by sketching the origins and mission of the CBI Theater, with attention to the clash of policies and personalities, and gives a very good account of the origin of the Long Range Penetration Groups for warfare deep behind hostile lines. From this he moves to the formation and training of the 5307th. The Unit was formed by getting volunteers from many other regiments and theaters (did OPD fear a public reaction if it ordered a complete jungle-trained regiment to a theater where there were so many British and Chinese soldiers?) with all that involved of personality and shakedown problems.

Once in India, the 5307th found that neither British nor Americans had clear-cut responsibility for it. It was an orphan, and often suffered from the rigidities of administrative practice.

Stilwell had tried to envelop and destroy the Japanese 18th Division at one blow, thus tearing open the way for a swift crossing of Burma to China. His Chinese simply would not move fast enough, so he sought and obtained the 5307th, which he then used for a series of deep envelopments behind the Japanese right (north) flank. These were made on air supply, in jungled mountains, where malaria and dysentery were endemic. Since the 5307th was designed for one mission, three months long, it had no replacement flow, so disease took a steady toll, as did the enemy. Despite this, the 5307th broke the stalemate in North Burma.

Then the Japanese in turn threatened Stilwell's flank, and Merrill's Marauders (as they now were called) were used to block the Japanese. This they did, at the cost of a siege and relief.

Nhpum Ga is a saddle of high ground, squarely across the trail the Japanese sought to use, and commanding the water lines to each side. There the 5307th's 2d Battalion formed a perimeter perhaps 400 yards long by 200-odd feet wide. The Japanese quickly took the local water hole. Dead horses and mules, dead Americans and Japanese, lay where they fell on the hard, gravelly dirt. Some foul liquid was obtained from pot holes, and 500 gallons were flown in toward the end of the siege, but thirst was as real a foe as the Japanese. The 3d Battalion was at hand, and tried to lift the siege, while the 1st Battalion moved across the grain of the country to help drive out the enemy. On Easter Sunday the siege was lifted, but the cutting edge was gone from the 5307th.

Stilwell chose to try one more stroke: a move across the Kumon Range at Myitkyina by the 5307th plus four battalions of Chinese, and now began to pay the price inherent in the 5307th's having been designed as a wasting asset. What now sustained the men was their belief that after this last march they would be relieved. To cross the range in the early days of the monsoon was a feat in itself. But it was done, and the Marauders overran the airstrip at Myitkyina with one rush.

Then the unit and with it the operation began to fall apart. Merrill and Hunter had planned to fly in food, ammunition, and fresh infantry; but the AAF's General Stratemeyer intervened to fly in AAA troops. Chinese sent to take the town of Myitkyina became confused and fought among themselves. The Japanese reorganized, reinforced, and made a fight of it. Meanwhile, the Marauders' evacuation rate soared. With real fear that the Japanese in their turn might overrun the strip and turn the coup into a debacle, evacuated and unfit Marauders were returned to combat. In these depressing episodes, which Ogburn tells with candor, passed the hope for a speedy end of the North Burma campaign.

The book has a wealth of professional interest. The self-contained, mobile, air-supplied Marauder combat team, ready to fight in any quarter of the compass, is very like the battle group in atomic war. How could its logistical support have been improved? Was OPD correct in asking for volunteers to fill an improvised unit, or would a regiment from SWPA or the Caribbean have offered fewer command problems? Ogburn's text suggests many such absorbing problems.

To sum up, this is a fine book. Good writing, patient craftsmanship, and warm humanity put it among the best of its class; indeed, it may become a classic.

No Casual Visitor

THE FACE OF WAR
By Martha Gellhorn
Simon & Schuster, 1959
244 Pages; $3.75

Reviewed by
MAJOR CHARLES B. MACDONALD, USAR,
who commanded a company in the 2d Infantry Division in ETO.

It is becoming the fashion among former war correspondents to dust off wartime dispatches. The first notable example, by John Steinbeck [ARMY, January 1959], was something short of rewarding. It can be reported that the latest, by Miss Gellhorn, is considerably more successful.

Miss Gellhorn was no casual visitor to war. As illustrated by this collection of 21 dispatches, she lived with cannon in Spain, Finland, China, and subsequently on almost every major front of World War II. She reported war, its backwash, and its aftermath, with keenness and perception.

Through much of World War II, Miss Gellhorn ran into difficulty with U. S. authorities who believed that woman's place was somewhere other than the front. But she did much to overcome the obstacle by concentrating on front-line units of other nationalities. She includes two examples here: one an account of French soldiers in Italy, the other a particularly sensitive story of Polish troops in Italy fighting their way back to a Russian-dominated homeland.

But for all her knowledge of what went on where the rifles were firing, Miss Gellhorn is at her best in describing the backwash of war and war's aftermath. Her "Slow Boat to War" is a *tour-de-force*, a story of assorted nationalities moving by trans-Atlantic tanker from the gayety of the New York World's Fair to the gloom of mine-infested Channel waters. As in another story where she recounts her experiences on a night-fighter mission, nothing much actually happens; but, as sometimes in war itself, you wish something would happen in order to break the overpowering suspense.

In "Paris Revisited," the correspondent looks behind the false, made-up face of the French capital for an agonizing glance at the varied horrors practiced by the Gestapo in the cellars and sewers of the

city. Her "Dachau," brief, underwritten, still stands as one of the most powerful commentaries on that glaring example of man's inhumanity to man.

Miss Gellhorn resurrects her dispatches, she tells us in a foreword, as one weak "cricket's chirp" against war in a nuclear age. It is here, unfortunately, that the logic of her writing is not sustained.

"The world's leaders," she writes, "seem strangely engaged in private feuds. . . . Their talk sounds as if they believed nuclear war to be a thing that can be won or lost."

"Nothing that concerns us in our brief moment of history," she continues, "gives us the right to stop time, to blot out the future."

Miss Gellhorn forgets that the choice is not necessarily ours.

"If we make or allow war—" she says.

But she forgets that to allow or disallow war is not within the province of this nation alone, or even of its allies.

Miss Gellhorn shies from stating the alternative, which is abject surrender.

It will take more than her admittedly excellent book to convince many of us that the kind of courage and fortitude she wrote about in her dispatches is out of date, even in a nuclear age.

Father of U. S. Artillery

HENRY KNOX: GENERAL WASHINGTON'S GENERAL
By Col. North Callahan
Rinehart & Company, 1958
404 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY, *retired, distinguished Army historian, all of whose service was in the Field Artillery.*

It was about time that someone resurrected Henry Knox: self-taught soldier, sound administrator and loyal American. Portly, buoyant and faithful, Knox was indeed George Washington's wheelhorse through the dark years of the American Revolution. He fathered the artillery of the Continental Army. Later, when the Thirteen Colonies blossomed into a nation, he laid the framework for the U. S. Army, and he built the Nation's navy. Yet for years Henry Knox has been America's forgotten man.

Colonel Callahan has corrected this situation. From the pages of his book emerges a vibrant, sympathetic portrait of one of the most magnificent figures of our nation's early days.

Knox would appear to have been in some respects a character out of the future Dickens; a Mr. Pickwick endowed with military acumen and a solid flair for leadership. The somewhat rambling style of Colonel Callahan, with its incessant digressions into collateral issues adds—wittingly or not—an element of lavender and old lace which enhances the charm of his book.

Not that there is anything comical or of tongue-in-cheek in the writing; perish the thought. The high spots of Knox's career are brought out in stark relief.

We see the young Knox, fresh from his Boston bookshop and his avid study of the military profession, thrown by George Washington into a task which might well have staggered any man; transporting Fort Ticonderoga's captured cannon across country to Boston in the dead of winter.

How Knox met his problem and how he solved it; the dogged determination with which he dragged the ponderous ordnance from Lake George to Albany and then in a straight line across the wilderness of the Berkshires to Dorchester Heights; these things are told in epic style.

Detailed, also, is Knox's incessant preoccupation with transforming the artillery of the Continental Army into an arm of potent precision in those early days; a precision, be it said, that has persisted through all our wars.

Sage and sound were the staff recommendations of Knox to Washington throughout the war. His words, and his deeds also, made sufficient impact on the American military mind to ensure that to this day the artillery commander still stands in relation to his superior as a combination of staff officer and troop leader.

Knox's contribution in the early days of the Republic was enormous in both political and military fields. Of special interest, but little known, it would appear, is the fact that as President Washington's Secretary of War, Knox was charged with building our Navy.

He insisted, in 1794, that our first six frigates should be so built as to "combine such qualities of strength, durability, swiftness and force as to make them equal, if not superior, to any European ones."

How right he was is told in the annals of the U. S. Navy and the records of these ships. USS *Constitution*, "Old Ironsides" of War of 1812 fame, was the first of these frigates to slip down the ways.

And what of Henry Knox the man? Out of his enormous research Colonel Callahan gives us a thoroughly heartwarming picture of a loving husband and generous father; a man whose heart ruled his pocketbook; a gourmet and a homebuilder. When Henry Knox died in his palatial home of Montpelier, up in Maine —where he lived his last days as a "nabob" —the United States lost one of its truly great men.

Trite though the remark may seem, this reviewer insists that every American soldier, sailor and airman should read this book. So too should every civilian.

ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

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The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

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REPORT FROM AUSA CP

Meeting of Council of Trustees. The Council of Trustees held a regular quarterly meeting on 20 March. Among the significant actions taken were:

Adopted a new procedure for handling Resolutions at the Annual Meeting, removing the 1958 requirement that Resolutions must be approved by the Council of Trustees before being binding on the Association.

Approved charters for nine new chapters and one new AUSA ROTC Company.

Revoked charters for three chapters and one AUSA ROTC Company.

Decided not to establish priorities for AUSA action on 1958 Resolutions.

Took action asking Congress to establish a floor of 900,000 officers and men under the Active Army for the next two fiscal years.

Future plans, programs and problem areas in Army mobility and communications came under intensive study at AUSA's Mobility and Communications Symposium held at Fort Bragg, N. C., during 1-3 April. Some 465 top Army and industry leaders gathered at Bragg to enjoy the outstanding Southern hospitality of Major General Robert F. Sink and the members of his XVIII Airborne Corps. The fast-moving program included presentations by top Department of the Army and CONARC leaders, panel discussions, and an outstanding air-and-ground demonstration put on by the officers and men of the 82d Airborne Division.

WALTER L. WEIBLE
Lt. Gen., USA, Retd.
Executive Vice President

CHAPTERS

ALAMO CHAPTER—Lt. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr., Commanding General of the Fourth U. S. Army, was principal speaker at a meeting on 24 March, at which new officers were elected. General Meloy spoke of AUSA accomplishments and the need for continuing support of the Association.

AUGUSTA AREA CHAPTER—A well-attended meeting on 19 February elected new officers. Among those participating were Mayor Millard Beckum, of Augusta; Brig. Gen. Howard M. Hobson, CG of the Provost Marshal General Center; and Col. Paul T. Snowden, CO of Fort Gordon.

THE BOGARDUS S. CAIRNS CHAPTER—Combined meeting of Executive Committee and Advisory Board of Directors planned for 1959 schedule of general membership meetings.

BORDER LEGION CHAPTER—March meeting presented awards to Lt. David C. Martin and First Sgt. Frank S. Zlobec for membership activity in Company A, 11th Armored Cavalry.

COLUMBUS-PHENIX CITY-FORT BENNING CHAPTER—Board of Directors meeting on 25 February emphasized committee work to perform

OAKLAND, CALIF. Models of the Army's air-defense missiles are exhibited at the quarterly luncheon of East Bay Chapter in February. Left to right: Arthur Ames, President; Maj. Jerry Barnes, program chairman; Maj. Gen. E. J. McGaw, principal speaker; Maj. Gen. William F. Dean. (Photo courtesy Oakland Tribune)

BLACKSBURG, VA. Three cadets among the party from VPI Company that visited the home of the USA Transportation at Fort Eustis during February. Left to right: Cadet Capt. Albert B. Childrey, Company Commander; Cadet Cpl. John T. B. Strode; Cadet James S. Kennan.

FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII. Newly elected officers of Hawaii Chapter, left to right: CWO L. F. Ramsey, Treasurer; Col. John Campbell, Second Vice President; Col. Percy H. Johnston, President; Ernest Albrecht, First Vice President; Col. George Hirsch, Third Vice President. Capt. W. J. Dunn was elected Secretary.

chapter functions. The Chapter has been most active in the legislative field, pressing for AUSA objectives in Congress.

EAST BAY CHAPTER—Board of Directors meeting on 18 March stressed committee activities, and planned for future general membership meetings. Chapter is active in bringing AUSA goals to attention of legislators.

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING CHAPTER—Chapter's campaign of widespread public education on Army problems has resulted in much publicity, widespread interest by legislators, and favorable comment by local newsmen.

HAWAII CHAPTER—Col. H. G. Haskell (a former member of the Executive Council of AUSA) spoke to the Chapter on 19 March on "The Implications of the Lodge Act upon the Army." A film, "Communist Propaganda," was shown. The Chapter elected new officers at this meeting.

HENRY LEAVENWORTH CHAPTER—Chapter presented a plaque to Mr. Dewey H. Miner, teacher in the Kansas City public schools, for his outstanding contribution to the promotion of scientific education. Chapter is using its awards program to assist both the Chapter and national defense, with publicity an important by-product.

KELLEY BARRACKS CHAPTER—"Lebanon—and the Army's Role in Limited War," was topic of Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams as principal speaker at the February meeting. The talk was followed by a question-and-answer session. General Adams had been commander of American Land Forces in Lebanon, and received the DSM for his efforts in this assignment just a few hours before attending the Chapter meeting.

MID-PALATINATE CHAPTER—Meeting on 13 March was followed by two missile films, courtesy of the 32d Artillery Brigade.

MOUNTAINEER CHAPTER—Charter meeting held on 1 April, with Maj. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker, CG, XX Corps, making principal address. Col. Arthur Symons, Secretary of AUSA, presented charter. More than 150 members, with a fair sprinkling of wives, attended cocktail party, dinner and presentation. General Zwicker's topic was the effect of the 1960 budget on the effectiveness of the Army.

NEBRASKA CHAPTER—Lt. Col. Paul Hickman, a member of the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, addressed the Chapter on 16 February on "Outer Space." New officers were elected at this meeting. The Chapter Council held meetings on 30 January and 27 February to discuss implementation of AUSA objectives.

NORTHERN DELAWARE CHAPTER—Maj. Gen. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, National President of AUSA, spoke to the Chapter on 5 February on the international situation and the need for a strong Army to back up our diplomacy, both subjects that ambassador-soldier Biddle is eminently qualified to cover. General Biddle was particularly pleased with the lively spirit of the Chapter.

POCONO MOUNTAINS CHAPTER—National Guard Armory, Kingston, Pa., was the scene of the 27 February meeting, at which Mr. Millard West, Assistant to the Comptroller, Signal Corps, spoke on the responsibilities of the Office of the Comptroller. An Executive Committee was formed at this meeting. The Col. L. A. Watres Armory, in Scranton, was the setting for a meeting on 20 March, at which the principal speaker was Maj. Gen. Henry Fluck, CG, 28th Division, who spoke on the place of all Army components in national defense planning, and decried the cuts in Army strength that have been planned. The Chapter is engaged in a dynamic program of building membership and influence in the local area.

POITIERS CHAPTER—Maj. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill, CG, Communications Zone, Europe, addressed the first formal meeting of Poitiers Chapter, and presented the charter to the Chapter. General O'Neill spoke on "The Swiss Army," and paid tribute to that country's determination to maintain her independence.

RYUKYUS CHAPTER—Annual Meeting, held on 19 March at Machinato NCO Club, elected new officers. Maj. Gen. R. L. Vittrup spoke on "The Role of the Army in Implementing U. S. Foreign Policy"; the 29th Army Band entertained with orchestra and choral music. The Soldiers of the Month for November and December were special guests.

SOUTHWEST OKLAHOMA CHAPTER—Brig. Gen. Philip C. Wehle, Assistant Commandant, A&GM School, spoke to the chapter on AUSA

Objectives at 12 March meeting. Principal speaker of the evening was Mr. Otis Spears, Chief, Technical Analysis Division of the School, who spoke on the scientific benefits of earth satellite experiments, and mentioned the contribution of the tracking station at Fort Sill.

3D ARMORED DIVISION CHAPTER (formerly Marne Chapter)—Chapter added 440 new members from Combat Command A in March; this was considerable help in building to the total of 1,114 members. One unit, 1st Cavalry, has 100 per cent officer and 75 per cent NCO membership.

3D INFANTRY DIVISION CHAPTER—January meeting revised by-laws, including change of name to above.

VERDUN CHAPTER—Mr. Arshad-uz-Zaman, press attaché of the Pakistan Embassy in Paris, spoke to the Chapter in March on his native country and its position in the international scene; films were shown also.

WILLIAM PENN CHAPTER—New officers installed on 6 March include majority from U. S. Army Signal Supply Agency, signalling another phase in the Chapter's widening area of influence from its start at Frankford Arsenal.

ROTC COMPANIES

CHIEFTAIN COMPANY, Seattle University—Organized with 58 charter members in March.

CITADEL COMPANY—Cadets Baker and Eady handled the program for the 19 February meeting, with the Battle of Chancellorsville as the subject. Baker presented the background, organization and tactical maneuvers of Hooker's Army of the Potomac; Eady did the same for Lee's army. The Company is operating a Summer Camp Orientation, and a continuing study of famous battles and their relation to the Principles of War.

COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY COMPANY—Capt. Fred F. Hipley, Assistant PMST, spoke on "Leadership Problems in Combat" at March meeting, based on his experiences in Korea. Company chose Miss Lorene E. Tyler as Company representative in the Annual Military Ball Queen contest.

DAKOTA COMPANY, North Dakota Agricultural College—Capt. Douglas Christensen spoke to February meeting on his experiences in Turkey; Company has accepted responsibility for ROTC display at All College Festival.

DICKINSON COLLEGE COMPANY—Col. Jack Wagstaff, a member of the Army War College faculty, spoke to the Company on "The Threat of Communism" at meeting on 11 March. Faculty members and other guests were present.

EDMUND R. WALKER COMPANY, University of Connecticut—March meeting heard Maj. Christo Zoukis speak on Special Forces, and viewed film. Business portion of meeting was devoted to election of officers and plans for future events, including joint "Coffee" with Scabbard and Blade and Arnold Air Society on Military Day, 21 May.

FARRIS-WARE COMPANY, Prairie View A&M College—February meeting was built around Explorer I film, with additional narration by the PMST, Lt. Col. Thomas H. Wright. Company Cadet-of-the-Month Board announced selection of Cadet Sgt. Willie D. Green for February. Company is also active in Cadet Remedial Training Program for MSII cadets.

FLORIDA SOUTHERN COLLEGE COMPANY—January meeting was strictly business, with election of officers and plans for future participation. February meeting continued planning, and saw film "History of the Korean War."

IDAHO STATE COLLEGE COMPANY—Feature of February meeting was talk by Maj. Paul Jones, ARNG, CO, 2d Battalion, 116th Armored Cavalry Regiment, on the role of the National Guard. Prof. A. V. S. Pulling, member of College faculty and noted conservationist, addressed meeting on 26 March on development and employment of military small arms; a demonstration accompanied the talk, which was illustrated with many weapons from the speaker's collection.

URBANA, ILL. Col. T. J. Ryan, PIO, Sixth Army (center) spoke on U. S. capabilities in limited and unlimited warfare at second annual AUSA banquet at Illini Company. Others are, left to right, Cadet Maj. Toby Metzer and Cadet 1st Lt. Richard J. Bartsch. At front is Kathy Parker, Army ROTC Sponsor. (Gerald D. Lewy photo)

FORT SILL, OKLA. Brig. Gen. Philip C. Wehle, Assistant Commandant, A&M School, discusses objectives of AUSA at meeting of Southwest Oklahoma Chapter in Snow Hall Auditorium on 12 March.

FORT CARSON, COLO. Col. Jasper Ackerman, President of Pikes Peak Chapter, cuts the cake for five sergeants of 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 68th Armor, after presenting their unit with three out of five prizes in AUSA membership contest. Others are, left to right: MSgt. John L. Burns, MSgt. J. E. Chapman, MSgt. Raymond Edwards, MSgt. Raymond Wood, MSgt. Glenn Betts, Jr.

IDAHO STATE COLLEGE. Major Paul H. Jones, CO, 2d Battalion, 116th Armored Cavalry, Idaho NG, speaks on the role of the National Guard. Others at head table are, left to right: Capt. F. A. Hunter, Advisor; Cadet 1st Lt. Corwin Lott; Cadet Capt. Harvey I. Buckles; Cadet 2d Lt. Brent Holmes; Cadet First Sgt. John Duff.

PHILADELPHIA, PA. Newly elected officers of William Penn Chapter. Left to right: Arthur H. Haak, member of Board of Directors; Isidore T. Shapiro, First Vice President; Col. Elmer L. Littell, CO, USASSA; Theodore Kyne, member of Board of Directors; Howard E. Moore, Treasurer.

FORT SHERIDAN, ILL. Recently elected officers of Fort Sheridan Chapter. Left to right: Donald McKay, Treasurer; Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Teace, President; Capt. Brad E. West, Vice President; Major Dale E. Williams, Secretary.

POITIERS, FRANCE. Key figures at charter meeting of Poitiers Chapter. Left to right: Brig. Gen. Richard J. Meyer, CG, Base Section, ComZ; Maj. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill, CG, ComZ, Europe; Col. Fielder P. Greer, President; Lt. Col. Paul J. Leahy, Vice President.

JOHN CARROLL UNIVERSITY COMPANY—Company enrolled 101 new members in February; a record exceeded only by the same Company the previous year. Tour of New Orleans Army Terminal and Port of New Orleans was principal activity of the month. Program portion of March meeting was devoted to color slides of Korea and Japan, shown by Dr. Carver of the Sociology Department.

KANSAS UNIVERSITY COMPANY—Charter meeting on 26 February, was host to members of the Military Department. Col. R. J. Hanchin, PMST, spoke on AUSA and its relation to the soldier and to the Army.

LASALLE ROTC COMPANY, LaSalle Military Academy—Mr. William H. Walters, President of the United States Printing and Lithographing Company and the United States Playing Card Company, addressed the March meeting on the printing industry, with special reference to job opportunities. The meeting was followed by refreshments.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY COMPANY, Chicago, Illninois—March meeting elected new officers, and made arrangements for AUSA participation in coming campus events.

MAD ANTHONY WAYNE COMPANY, University of Toledo—February meeting discussed methods of improving ROTC recruiting, and came up with solid recommendations for consideration by the Military Department. Two films, "Turkey—The Land in Between," and "Rugged Rangers," were shown.

MOCCASIN COMPANY, University of Chattanooga—Moccasin Company is engaged in an active program to assist other institutions in forming AUSA Companies. Lt. Col. Dale M. Engstrom, Senior Adviser to Chattanooga Reserve units, spoke at dinner meeting in March about the various Reserve programs.

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY ROTC COMPANY—February meeting featured talks by Cadets William McCullough and Richard Benson on AUSA's regional organization; new officers were elected. Company will assist in indoctrinating sophomore cadets into advantages of taking advanced ROTC.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS COMPANY—Company held dinner on 13 February to honor new members accepted on 6 February. Organization is continuing its assistance to the Military Department, including school for cadet NCOs, seminars, calisthenics "toughening" program preparatory to summer camp, providing instructors on call for freshmen cadets, and related activities.

ROBERT E. SYLVEST COMPANY, Northwestern State College of Louisiana—March meeting elected officers, viewed film "Attack in the Pacific."

SIOUX COMPANY, University of North Dakota—March meeting, preparatory to the Military Ball, was devoted to planning for that affair.

SOONER COMPANY, University of Oklahoma—Capt. A. F. Gerkin, USN, Professor of Naval Science at University of Oklahoma, spoke on "Naval Operations in Support of Army Ground Operations" at the 12 March meeting.

TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY COMPANY—Company sponsored basketball tournament for city high school ROTC units in February. Officers elected on 24 March. Company has been getting good publicity in campus and Fort Worth newspapers.

V. RAYMOND EDMAN COMPANY, Wheaton College—Mr. David Belman, former officer in the British Army, addressed meeting on 15 March on the life of the British soldier. Company sponsored, on 12 March, a campus-wide lecture by Dr. Fred G. Schwarz on Communism, attended by several hundred students.

VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE COMPANY—Company combined with Scabbard and Blade, and Arnold Air Society, to stage Military Weekend including Military Ball, which was held on 7 March. Ball attendance was about 800 couples.

WASHINGTON & JEFFERSON COLLEGE COMPANY—Lt. Andrew N. Farley, 1956 W&J graduate, spoke to the Company on 18 March on his experiences in the Army as a recent ROTC-commissioned officer, following election of new officers for the Company.

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6. Full use of the Army's proved capabilities in land-based surface-to-air defense systems.
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